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Abstract 
 
Previous research has noted that members of research ethics committees are 
unclear about the extent of their roles.  In this study, research amongst members of 
independent ethics committees (IECs) about how the ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ roles are 
understood and operationalized offers an explanation for this lack of clarity. 
 
IECs were selected for study because they have only addressed one type of 
research (Phase 1 ‘healthy volunteer’ studies) and this limited remit suggested that it 
would be in such committees that the member roles would have become most 
pronounced.    
 
Drawing on findings from the sociology of professions and employing a 
phenomenological approach to understanding, 20 semi-structured interviews with 
both expert and lay members of these committees revealed that a number of 
members were not only unclear about the roles, but unclear too whether they, or 
certain of their colleagues, were in which membership category.  Notwithstanding 
this fact, and paradoxically, the ‘expert’ designation was seen as granting its 
members a privileged position on the committees.  The expert member was seen to 
be either a medically qualified member or one tightly associated with the medical 
model.  Such a repository of expertise being with the medical model privileges this 
model in ethics review such that other matters formally to be scrutinized by ethics 
committees become marginalised.   
 
Participant safety was the prime concern of the ethics review for IEC members.  This 
relegated other matters including the adequacy of the insurance arrangements, the 
 
 
readability of the consent forms, the fairness of the inclusion criteria, and so forth, 
into areas of lesser concern.  That this occurs though when the science, the safety 
and the methodology of the trials are already – separately - subject to an 
independent analysis by a body of experts, whose statutory role is to concern itself 
with these issues such that no trial may occur without their sanction, is of 
significance.  IEC members were cognizant of this duplication of role but unable to 
resolve it.  The situation could be accounted for as due to capture by the medical 
model and a cognitive dissonant process. 
 
Members’ training and education were found to have been neglected because under 
the medical professions’ gaze no other type of knowledge was considered necessary 
in ethics review.   The study revealed that the medical profession’s dominance of 
such committees accounts for the members’ role uncertainty and as such allies itself 
to Freidson’s theory of professional dominance.  If such a concept has been thought 
to be an obsolete one, this study suggests such a notion of the status of the theory is 
premature.  The medical model’s status is implicitly accepted such that nothing else 
need be considered.   
 
The research calls for further studies to corroborate such findings in other research 
ethics settings and for a debate about what society wants its ethics committees to 
focus upon in their review. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This research reports the perspectives of members of independent 
ethics committees (IECs) about the expert and lay members’ roles.  IECs 
are a sub-type of research ethics committees (RECs), and the lay 
members’ role (in particular) on RECs has been noted to be poorly 
understood (e.g. Dyer, 2004).  This research helps us to better 
understand it.  The research also reveals several other aspects of IECs, 
and by extension RECs, which have not been clear before and which will 
be of interest to scholars of such committees. 
 
RECs are notoriously difficult to access for those wishing to subject 
them to research (De Vries, 2004), and IECs have been particularly 
impenetrable because of a combination of their low profile (McHale, 2004) 
and the commercial sensitivity that surrounds the studies they review 
(Beyleveld and Sethe, 2008).  This study, by its very discussion of IECs 
and their practices thus breaks new ground.  The research reveals not 
only the perspectives of members of IECs about the member roles on 
such committees, but reveals the members’ approach to ethics codes, 
how they address the insurance arrangements concerning the studies 
which they review, and their involvement in assessing the clarity by which 
the participant information sheets are expressed.  The research also 
explains how members were recruited and it discusses the training 
members have had.  Important issues also emerge concerning the 
medical dominance of the committees and the concomitant implications 
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this has had for both appraising the science and ethics of the research 
which the committees are required to consider. 
 
The research engaged in was qualitative, and as typical of such 
research, the direction of the research needed to accommodate emergent 
issues and themes.  One particular issue that arose with more frequency 
than initially envisaged concerned the extent to which an ethics committee 
(EC) should review the science of the research.  Another body already 
had the specific task of conducting a scientific review, having been 
constituted with that task in mind.    
 
A key question for research ethics then concerns the extent to 
which it is the function of a REC to review the scientific quality of the 
proposals put to them given that they are not explicitly constituted with 
such a task.  Whilst such a question has already been answered in the 
governance arrangements of NHS RECs and in their standard operating 
procedures, it nevertheless proved to be a fundamental issue for the work 
reported here.  The issue appears repeatedly as the study progresses, 
and even where it does not make an explicit appearance it is always in the 
background.   
 
An associated question, asking why there are ‘expert’ members on 
RECs if it is not for such committees to appraise the science underpinning 
the research, is nearer to the original focus of the work that follows, and 
the two questions run in parallel throughout the study.  But such questions 
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as posed are too pointed and as such are likely to by-pass the real 
dynamics of the committees.  The question to be asked and understood – 
the research question here – is one that additionally provides a rare 
glimpse into the workings of committees which have largely escaped 
scholarly observation, yet whose operations and procedures have been 
key determinants in authorising research involving human subjects. 
 
The main question this research sets out to answer is 
epistemological (although it is not one which is difficult to conceptualise) 
and may be put simply as ‘how do members of research ethics 
committees conceive the ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ roles on their committees?’  No 
satisfactory account for this has been obtained to date despite several 
researchers (with Dyer (2004) being amongst the most prominent) noting 
members’ lack of clarity about their role.  An explanation for this lack of 
clarity has proved elusive.  Answering this ostensibly simple question 
should thus potentially open up an important understanding of exactly 
what committee members are actually trying to do.  And with that 
understanding most else about such committees will be seen to pivot.   
 
Subsidiary research questions address how members respond to 
particular issues; what, if any, guidance they follow; how members relate 
matters of ethics to matters of science; how they determine the adequacy 
of insurance; and what level of training is necessary for the roles.   
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Further elaboration about the research questions is provided at the 
close of the literature review where relevant questions are teased from the 
extant literature as being of interest to the community of research ethics 
scholars.  The understanding obtained from this research is intended to 
enable a more informed debate amongst the wider society about what 
such committees are to do, and will have important implications for 
member recruitment, training and development too. 
 
Some readers may point either to legislation as suggesting that the 
committees’ tasks are their duty “to protect the rights, safety and wellbeing 
of human subjects involved in a trial” (Art. 2(k) of the Clinical Trials 
Directive), or to the statement of purpose of NHS RECs, which has been 
adopted by the National Research Ethics Service (NRES).  This states: 
“The purpose of a Research Ethics Committee in reviewing the proposed 
study is to protect the dignity, rights, safety and well-being of all actual or 
potential research participants” (Department of Health, 2001: para. 2.2; 
and see para. 3.1.1, 2011).  However, such terms - ‘rights’, ‘safety’, ‘well-
being’ and ‘dignity’ – are, as shall be demonstrated, all contested notions.  
This contestability, coupled with that the REC shares its role and 
responsibility with others, as described in the Research Governance 
Framework for Health and Social Care (Department of Health, 2005a), 
further stands to blur role clarity.  This problem is then further exacerbated 
by a lack of practical clarity in agreeing what precisely are the roles and 
                                                     
 Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 4th April 
2001 on the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the implementation of good ethical practice in the conduct of clinical 
trials on medicinal products for human use. OJ L 121, 1.5.2001, p.34 
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responsibilities of both the ‘lay’ and the ‘expert’ members of the 
committees. 
1.1 Personal interest 
 
The study focuses on human-subject research ethics review and in 
particular on REC members’ perceptions of their roles and functions.  
Such a topic may have an intrinsic appeal:  
 
“I can’t say exactly when I was captured by issues in human 
research ethics….  Whenever it was, I was struck by the unavoidable 
and seemingly irresolvable exquisite moral framework of clinical 
research: that it involves using a person as a means to someone 
else’s benefit, and does so while applying and refining what are 
among the most impressive expressions of humanity: ingeniously 
crafted scientific ideas. 
 
Nearly as soon as I acquired an appreciation for the richness of this 
framework, I was also struck by the richness of the history of 
research involving people and by how difficult it can be to identify 
circumstances that satisfy the diverse moral requirements of ethical 
research” (Moreno, 2005: 105). 
 
 
Like Moreno, I have also been intrigued by the task of 
contemplating the ethics of human subject research.  When I set out on 
the research programme that has now culminated in this dissertation I did 
not anticipate the interest in research ethics that I have developed.  I had 
been appointed as a lay member of an “independent pharmacology ethics 
committee” (despite having no pharmacological knowledge) only a matter 
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of months before enrolling on the programme.  It was the doctoral 
programme, coupled with the novelty of my new role, which gave me 
cause to think about my experiences as a committee member in a more 
detailed way than I suspect I would have done without the course’s 
influence. 
 
 The course also encouraged me to write and to get published.  
From a position of having no publication record I have now had over two 
dozen peer-reviewed papers published, most of which relate to ethics, 
and research ethics in particular.  Many of these will be referred to in this 
dissertation.  Although I did not know it at the time, these publications 
were acting increasingly like jigsaw pieces giving me a sense of working 
towards completing a larger, if, at any one time, unknown, final picture.  
New linkages continued to appear with ongoing contact with the research 
ethics community.  This dissertation itself has furnished a corner or two 
and possibly a connecting edge to the puzzle which will help me on my 
way to my project of understanding RECs. 
 
Role uncertainty was something I experienced as a new member of 
an ethics committee.  The committee did not operate as I had anticipated 
it would, and I wondered if the fault was with me.  My new colleagues did 
not seem as convinced about the roles as I expected and I could find no 
published material on the workings of the type of committee I was 
involved in: my curiosity grew. 
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1.2 Independent Ethics Committees 
 
 The ethics committee I had joined had been established by a 
pharmaceutical company in the 1980s to review the procedures proposed 
for their new drug compounds before they were first administered to 
human ‘guinea pigs’.  The Welwyn Committee was originally associated 
with Roche and each of the other committees had originally been 
established by a pharmaceutical company. 
 
 Although such committees were termed ‘independent ethics 
committees’ (IECs) they typically had their base on the property of the 
pharmaceutical company which had established them.  The Clinical Trials 
Directive of 2001 and the lead up to it caused a change in perception 
about this and greater independence was created by relocating the IEC 
meeting places to neutral venues, and empowering the IECs to review the 
protocols of any pharmaceutical company.  The IECs were no longer 
pharmaceutical company-specific. 
 
IECs were finally absorbed into the NHS REC structure at the close 
of 2011 – more will be said about this later – but not before I had 
managed to conduct my research and discern the reason why REC 
members experience role uncertainty. 
 
These points will be discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters but firstly, in order especially for those who may not be familiar 
with the workings of RECs and the key problems and issues associated 
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with them, the following chapter is intended to provide a background.  This 
helps set the scene in which the work of IECs and RECs is to be 
understood.  A literature review section then follows.  This section 
comprises two chapters, the first of these provides a sociological 
accounting of professions which will help frame the findings, and the 
second describes key published research that has been undertaken on 
the workings of RECs.  A discussion of the research methods occupies 
the subsequent chapter (chapter 5) and then there follow three findings 
chapters, the breakdown of which is intended to help the reader digest the 
material at a reasonable pace.  A discussion chapter finally advances the 
significance of the key findings of the research and indicates areas for 
further study. 
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2.  Background 
 
2.1 Response to scandal 
 
In order for research involving human subjects to proceed, there is 
a requirement that the research proposal receive a favourable opinion 
from an ethics committee.  The requirement for review arose following 
such outrages involving unethical human research practices as were 
witnessed in the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trials (Schmidt, 2006), as were 
exposed by Beecher (1959,1966), and as further revealed in the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Studies (Jones, 1993).  The National Health Service 
has required ethics approval since 1991 (Department of Health, 1991) 
where NHS patients and (until the revised version of the Governance 
Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees (GAfREC, Department of 
Health, 2011)) facilities or staffs are involved.  Although virtually all 
pharmaceutical research was also subjected to independent ethics 
scrutiny from even earlier (e.g. Curran, 1979; Laurence, 1984), there was 
no legal requirement for an ethics review of any clinical trial before the 
Clinical Trials Directive of 2001.  This was not implemented into UK law 
until 2004 (as The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004, S.I. 2004/1031). 
 
In most of the world, committees set up to review the scientific 
merit and ethical acceptability of research proposals involving human 
subjects are known as research ethics committees.  The first mention of 
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committee review in an international document was in the Tokyo revision 
of the Declaration of Helsinki (World Medical Association, 1975).  This 
followed experience in the United States, where the first federal document 
requiring committee review had been issued on 17 November 1953 and 
applied only to the Clinical Centre of the National Institutes of Health.  On 
8 February 1966, the Surgeon General of the US Public Health Service 
(USPHS) began requiring all those in receipt of USPHS grants in support 
of human subjects’ research to specify committee review: 
 
 “(1) Of the rights and welfare of the … individuals involved, (2) Of 
the appropriateness of the methods used to secure informed 
consent, and (3) Of the risks and potential medical benefits of the 
investigation.”  
 
 
Historically, the RECs’ primary focus had been on safeguarding the 
rights and welfare of the research subjects.  This is actually rather a 
vague set of instructions.  For example, it may be the case that: 
 
“we must show concern for the well-being of subjects and not ever 
let the temptations of research lead us to lower our level of concern 
from its normal, appropriate level.  But what is the normal, 
appropriate level?  What does ‘concern for well-being’ even mean?” 
(Hawkins, 2008: 34) 
 
 
Elsewhere I have argued that the meaning of the term ‘welfare’ in 
the UK’s Health and Safety etc. Act of 1974 is in fact still unclear and this 
despite employers having had a legal responsibility to safeguard the 
welfare of their employees for approaching four decades (Humphreys, 
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2007a, 2007b).  Unsurprisingly then, that particular legislative requirement 
has arguably failed to secure anyone’s welfare at work and indeed has 
failed to result in a successful prosecution.  It is difficult to believe that the 
same term is operated with any greater effectiveness by ethics 
committees. 
 
From 1978, in response to gay activism over access to 
experimental AIDS medication (Wachter, 1992), the National Commission 
for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural 
Research (National Commission) in the US, added a requirement that 
ethics committees also ensure equitableness in subject selection.  (In 
passing one can note that in the US, Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) 
are the effective equivalent of RECs, and in Canada similar committees 
are termed Research Ethics Boards (REBs).  A glossary of terms is 
provided as Appendix 1.) 
2.2 Science/ethics divide 
 
Despite such mandates to protect the rights, safety, welfare, dignity 
and, later, even the opportunity to participate in research, there has also 
been a continuing controversy concerning whether the REC has an 
obligation to approve or disapprove the scientific design of the research 
protocol (e.g. Levine, 1986).  Those who argue that they do have such an 
obligation note that ethics codes require good scientific design and that 
the risk to subjects necessarily relies on a prior determination about the 
scientific design (e.g. Dawson and Yentis, 2007).  Opponents, while 
conceding these two points, argue that RECs are not designed to make 
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expert judgements about the adequacy of scientific design.  Rather they 
should form an opinion about the value of the science (“the humanitarian 
importance of the problem to be solved” – as para. 6 of the Nuremberg 
code (1947) put it) and leave the scientific issues to be assessed by 
others.  They must ensure that the science has been appropriately 
reviewed – but not necessarily review it themselves.  This debate is an 
important one, and proved central to the research which is to be reported 
below. 
2.3 Expert and lay role divide 
 
The Surgeon General’s 1966 memo, already referred to, had called 
for a prior review by “a committee of [the investigator’s] associates”.  The 
U.S. Congress however wanted human experimentation to be scrutinized 
by ‘outsiders’: “For the proper regulation of the powerful professionals of 
modern society, we need a combination of insiders and outsiders, of 
professionals and citizens” (Commission on Health Science and Society, 
1968: 1265).  Accordingly the guidelines were refined on 1 May 1969 to 
indicate that a committee entirely composed of medics or scientists would 
be inadequate to perform the functions expected of it.  This was a clear 
indication that Congress at least did not believe that the science as such 
was the real problem.  Rather the problem to be tackled centred on what 
the research intended for fellow humans.  For the humanitarian aspect of 
the research a moral, rather than scientific, review was required.  For that 
no expertise would be necessary, indeed ordinary ‘citizens’ would be good 
enough. 
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In 1973, in response to the Tuskegee revelations (Jones, 1993) 
that further unethical medical research had been perpetrated on US 
citizens, a National Commission was established to determine how to 
prevent further similar research scandals.  Its eleven members were 
drawn from “individuals distinguished in the fields of medicine, law, ethics, 
theology, the biological, physical, behavioural and social sciences, 
philosophy, humanities, health administration, government, and public 
affairs” (US National Research Act § 201, cited by Schrag, 2010: 55-6). 
 
In the UK meanwhile, researchers had been quick to follow 
American influences (Neuberger, 1992; Nicholson, 1993;  Schrag, 2010) 
primarily in order to be eligible for USPHS research funding (RCP, 1967).  
Pappworth (1962, 1967) followed Beecher (1959, 1966) by drawing 
attention to the state of clinical investigations in the UK.  Seeing the moral 
necessity he also called for a REC to be established in every regional 
health authority area and for committees to have at least one lay member 
(Pappworth, 1967). 
 
The call for lay participation grew very much as a consequence of 
the Beecher/Pappworth revelations and also out of the thalidomide 
tragedy of the time (Rothman, 1991).  The extent of the scandals being 
revealed, especially in America, caused the public to realise how much 
                                                     
 A highly effective sedative drug often prescribed in cases of morning sickness because 
it was thought safe in pregnancy.  Used from 1957 it was implicated in birth defects and 
withdrawn worldwide by 1962. 
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power they had given the medical profession to conduct themselves with 
effective carte blanche, and they began to see that as patients, they too 
had rights – including rights to decide what happened to their bodies.  The 
first Declaration of Helsinki setting out a code of ethics for medical 
researchers was issued in 1964 by the World Medical Association in order 
to begin to take charge of the problem from within the profession.  Its 
1975 version required ethics committees to review proposed research.   
 
In a survey subsequently carried out in England and Wales during 
1982-3, 254 RECs were identified with 53% of responding RECs 
indicating that they had just one lay member and a further 8% having no 
lay member at all (Nicholson, 1986a).  That research found that the RECs 
were unclear about the nature of their task, and similar research a decade 
later found that the situation had little changed, noting as it did: “The 
fundamental flaw in their operation was their own lack of clarity as to what 
their task should be” (Neuberger, 1992: 44).  Dyer (2004) found the same 
problems and the present research will demonstrate that this remains the 
position today. 
 
The Royal College of Physician’s guidelines of 1984 had indicated 
for its part that the objectives of ethics committees were “to facilitate 
medical research in the interest of society, to protect subjects of research 
from possible harm, to preserve their rights, and to provide reassurance to 
the public that this is being done.  Committees also protect research 
workers from unjustified attack” (emphasis added, Laurence, 1984: 1).  
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Yet one suspects that this final sentence betrayed the chief concern of the 
profession as the research workers being referred to were, in most cases, 
fellow medical professionals. 
2.4 Criticisms 
 
Such guidelines certainly did nothing to protect the process of 
ethics review from being the target of complaints.  The main criticisms 
have come from researchers themselves and so one should be cautious 
of at least their potentially biased perspective.  Their oft cited claim is that 
research is unnecessarily hampered by such reviews.  The process has 
been implicated in unnecessary delays (Ahmed and Nicholson, 1996; 
Ledford, 2007) and has been tarred with being inconsistent, such that 
identical research may receive a favourable opinion from one committee 
but be rejected as unethical by another (e.g. Cave and Holm, 2002; 
Edwards et al., 2007; Schrag, 2010).  Accusations about the lack of skills, 
knowledge and understandings of ethics committee members have also 
been made (e.g. Hoffmann et al., 2000; Schrag, 2010; Stewart et al., 
2008; Williamson, 2008; Wisner et al., 2011).   Harding and Ummel (1989) 
demonstrated that the committees could also be too lax. Cheung reported 
“[s]tudies have shown that 34%...[of] institutional boards, have never 
modified any research applications or rejected a research proposal, and 
that committee decisions relied heavily on physician-scientists, who make 
up the vast majority of the boards.  Most decisions arrived at by the board 
members were based largely on technical issues rather than ethical 
matters” (2007: 146).  In Canada an official report cuttingly found that 
“enhancing the competency of some REB [research ethics board] 
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members…would greatly improve the functioning of the REBs on which 
they sit” (Experts Committee for Human Research Participation Protection 
in Canada, 2008: 31).  According to such criticisms whatever the 
committees were doing they were not doing it well, and had not done it 
well for decades.  Virtually whenever RECs have been the subject of 
comment they have been castigated: “As has been stated frequently in 
the Bulletin, however, there is no evidence that even a minority of the 
committees, as constituted and working at present, are doing their existing 
work properly” (Nicholson, 1986b: 6).  In particular, questions arose about 
the suitability of members to perform ethics reviews.  It has often been 
remarked for example that at least some members seem to concentrate 
their efforts on criticising the grammar of the information sheet and 
informed consent document (Angell and Dixon-Woods, 2009) and 
sometimes go so far as even “judging proposals based on the proportion 
of spelling and typographical errors” (Schrag, 2010: 170). Stark (2012) 
explains that this alleged pettiness can be accounted for in that some 
reviewers view the level of apparent attention to detail as illustrated by 
completed application forms and so on as a metric for how carefully a 
researcher might conduct a trial or attend to participants. Despite this 
though, RECs have their own reputation for spelling and grammatical 
errors (Schrag, 2010; Nicholson, 1997).  They allegedly add nothing of 
value, and are more likely to get in the way of research rather than help 
good research to progress.  Too often, it is claimed, research is subjected 
to inappropriate modification by ethics committees (Bond, 2012; Schrag, 
2010). 
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It is helpful to be alert to the fact that not all RECs are identical.  
Such a caution is most clearly articulated by Hedgecoe (2012a) who 
draws attention to what he terms the isomorphism of the differing bodies 
that act as research ethics committees. 
 
An isomer is a chemical entity having an identical atomic formula 
but a different arrangement of those atoms compared with another 
instance of that chemical.  The chemicals have features in common but 
are also capable of acting very differently.  The analogy is helpful – NHS 
RECs differ from IRBs which differ from REBs; different European Union 
states’ RECs, although based on the same common Clinical Trials 
Directive, are comprised of differently qualified individuals and so on.  
Whilst NHS RECs may review protocols which may not to be performed in 
the locality where the REC is based, in the USA most IRBs are 
institutionally-based.  In the USA too, a relatively new group of ‘for-profit’ 
IRBs have developed, these IRBs by contrast review studies due to take 
place at locations that no member of its committee has any affiliation with. 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has attempted to address the variety 
of practices that might have existed in RECs by championing international 
legislation based on the industry’s own common standard of ICH-GCP 
(e.g. Commission Directive 2005/28/EC and Humphreys, 2007c), and 
there are now proposals to revise the European directive on clinical trials 
(2001/20/EC) to further narrow variation amongst committees by 
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attempting to formally separate the scientific review from the ethics review 
(Europa, 2012). 
 
There is scant literature on IECs and so for insights into the 
operation of RECs one must, perforce, utilise the nearest set of literature 
available whilst noting any differences. That literature concentrates largely 
on the numerically larger group of IRBs (in the USA), Canadian REBs and 
the UK NHS RECs.  As the literature does not specifically address IECs, 
consideration of this fact, and of the variety of RECs and their isomorphic 
practices, needs to be kept in mind.  
 
What goes on inside ECs however is invariably such that only its 
members can know what is acceptable to it, and in this subjectivity their 
power becomes great indeed.  It becomes for them to decide to either 
permit research to occur in a particular way, or prevent it altogether.  Such 
‘normalising judgements’ of a REC create a productivity such that the 
subjects (the researchers) will police themselves in accordance with the 
REC’s requirements.  However, the normative is artifactual, having no 
reality beyond what it references.  In producing requirements about what 
is to be regarded as ethical research, the ethics committees effectively 
stultify ethics, coming to regard matters ethical as necessitating rigid rules 
to be imposed inflexibly (Toulmin, 1981).  Thus instead of what actions 
are ethically appropriate being for each individual to determine 
autonomously, they become heteronymous impositions.  Such ‘games of 
truth’ (Foucault, 1997), whereby the ‘right’ stance is positioned as 
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incontestable, aim to create individuals as subjects of knowledge and thus 
pawns to those wielding power.  Individuals are thus expected to orientate 
themselves and their behaviour towards a majoritarian position (the 
norm).  However with ethics there is nothing to be objective about, other 
than intersubjectively.  Ethics is usually seen to be about doing the right 
thing, with the right motives.  This need not necessitate a single way of 
doing things.  Ethics committees however do not always view ethics in this 
way and tend to bind themselves to their own precedents, often with 
unrealistic expectations of harm that may befall those researched 
(Haggerty, 2004; Schrag, 2010; van den Hoonaard, 2011). 
 
Juritzen et al. (2011) suggest that the members’ knowledge/power 
modality creates ‘docile bodies’ of researchers who go on to police 
themselves in accordance with what is created and legitimated by the 
committees. 
 
Such ‘power plays’ where the EC seeks to redesign the 
methodology proposed by the researcher are accepted because the EC 
has a status of independence and a deemed expertise.  This alleged 
expertise is questionable however.  For example, in the case of IECs, the 
Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) was 
established on 1st April 2003 as the UK national ‘regulatory authority’ and 
given as a specific task responsibility for assessing the science and safety 
of Phase I trials.  The responsibility for the science and safety of such 
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trials is thus with the MHRA, but, as will be seen, ethics committees 
continue to insist on performing their own review of the scientific design. 
 
There is no reason why an EC should not concentrate on the ethics 
of the protocols, and leave the science and safety aspects of the studies 
to the authorized experts in the MHRA.  The MHRA employs its own 
technicians and contracts with external scientists and academic experts 
specifically to conduct the necessary assessments.  In contrast it is 
virtually impossible that members of an EC will have expertise in all - and 
very often, any - of the aspects of the trials that need to be considered.  
Committee members’ ‘ignorance’ has been acknowledged by the Royal 
College of Physicians for its members (Hoffenberg et al., 1986).  Fisher 
(2009) in the US also found for example that not one physician even 
claimed to understand the science behind the clinical trials they were 
party to as researchers.  If anyone might be expected to understand the 
science behind the clinical trial they were acting as an investigator of it is 
surely these physicians.  Her observation thus highlights the lack of 
knowledge physicians in general can be expected to bring to a REC.  
Petryna (2009) too reports the widespread view that “the average 
physician… [does] not know enough about drugs” to be able to comment 
adequately on the testing of experimental compounds (p.57).  This is a 
point also picked up by Abadie (2010), who notes: 
 
“During phase I the professional knowledge required in drug 
development is mostly supplied by biostatisticians and experts in 
toxicology.  In contrast to later phases in drug research, no 
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specialized knowledge about a particular disease or medical 
condition is required” (p.22, emphasis added). 
 
In another, but still telling, context, Hubbard too has noted how the 
pharmaceutical industry’s practice of detailing has long exploited the fact 
that amongst physicians “there is often a significant deficiency in their 
knowledge of pharmacology” (Hubbard, 2009: 110).  There is thus distinct 
evidence that a typical medical member will bring but little relevant 
expertise to the review.  S/he can only be an expert in comparison to 
those who have no recognised clinical knowledge or skill set.  The history 
of the committees suggests that the term was selected with medical 
members in mind, and very probably by them too (Hoffenberg et al, 1986). 
 
The model process of research ethics review of new medicines is 
explained by Edwards: 
 
“The regulator [MHRA] assesses the safety of all new drugs tested 
within clinical trials… the ethics committee may not be in a position 
to assess risk in the same way [it will not have access to all the 
evidence and may not have the relevant expertise available to it] but 
refers to the regulator’s expert judgement… 
 
… [T]he ethics committee…must nevertheless endorse this 
judgement [of the regulator] as well as ensure the whole protocol is 
ethical…they must ensure that the procedures for consent are good 
and that the systems for managing and minimising any high risks are 
robust… 
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… [I]t is the regulator which assesses risk and the ethics committee 
simply checks this assessment and the way the investigator intends 
to manage risks.  There are scientific experts on committees 
however who are in a position to understand the risks and explain 
them to the other members” (Edwards, 2010a: 99-100). 
 
In an earlier article, Edwards (2010b) explains this by pointing out 
that whilst “ethics committees are not constituted to review the science of 
a project they must assess the social benefits of research and [thus they] 
have an important role in checking that the science has been peer-
reviewed” (emphases added, Edwards, 2010b: 58). 
 
It is an important point, and the distinction between re-reviewing 
and accepting that something has been properly reviewed already, must 
be understood if ‘double-jeopardy’ is to be avoided.  The REC must see 
evidence that a proper review has taken place; where the REC has 
evidence that such a review has already taken place they should not take 
it upon themselves, arguably, to dismiss that review.   The science must 
be satisfactory, as if it is not the research may be unethical (either 
dangerous or wasteful of resources) – the issue is who should be 
responsible for the scientific review. 
 
At the risk of belabouring the point, GAfREC clearly states: 
 
5.4.2 RECs should receive guidance on the wider regulatory and 
governance environment for research and its reliability so that they 
can assess the assurances they receive.  RECs will accept credible 
assurances that others will do what is expected of them. 
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(a) A REC need not reconsider the quality of the science, as this is 
the responsibility of the sponsor and will have been subject to review 
by one or more experts… 
(c) Where others have a regulatory responsibility, a REC can expect 
to rely on them to fulfil it.  If the law gives another body duties that 
are normally responsibilities of a REC according to this document, 
RECs do not duplicate them.  For example, the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has the primary legal 
responsibility for considering the safety of the research it regulates.  
 
Thus Edwards’ description accords perfectly with section 9 of 
GAfREC (Department of Health, 2001; para. 5.4.2 GAfREC II), 
Recommendation 2 of the Warner report (Department of Health, 2005b, 
see also COREC, 2006) and the NRES standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) (see Humphreys, 2011), but despite all this it has not been a 
process EC members chose to adopt in practice.  It has also been the 
practice that submission to the regulator and the EC are made at the 
same time (‘in parallel’) and this can mean that it may not always be 
possible to check that the regulator has assessed, properly or otherwise, 
the protocol.  But again there has been no requirement that an IEC be 
constituted in such a way as to grant it a legitimate claim to such ability in 
any case.  It has also been the case that the ‘experts’ on a committee may 
have had no relevant experience and all, in theory, could be either non-
medical (e.g. therapists, podiatrists etc.) or long into their retirement.  
There have thus been no reasonable grounds for an EC to claim the 
ability to perform an adequate scientific review of a protocol: RECs were 
not formally constituted with such an aim. 
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2.5 Committee types 
 
Various types of research ethics committees exist.  In the UK the 
NHS RECs are possibly the most well known.  Some of these are 
‘recognised’ to review clinical trials (Type 1: healthy volunteers anywhere 
in the UK; Type 2 - currently in abeyance – patients in a single region of 
the UK; Type 3: patients anywhere in the UK); the rest are merely 
‘authorised’ to review other NHS research.  In addition, committees may 
be ‘flagged’ as specialising in certain types of research such as involving 
children, prisoners, medical devices and so on.  Fifteen NHS RECs are 
also recognised by the US government as IRBs – although these are not 
required to follow US legislation (personal communication to the 
researcher, 2011).  There are also, amongst others, university RECs (and 
within a university there may be faculty, departmental and/or school 
RECs); what McHale (2011) terms the “specialist ethics or ethics and 
governance committee attached to a particular research project”; there is 
a National Social Care REC; and until late 2011 when they were absorbed 
into the NHS REC system, there were ‘recognised independent ethics 
committees’.  These dealt exclusively with Phase I drug trials in healthy 
volunteers and were ‘stand-alone’ committees, so little known outside 
their circle of contacts that virtually nothing has been published about their 
workings.  The only exceptions to this which I am aware of are Anon 
(1989); Hibbert (2008); and Ramsay et al. (1977).  Neuberger (1992) 
mistakenly claimed “Phase I studies are…rarely encountered by a 
research ethics committee” (p.10).  In fact though we have known very 
little about the workings of any ethics committee (Citro, Ilgen and Marrett, 
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2003; De Vries and Forsberg, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2012a; Schrag, 2011; 
Speers, 2008; van den Hoonaard, 2011). This research shall eventually 
concentrate on this latter, now defunct, group – the IECs - but in this 
chapter (as in the literature review which follows) necessity requires a 
discussion based largely on IRBs and NHS RECs because they have 
dominated the literature. 
 
Part of the reason for a lack of publications about independent 
ethics committees (IECs) has been due to the confidential nature of their 
meetings.  Article 11 of the EC directive states “(1) Member States in 
whose territory the clinical trial takes place shall enter in a European 
database, accessible only to the competent authorities…(d) the 
favourable opinion of the Ethics Committee…[and] (3)… shall ensure that 
the confidentiality of the data is strictly observed” (and see Beyleveld and 
Sethe, 2008 on this).  Such regulations clearly hamper even the 
observation of the activities of the committees lest sensitive, commercially 
confidential matters be disclosed inappropriately.  (The directive was 
written under the direction of the pharmaceutical industry (Humphreys, 
2007c).)  For this reason McHale could discover little about them, and was 
only able to indicate that “While it appears that in practice private 
organisations do frequently have ethical review committees…overall 
commercial competitive pressure frequently result in private sector 
research activity being of lower visibility”  (2004: 722).  In France, 
researchers who included the author of the relevant law, wanted to 
evaluate the operation of their national REC system.  They found though 
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that “the law which would ban any access to the data, even anonymised, 
to an outsider, even sworn to secrecy, would ban any study on the 
opinions rendered by the committees” (Fauriel et al., 2004: 313) and had 
to adjust their methodology accordingly.  Commercial sensitivities are thus 
one barrier to permitting researchers gaining access to these committees. 
 
I was a lay member of an IEC from 2006 (appointed alternate vice-
chair in 2007) until 2012 which was after the data gathering phase of this 
research.  I am also a lay (my original appointment letter stated I was an 
‘expert’) vice-chair of an NHS REC, an ‘external’ member of a university’s 
Science and Engineering REC, and a trustee director of the Association of 
Research Ethics Committees.  I do not believe any other researcher has 
been in such a privileged position, especially in relation to accessing an 
IEC.  
2.6 Lay involvement 
 
Whilst Pappworth (1967) had called for lay representation on 
RECs, Nicholson has noted that: “[t]here was little interest at the 
Department of Health and Social Security, and none at all from any 
patients’ groups” (Nicholson, 1993: 14). This seems odd as the Patients’ 
Association had been formed in response to Pappworth’s revelations, but 
Hedgecoe (2009) has been able to offer an explanation for the lay 
presence.  His paper revealed that lay members essentially first slipped 
on to the scene as an unintended consequence of making use of hospital 
boards as ethics committees in those institutions where research that 
might ultimately be funded by the USPHS was to occur.  Hospital boards 
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at that time were dominated by the medical profession but comprised a 
few non-clinical members such as hospital administrators.  (See also 
Hazelgrove (2002) on the history of RECs in the UK.) 
   
 Once ‘lay’ members were on the committees they could only offer 
their inexpert (non-clinical, or lay) opinions of course: ‘lay’ in the context of 
RECs thus essentially means ‘non-clinical’.  Such members are 
specifically defined as not being expert members (“’lay member’ means a 
member of an ethics committee, other than an expert member” – para 1, 
sch. 2, S.I. 2004/1031).  Their specific role though has never been 
defined, and no official guidance for how the roles should be interpreted 
by the members (whether expert or lay) has been given.   
 
The governance arrangements for NHS RECs (GAfREC, 
Department of Health, 2001, 2011) require that at least half of the lay 
group be comprised of persons who have never been clinicians or 
researchers – ‘lay plus’ members in the NRES jargon.  Another way of 
reading this of course is that up to half the lay members could be 
comprised of retired clinicians.  The legislation does not specify particular 
roles for particular types of members, and that there is no adequate 
explanation in the literature has been remarked upon by several writers, 
as shall be discussed below.  Before the clinical trials legislation of the 
early twenty-first century, both the IECs and NHS RECs, followed the 
RCP’s guidelines, at least until the early 1990s when the Department of 
Health introduced guidance for its committees (Department of Health, 
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1991).  Thus these two types of REC shared some common structural and 
administrative beginnings. 
 
Even professional ‘bioethicists’ would be classed as ‘lay’ members 
(unless they also had a clinical background).   The legislation, and even 
the NHS governance arrangements (Department of Health, 2001, 2011) 
for its RECs, has thus privileged clinical experience as deserving of the 
expert designation, with all other professions being termed ‘lay’ in 
comparison. 
 
  A common misperception is that ‘expert’ adheres to any expertise.  
A barrister for example would be a lay member despite having legal skills.  
The designations (‘expert’ and ‘lay’) thus become confused where RECs 
are involved. Sometimes US-based writers, especially, use the term ‘lay’ 
to mean ‘non-professional’.  For example: “In restructuring IRBs, an effort 
must be made to include more non-affiliated and non-scientist members, 
but regulators should go further.  It would be wise to also require lay 
membership on local boards [as in our survey]… nearly all the 1161 
members…were professionals of one sort or another” (De Vries and 
Forsberg, 2002: 214).  This professional dominance is of such note that 
part of the literature review will specifically examine its pertinent features.   
 
Commonly too, amongst NHS RECs, a statistician can be a 
regarded as an expert on one committee but as lay on another, yet para 
1, sch. 2 of the Clinical Trials Regulations (as amended by para 5(2) The 
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Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) and Blood Safety and Quality 
(Amendment) Regulations 2008, S.I. 2008/ 941) only permits a statistician 
to be an expert member if that statistical skill has been acquired in relation 
to clinical research.  Strictly, this would only become an issue if the REC 
concerned was ‘recognised’ rather than merely ‘authorised’ (as explained 
above).  In fact, as my research goes on to note (see section 6.3), IECs 
rarely, if ever had a statistician as a member and this was because in 
Phase I research the concern is with safety and tolerability (only one or 
two serious adverse effects may be enough to halt further progression of 
the trial) rather than efficacy. The new GAfREC though no longer includes 
statisticians as illustrative of the expert category (Hutchinson, 2011).  And 
as for the bioethicist, they at least will have background knowledge upon 
which to base ethical arguments.  However, as there can be no experts in 
‘what is the right thing to do’, whose opinion carries essentially becomes a 
matter of power or influence, and thus very likely a matter of little more 
than how the numbers stack up on either side of the ‘debate’.  It is thus of 
significance that the medical members have a practical majority on the 
committees.  Typically about two-thirds of a committee’s members are 
‘experts’ most of whom are physicians and the majority of the rest are 
usually comprised of professions allied to medicine (see Appendices 2a 
and 2b). 
 
 Anyone can ask a question in committee and if members do not 
have clear roles then it is likely that issues of power and/or ego will 
surface.  There have been a number of scholarly articles critical of ethics 
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committees and their members’ lack of relevant skills, knowledge and 
understanding of research practices (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2000; Schrag, 
2010; Stewart et al., 2008; Williamson, 2008; Wisner et al., 2011).  Thus 
according to such critiques it is, for example, not uncommon for 
researchers whose clinical trial has been devised in conjunction with a 
highly experienced team, approved via a rigorous peer-review process, 
and sanctioned by an independent government body, to find their 
research proposals subject to further, often vague and inadequately 
informed, questioning by members of a REC.  As Hedgecoe puts it: there 
is a “longstanding… range of UK researchers’ complaints about the 
iniquities of research ethics review…the inherent injustice in having to 
submit an application to bodies lacking the required expertise…” (2012b: 
678).  Such RECs will be comprised of lay and other members who may 
have little or no experience of the particular type of research involved, or 
indeed, of any research at all.  Thus, according to those who complain 
(e.g. Dingwall 2006, 2008b, 2010; Schrag, 2010, 2011), not infrequently 
too the REC will want to impose some further obstacle that bears their 
imprimatur before the perfectly reasonable and wholly adequate research 
can commence.  The researcher-applicant will, it is implied, be forced to 
become like the Emperor in Hans Christian Anderson’s fairy-tale, who, 
confronted by his new clothes (in the guise of the new ethics 
requirements), finds himself in the awkward position of having to 
acknowledge the excellent quality and fineness of those ‘clothes’ or admit 
he lacks the ‘wisdom’ to see them.  It is then only when away from the 
REC that: 
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“Researchers [can] complain that RECs are neither sufficiently qualified 
to make such scientific judgements nor formally authorized to do so” 
(Dyer and Demeritt, 2009: 58). 
 
This sorry state of affairs has been much grumbled about, mainly 
sub verbo, for years by the research community, but the problem has 
been seen to have an intangible element to it which resists a remedy.  
After all it is not easy to say that an ethics committee is wrong, at least not 
in committee to the faces of the members tasked with the ethics review, 
and especially before approval has been granted.  Weblogs though exist 
which chronicle some of the alleged absurdities encountered by 
researchers e.g. www.institutionalreviewblog.com , http://researchethicsblog.com 
(and see also Hamburger, 2004 and Schrag, 2010).   
 
Hedgecoe provides a more emollient perspective on the work and 
value of RECs (Hedgecoe, 2008). He instances cases of RECs 
proactively promoting research – by, for example, making suggestions to 
get around issues that the REC would otherwise see as obstacles to 
ethical research; in deciding that ethics review could be dispensed with; 
and by accepting as committee members those with qualitative research 
expertise.  He is also able to distinguishes between ‘hostility’ towards, and 
‘lack of familiarity’ with, qualitative research, and he noted no instances of 
the former attitude in his research.  Clearly there is another side to the 
debate about how RECs treat researchers, especially those of the 
qualitative ‘variety’. 
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If though there is a problem with ethics review, as many 
researchers allege, one possible reason for the problem, as revealed by 
Dyer (2004), could be due to the lack of clarity amongst REC members 
about their understanding of how they should engage with their role, be it 
expert or lay.  She finds that the extent of this lack of role clarity has 
created at least one controversial unethical situation in that it seriously 
risks wasting resources and people’s time.  Other unethical consequences 
have also been strongly suspected and these shall be discussed below.  
One might wonder, for example, why there are ‘expert’ members – and 
indeed why they occupy the majority on most UK RECs - if it is not the 
role of an ethics committee to review the science of a protocol.  Such 
scrutiny of the ‘science’ is declared in the official guidance to REC 
members, and it has been reiterated numerous times by NRES, its 
predecessor and other bodies, as being primarily the responsibility of the 
research sponsor and not of the REC (e.g. Department of Health, 2001, 
esp. para. 9; Department of Health, 2011 para. 5.4.2; Edwards, 2010a; 
Humphreys, 2011).  In the case of clinical trials of investigational 
medicinal products (CTIMPs) and medical devices, the MHRA has the 
role to review the science/methodology proposed (Humphreys, 2012a).  
Student research is subject to academic critique by the supervisory team 
in the university (Humphreys, 2008a) and any statistical arrangements 
required in the research have to be verified by an independent statistician 
before submission of the protocol can be made to the REC (Williamson et 
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al., 2000).  The REC will receive confirmation that such scrutiny has 
occurred.  One must not forget either, that: 
 
“Scientists, as scientists, have nothing special to offer towards technical 
decision-making in the public domain where the specialisms are not 
their own… [and] scientists’ supposed referred expertise about fields of 
science distinct from their own is nearly always based on mythologies 
about science, rather than on science itself” (Collins and Evans, 2002: 
250, 260). 
 
The duties incumbent upon REC members arising from their expert 
or lay status have nowhere been clearly stated.  In this it is not difficult to 
perceive the problem that has attracted so much criticism: ethics 
committee review is easily distracted into ‘inappropriate’ areas at, too 
often, the idiosyncratic whims of those who happen to be on a committee.  
It has been claimed that the looseness of the reviewer roles is particularly 
open to chaotic outcomes.  Thus researchers find inconsistency not only 
between committees but also between one meeting of the same 
committee and its next meeting, depending on which members are 
present and who have tendered their apologies (Dyer and Demerrit, 
2009).  Considered in this way, RECs can appear disposed to so 
unpredictable an outcome that it is difficult to see how such committees 
can legitimately be thought to be any advance over professional self-
regulation. 
 
At this stage one can rationalise the following potential explanation.  
IECs have for most of their existence been autonomous bodies and so will 
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have decided for themselves what to address in, and how to go about, the 
ethics review.  It was not until the clinical trial legislation of the early 2000s 
that this situation altered.  Members, appointed as they were as 
professionals and lay people, can surely only have believed that as those 
statuses were prerequisite to their engagement they must have been 
intended to have some bearing on what their role was – even if it was not 
made explicit.  
 
Despite, or because of this, Dyer (2004) has discovered that 
actually many lay members recognise that their role is unclear, and that to 
be worthwhile and valuable members they need a much greater degree of 
role clarity within which to function.  Dyer’s (2004) paper examining some 
of the rationales for engaging public participation in health service 
decision making bodies discusses lay-members’ understanding of their 
role in local RECs (LRECs).  She found members to be unclear about 
their role and called for a more defined role for them if they were to 
challenge the expert members’ technical rendering of the research 
reviewed.  In the absence of a clearer role, the lay member can, arguably, 
appear as little more than a party to a public relations exercise aimed at 
lending questionable legitimacy to a process, affording it the hallmarks of 
fair and sound decision making.  Such ‘legitimacy’ inoculates the system 
against criticisms of the process because it supposedly provides an 
element of democracy. 
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In her paper Dyer also examines what it might be, if anything, that 
non-experts can contribute to technical decision-making.  She suggests 
there are two broad areas where the lay member might conceivably have 
a distinct role compared that the expert.  Lay members, she notes, have 
lived experience and knowledge of “the particular” – although what such 
experiences might be relevant needs to be established.  (Hedgecoe 
(2012b) may offer the answer to this as he notes the value of ‘local 
knowledge’ in assisting in ethics review.  There is certainly no reason to 
suppose that lay members will not have unique experiences which may be 
brought to bear on occasions in ethics review.) 
 
The second broad area Dyer suggests is what she terms “non-
certified expertise” drawing on Collins and Evans (2002).  This is expertise 
acquired without formal training, and she gives the example of an AIDS 
activist – someone with expertise of living with a particular illness.  Whilst 
both of knowledge of ‘the particular’ and ‘non-certified expertise’ could 
indeed be valuable in particular situations it is not clear however how 
these might be recognised, in any regular way, for the purposes of 
recruitment to RECs. 
 
Dyer is also able to recognise that “public participation can be 
conceived as primarily concerning values…[such that p]ublic participation 
provides a check on science being taken inappropriately from the 
laboratory to the real world beyond” (2004: 341).  In this connection Dyer 
notes that an LREC review is “explicitly an ethical and not a scientific 
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review” although as she also notes how the LREC debates she observed 
were embedded in a scientific rationality. 
 
Dyer’s work (2004) thus particularly alerts us, in the context of the 
research to be reported here, to the fact that at least part of the lay 
members’ role could perhaps be to act as a foil, or public brake on over-
eager science.  Whether engagement with such a role is indeed one that 
IEC members have adopted, and if so, whether and how such a role has 
been exercised by them in ethics review shall be addressed in the 
discussion section of this dissertation. 
2.7 Politics 
 
 
Ethics itself is ‘political’ in that it is an attempt to persuade others of 
the rightness of a particular course of action which ought to be recognised 
as appropriate (Humphreys, 2008b).  What is wrong to one group though 
can be right to another.  Many social issues demonstrate this: abortion, 
cloning, right-to-die and so on, to select just a few from the realm of 
medicine. 
 
Such politics are alleged to occur where it is claimed that research 
is approved essentially based on knowledge of the investigator: 
 
“Sometimes one hears academic and research colleagues say, at 
approval… committees, that ‘I know his work and I think based on his 
previous track record we should approve his/her application.’  The 
lesser experienced committee members, or lay members, would not 
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have the confidence to challenge those who are the acknowledged 
experts in the field…” (Cheung, 2007: 146). 
 
Such a virtue ethics approach as this, which arguably attempts to at least 
partly recognise the moral character of the actors, may have their 
advocates, but as Cheung implies this sort of practice would for many 
represents an improper approach not least in that it excludes those who 
do not know the individual researchers, and so in this there may be a clue 
about what type of member has most influence in the REC’s decision-
making process. 
 
The governance arrangements (Department of Health, 2001 and 
2011) note that committee members “are appointed in their own right”, 
and it has been suggested that the rationale for this: 
 
“may rest on an assumption that the moral concerns which should 
mobilise the REC’s work do not come from particular professional or 
other interested groups but rather from society as a whole, of which all 
mature and responsible citizens are members.  If this is the 
assumption, it seems a good one.  ‘Sound judgement’ in matters of 
morals comes from experience of living in society as a whole, and not 
from working in any particular profession… [Thus] it is to insist that the 
moral conclusions which should be drawn in the light of specialist 
clinical information are nonetheless [to be] drawn on the basis of wider 
concerns – concerns which we are qualified to promote, if we are 
qualified at all, simply by living responsible lives” (Evans and Evans, 
1996: 108). 
    
Parker has suggested: 
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“[W]hat the lay members represent are the political or ‘ethical’ 
standards used by the government to achieve public acceptance of 
medical research.  The lay member’s particular ethical expertise is an 
awareness of what is acceptable to reasonable people” (2009: 153). 
 
Lay membership is thus seen as a political mechanism – as has 
expert membership - but both may be about to enter a new phase, for 
Shergold (2008) saw evidence of a: 
  
“significant [and international] shift towards involving the general public 
in debating a nation’s position on fundamental questions of research 
ethics.  Although the great majority of ethics panels around the world 
now include lay members, this [new] movement aims at a broader and 
in some respects ‘more lay’ decision base” (p.28).  
 
Shergold saw lay members as legitimating agents and their 
increasing use in such a role has been identified by others too (Glasby 
and Beresford, 2007; Moreno and Berger, 2010).  Tranøy though heralded 
such a prospect over two decades ago: 
 
“bioethics is no longer the prerogative of physicians – a natural 
consequence of the fact that the moral problems of contemporary 
biomedicine are no longer simply or mainly a concern for the medical 
profession.  They are communal and shared concerns in the broadest 
sense” (1990:18). 
  
Having now provided a background to the research, and noted the 
uncertainty of both the member roles and the scope of ethics review – in 
particular whether it should extend into the science/methodology where 
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that has already been independently reviewed - the next following 
chapters provide a literature review to identify how the main issues and 
debates in research ethics review as it has focused on committee member 
roles has developed.  But the literature review itself commences with a 
review of the literature on the professions for that oeuvre’s insights into 
the concept of experts and indeed expertise because, as this chapter has 
seen, the issue of professions arises with such frequency in discussion 
that it is likely to have significance.  After the literature review (chapters 3 
and 4) the subsequent chapter then explains the methods by which the 
research was conducted in order to understand the question of how 
members perceive the expert and lay roles (chapter 5).  Other chapters 
then go on to analyse the evidence which was gathered (chapters 6 
through 8) and then to discuss and interpret the findings (chapter 9).   
 
The current research thus provides evidence about how members 
of independent ethics committees have perceived their roles and how the 
roles of the expert and lay members are understood by those members.  
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3. Literature review: the professions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This literature review has two main aims, each of which are 
addressed in, and form, separate chapters.  The first chapter considers 
the different ways the literature describing professions has understood 
that concept.  Professions have coveted expertise and so an 
understanding of the latter term will benefit from understanding the former 
concept.  Understandings of professions will subsequently be used to 
articulate discussion of the research findings.   
 
The second chapter (chapter 4) addresses a more specific set of 
key works which underpin and describe the current state of knowledge 
about how ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ roles on RECs are understood.  Particular 
gaps and deficiencies in the literature are highlighted, and the identified 
gaps are subsequently used to help shape questions which the current 
research will tackle. 
 
With the prior analysis of professions, the literature about RECs 
can be read to reveal a medical professional dominance of committees.  It 
is for this reason that the literature review commences with a review of the 
development of the theoretical literature which has attempted to 
understand the professions. The debate is seen to have been dominated 
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by sociological enquiry with expertise emerging as a feature very much 
associated with the professions. 
 
3.2 The Functional Understanding of Professions     
 
Accounts of professions have recognised them to be a type of 
business model in the service sector which sought to protect members via 
a variety of barriers to entry (e.g. Collins, 1990; Johnson, 1972; Krause, 
1996; Larson, 1977).   These barriers were designed to maintain market 
position against interlopers – non-professionals (also known as ‘amateurs’ 
- a derogatory term) who offer to do allegedly equivalent services.  As well 
as being about ‘control’, professions have also been concerned with 
‘content’, and the notion of professions being closed groups applying 
abstract knowledge can be found in many discussions of professionalism 
(Abbott, 1988; Dingwall, 2008a; Freidson, 2001; Larson, 1977; Wilensky, 
1964). 
 
The sociological examination of the professions quite early on 
recognised that any group providing a particular set of services may make 
a claim to professional status, but the success of that claim will be 
determined by whether the wider society recognizes the presence of 
sufficient determining traits as to legitimate the appellation of ‘profession’.  
A profession’s status can thus be thought of as being located on a 
continuum, with its precise point being decided by how a particular society 
at a particular time has perceived the occupational group’s status (Abbott, 
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1993).  Amongst the most frequently identified ideal-typical traits 
suggested as demonstrative of professions included an extensive period 
of education; institutional training; work autonomy; a professional code 
and association; skill based upon theoretical knowledge; licensure; self-
regulation; public service and an altruistic ethic; exclusion, monopoly and 
legal recognition; high status; individual clients; and indeterminacy of 
knowledge. 
 
As no absolute agreement as to the core set of traits which would 
define a profession evolved, and given the inchoate nature of the term 
‘profession’ and its attendant plethora of definitions, Freidson (1983) 
pointed to the necessity for researchers and writers to clarify what they 
meant by the term, whenever they employed it.  Which occupational 
groupings were accepted as being professions were also a function of the 
particular culture (see Larson, 1977), but arguably the professions have 
been essentially an Anglo-American concept, the term being used rather 
differently, if at all, in for example, Germany (Kocka, 1990), France 
(Geison, 1984) and Asia (Evetts, 2003). 
 
Such taxonomic approaches attempted to account for the claimed 
distinctive characteristics in terms of social function, and were posited on 
the premise that the professions performed some special role in society 
(Turner, 1996).  Tawney (1921) for example viewed the professions as 
able to bring about balance in a society threatened by the primacy of 
individualism.  Professions were seen as giving a rather different message 
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to society: less self-interested and more community-focused, professions 
enabled society actually to ‘function’ rather than disintegrate (Neibuhr, 
1932).  Altruism was thus an important trait. 
 
The structural-functionalist school is often associated with Parsons 
(1951).  He perceived professions as providing a stabilizing force in 
capitalist society, by counter-balancing capitalism’s crude profit-seeking 
behaviour.  He saw in the professions official commitment to various 
forms of personal service and community welfare such that they 
embodied a disinterested commitment to community values.  For some 
commentators this approach failed to adequately account for the 
supposed moral basis of professionalism (e.g. Wynia et al., 1999) yet Ray 
and Reed (1994) felt able to detect, in a Weberian analysis of the 
professional vocation, a notion that a profession positions itself above the 
mundane or base motivations and sought instead to do what was ‘right’ 
rather than pursue personal interests or financial rewards. 
3.3 The power perspective 
   
Other scholars, such as Hughes (1958) were critical of such 
approaches as falling for the public relations hype of the professions 
themselves, and he emphasized the material and symbolic benefits a 
person derived from professional status.  The independence (an inevitable 
consequence of indeterminacy) of the professions meant that it had to be 
the profession itself which would determine who could do what, and thus 
the archetypal professions were self-regulating with a monopoly to 
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practise and the right to be judged by a court of their peers in professional 
conduct cases.  Even in civil matters the wider courts gave professions 
considerable discretion - as illustrated by the Bolam test (Bolam v Friern 
Barnet Hospital Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 583) which 
effectively excused a professional from a charge of negligence where it 
could be shown that the actions performed by the accused might also 
have been performed by other members of the profession.  (Bolithio v City 
and Hackney Health Authority [1988] AC 232 only marginally tightened 
the test.)   Many professions were also able to enjoy excusal from jury 
service – suggesting official recognition that they were in some sense, 
special citizens, almost part of a parallel legal system. 
 
Johnson (1972) also emphasized the power dimension and this 
way of seeking to understand professions forms the second main 
sociological approach to evaluating professions.  Here the traits were 
seen not so much as about ultimately establishing whether an occupation 
was a ‘profession’, but about how the amassing and development of those 
traits allowed occupational members to develop for themselves more 
power, status and privilege. 
 
Freidson, noting the monopolistic power of the professions, 
highlighted their ability to suborn allied occupations – permanently 
maintaining the relative status with the doctor at the top and the nursing 
and other health professions populating decidedly lower professional or 
even semi-professional rungs.  This was his theory of professional 
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dominance (1970).  In the dominance there was a suggestion of an 
imbalance in the relationships between the professional, the co-workers 
and the client.  The theory implicated issues of trust, exploitation, 
subordination and suppression, and the dominant professional was placed 
under a cloud of suspicion, but protected by a saintly aura or at least a 
cloak of indeterminacy.  Freidson did not quite abandon his theory of 
professional dominance (Dingwall, 2008a) but as inroads into professional 
dominance came to the fore he gave greater emphasis to other aspects of 
professionalism such as it resting on an official belief that the knowledge 
and skills of a particular specialization required a foundation in abstract 
concepts and formal learning.  Professionals were thus expected to 
employ these foundations in discretionary ways and so had a claim to a 
special status of trust (Freidson, 2001).  In turn, this level of trust enabled 
the rules governing professionals’ work to be minimized and they were 
increasingly expected to manage themselves under conditions of even 
greater trust in their discretion and exercise of good judgment. 
 
The Marxists of the 1970s noted how professional status and 
dominance contributed to the keeping of a disciplined and subservient 
working class.  For example, not only would the doctor sanction the sick 
role (no other group could do this) but, as Navarro (1978) explained, it 
was the medical profession that legitimized the Health and Safety at Work 
etc Act 1974 and the health and safety professionals it spawned.  It did 
this, by, amongst other things, maintaining the fiction that much 
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occupational ill-health was in fact the worker’s fault for not obeying the 
system put in place to protect him. 
 
More generally, Fisk’s (1980) Marxist account of ethics illustrated 
how that notion is constructed by dominant classes to recreate and 
reinforce their values in society.  Ethics has no independent objective 
basis: what is right being determined from the viewpoint of those whose 
interests are being promoted. 
 
Larson (1977) perceived that the professions ‘captured’ the State to 
create regulation in their interest.  To the extent that the professions are 
seen as cooperating with the State in the control of populations one may 
talk of a demand theory of professionalization (legal and economic 
privileges being demanded by the professions from the State in return for 
such cooperation). 
 
Foucault (1977) saw the professions as a major part of the 
‘disciplines’ that were used to control society.  As a technology of power, 
‘discipline’ is a wide and general category moving beyond the State, 
which, by its omnipresence, can regulate social behaviour.  For many of 
the professions, the main instrument of this discipline was the ‘gaze’, often 
witnessed in the examination.  This might be the entry test(s) to become a 
professional or, equally, could be seen in the questioning of the plaintiff or 
defendant, the physical inspection of the patient, or even in the 
confessional.  Evetts (2003) similarly noted how amongst a contemporary 
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workforce a professional discourse could be used to invoke a 
‘professional myth’ to exercise a controlling influence over an occupational 
group who were being encouraged to think, act and be ‘professional’.  
Thus if one failed to do exactly what was expected the discipline was the 
admonishment that one had failed to act professionally. Juritzen et al. 
(2011), for example, suggested that the stipulations of RECs create docile 
researchers who go on to self-police their own ethical behaviour in 
accordance with what the REC has instructed.   
 
Williams also inclined towards a demand theory account: 
 
“To obtain official recognition as professions, occupational groups 
had to demonstrate that they incorporated the principal 
characteristics of a profession, namely, high moral standards, 
including a strong commitment to the well-being of others, mastery of 
a body of knowledge and skills, and self-governance.  They did this 
by forming membership organisations that adopted codes of ethics, 
established educational requirements and developed disciplinary 
procedures to protect the public from unethical or incompetent 
practitioners.  In return, governments granted the associations and 
their members a great deal of freedom to exercise their occupation 
and usually gave them a monopoly over its practice” (Williams, 2009: 
48). 
 
Dingwall (2008a) has suggested that the positions of Freidson 
(1986) and Johnson (1995) might amount to a supply theory of 
professionalization, for in such analyses as theirs, the State was seen as 
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having a more independent role, granting market privilege to a profession 
where it coincided with a State purpose. 
 
Abbott (1988) was not wholly convinced by either the demand or 
the supply theory, and was at best unsure how the actors (State and 
profession) came to manipulate each other: it was certainly possible to 
see the State as conferring powers on the professions, or as confirming 
their claims. 
 
Illich’s (1974) concern was about the dependency professions 
fostered.  Rather than allowing people to face up to life’s vicissitudes, as 
they formerly might, hopefully to emerge as stronger, better, individuals, 
and perhaps even allowing their community to assist them in their 
struggles (so strengthening social bonds), he noted instead how such a 
morally communitarian ethos was supplanted.  People increasingly 
avoided their neighbours and simply turned to the professionals and their 
offer to put the problem right in privacy, and without creating a sense of 
reciprocal obligation (other perhaps than in terms of due deference).  In 
healthcare, misery at the increasing alienation from community and a loss 
of sense of self-worth were the iatrogenic consequences.  The ill could 
merely keep taking the tablets.   
 
Feminist scholars have also been highly critical of (male 
dominated) professions.  One such critique, both wide in its scope and 
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also interesting in its suggestion for remediation, suggests that 
experience, at least in some circumstances, can be as good as expertise:  
 
“The movement’s critique of physicians is extensive.  Women cite 
serious communication problems.  Physicians frequently are 
patronising, detached, disrespectful, racist, homophobic, and 
unwilling to trust the reports of their women patients.  Subjective 
experiences of illness and treatment are frequently ignored… 
 
Medical professionals now claim to be experts in subjects that 
formerly were the territory of non-professionals.  Thus, child rearing 
and aging are matters to discuss with our doctors… 
 
In a sense, the medical world defines women as inherently defective 
throughout life, in that we ‘require’ a physician for all our normal 
female functions. 
 
Movement women believe the greatest hope for change comes from 
the woman consumer’s acquisition of knowledge, for this can provide 
the basis both for presenting an authoritative critique and for 
becoming a less dependent and more assertive participant in the 
health care system….Goals include greater patient control and the 
demedicalization of childbirth,… and even abortion, if it is performed 
by qualified non-professionals.  Indeed …a…network of self-help 
groups has emerged in which some ‘experienced’ participants 
perform early abortions” (Dresser, 1996: 147,148, 151). 
 
The notion of expertise was thus openly challenged and shown as a 
product of knowledge with a corollary implication that to keep expert 
status the professions had to find ways of controlling access to the 
knowledge. 
50 
 
3.4 Ethical code 
 
Traditionally, the professional ‘professed’ a belief which invariably 
incorporated a requirement to uphold an oath (Lester, 2009).  He 
(generally, but later also ‘she’) had to subscribe to an ethical code which 
effectively acted as his client’s service guarantee when it was difficult to 
judge the quality of the service being offered, especially when its final 
result may only be known years ahead (and perhaps even subsequent to 
the demise of one – if not both, or all - of the parties involved).  A code of 
ethics indicated a ‘higher calling’ than mere commerce and suggested its 
members had a personal overriding objective of seeking to do the right 
thing in all matters.  Because of this and their education, a professional 
would expect, and be expected to, speak out (‘profession’ deriving from 
the Latin for ‘speaking forth’) on matters of public policy for example, and 
so had to be seen as independent of both the State as well as at least of 
certain aspects of commerce.  The professions therefore emphasized 
trust, discretion and honest dealings - and thus competence (as cognitive 
dissonance could not allow a person to profess to uphold such ideals 
whilst simultaneously believing they were incapable of performing the 
tasks they would undertake for their clients).  Thus members of the 
medical profession for example – and at least in the ideal representations 
of such persons - would do all in their ability to secure the life and health 
of the patient.  The lawyer would protect the rights of the client.  And both, 
like the cleric, would maintain client confidentiality to the absolute.  Such 
trust depended on the professional being perceived to be above moral 
reproach in all matters, socially as well as in business. 
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The strong tie between the professed oath and religion was usually 
seen as a product of the Church’s monopoly on education.  In the West, 
historically, universities only taught aspects of the Christian faith and 
expected their student-adherents to acknowledge the creed, necessitating 
that education and an oath were inseparable.  But even as the 
Reformation graded into the Enlightenment and the universities taught the 
newer (profane) disciplines, the oath was kept.  Thus it was that the 
professions were linked to higher education, and over time it was the 
educational requirements, practical training and increasingly even 
licensing which encroached on the religious and effectively reduced the 
‘professional oath’ to ritual status.  Rationalism (certainly never 
emotionalism) underscored the professional’s education and training, and 
characterized the (male-dominated) professions. 
 
The concept of ‘profession’ thus came to acquire “two related 
meanings: (i) an occupation that is characterized by high moral standards, 
including a strong commitment to the well-being of others, mastery of a 
body of knowledge and skills, and a high level of autonomy; and (ii) the 
collectivity of individuals who practice a profession” (Williams, 2009: 48).   
3.5 Expertise 
 
Professions have strongly advocated the notion of expertise, and 
have had a strong vested interest in identifying and controlling what it was 
that defined ‘professional expertise’ (Larson, 1990).  Expertise and the 
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disposition to apply that expertise responsibly thus contend to be defining 
traits of a profession (and in this show how the trait and power theories 
can overlap).  Expertise has required competence, and the correct 
disposition required a code of professional ethics.  After expertise and a 
code of ethics, a third defining trait was that the professionals identify 
themselves as belonging to a recognised body.  By their professing to 
practise according to the standards expected from members of the 
professional body, those who avail themselves of the professional’s 
services could expect that the services be rendered according to a 
standard of quality.  This was reassuring to the service user where she 
herself could rarely judge the quality involved – especially as the final 
outcome may not have been known for many years (well after any bill had 
been paid and perhaps even post mortem).  Even the traditional British 
professional’s practice of billing in guineas reinforced the notion that the 
service quality received was often of an unclear, indeterminate, nature. 
3.6 Moral basis 
 
Nonetheless, there would appear to have been an inevitable 
requirement for a moral basis to underpin a profession.  In the case of 
medicine that moral basis was the need for the provision of a certain 
standard of health care for the community.  Whenever a certain level of 
aggregate need arose then: 
 
“what is required is collective or joint action on the part of many 
persons.  Accordingly, a cooperative enterprise or institution is 
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established that has as a collective end the provision of health care 
to the needy many… 
 
Where such collective responsibilities to assist can most effectively 
be discharged by establishing institutions and institutional roles 
whose institutional duties consist of providing such aid, such as 
doctors and hospitals, then members of the group who have the 
collective responsibility have a derivative responsibility to establish 
and support such institutions. 
 
Further, members of a given group may have collective moral 
responsibilities towards the membership of that very group, that is, 
the group of which they are members” (Alexandra and Miller, 2009: 
77, 79). 
 
Each profession thus needed to establish its legitimate right to 
determine and provide the correct standard of service and to do this it 
emphasized its members’ skills, training, education, qualifications, 
licensure, peer-acceptance and the like.  Professionals, in thus laying 
claim to be the experts, accordingly expected monopoly rights to practise 
the profession. 
 
However, inroads into such claimed expertise, and the exalted 
positions the professions came to hold, developed with expanded 
education which in varying degrees undermined the informational 
asymmetry which had traditionally so characterised professional service 
and which had given the professions much of their esoteric power base. 
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  From universities being for the few and Christian men only, they 
became increasingly not only for both sexes but simply for the many.  The 
consumer movement and patients’ associations also developed from the 
1960s and promoted the notion that the patient should have a say in the 
treatment they were being offered.  The internet too has meant that 
knowledge was far more accessible than it ever has been (e.g. Nettleton, 
2004). 
 
With all this, the ‘wonder’ at medicine diminished, as the population 
began to understand more and more about how their bodies worked.  
Members of the public began to arrive at the doctors’ with their own 
wants, rather than merely prepared to accept what the medical profession 
decided they needed.  Some wanted the ‘pill’ to control their fertility and 
so liberate them from nature, others wanted antibiotics despite having a 
virus, and collectively they wanted all manner of medicines to minimise 
their health deficits.  And not just on the traditional medical model.  Health 
was increasingly about what the consumer wanted not just what the 
doctor believed was appropriate for the patient – or what was socially 
affordable.  With more people benefiting from enhanced educational 
opportunities so more often would the doctor find the patient to be the 
smarter – either about the specifics of the illness (e.g. Rogers, 2010a), or 
in general.  Patients armed with newspaper articles or internet findings 
tended to put their doctor in the ‘backseat’ (Ahluwalia et al., 2010).  Even 
worse for the medical profession was the fact that the customer was no 
longer the client – the NHS (and insurance companies) had ensured the 
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separation of the payer from the patient/client.  Increasingly there was a 
role for big business too as the pharmaceutical companies and the other 
research organizations such as the Medical Research Council employed 
medical professionals as salaried researchers.  The medical profession 
increasingly faced conflicts of interest – were they to promote patient 
health or corporate profits? 
3.7 The historical incision 
   
Sociological approaches to the professions, which revealed 
important perspectives on the professional agenda and how it contended 
and fared in society, have been rivalled by the approach of historians of 
medicine.  The two disciplines’ understanding of the phenomenon can 
eventually be seen to share many similar insights, but it was the historical 
record that illustrated the progress of the professions, and clearly showed 
the progress of the medical profession as being about creating a 
distinction in skill-sets which separate and ranked the various professions.  
For this reason it is appropriate to temporarily switch tracks as it were and 
follow the thinking of some medical historians about the development of 
the medical profession.  Here it is notable that the medical profession has 
concerned itself with creating and maintaining a social position for itself 
such that other (non-medical) approaches were, at best, relegated to the 
side-lines and not permitted to interfere with the medical approach.   
 
History shows us that in 1803 Thomas Percival coined the 
expression ‘professional ethics’ to reflect his new conception of 
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professionals as members of a self-regulating learned occupation, 
dedicated to the service of society and the care of others. 
 
“Percival’s new concept of a profession that was inherently ethical, 
compounded three somewhat different notions into a new 
conception, laying the groundwork for centuries of uncertainty about 
what it is to be a professional.  The three conceptions that Percival 
compounded were [1] a conception of the professional as someone 
playing a role governed by its own internal morality of service to 
others, [2] the idea of the professional as bound by a social contract 
in which social privileges are conferred on a learned occupation in 
exchange for social obligation to serve society, and [3] the notion of 
the professional as a member of a fraternal society, bound by its own 
self-imposed rules” (emphasis added, Baker and McCullough, 2009: 
291). 
  
His first two concepts may strike one as being probable suspects in 
having driven the functionalist approach, and the fact that there were two 
supportive concepts adds credence to why this approach might have been 
thought to have sufficient strength of support to contend as the early ‘front 
runner’; the third concept justifies an approach based on the notion of 
‘power’. 
 
Thus, and against such authors as Pellegrino (1979) and Pellegrino 
and Thomasa (1981), the origins of the modern concept of a profession: 
 
“have nothing to do with the Hippocratic Oath, or with any other 
aspect of ancient Greek medicine… [Indeed] originally the term, 
profession, simply meant one’s occupation – the occupation one 
declared to the [Roman] tax collector under oath.  The term lacked 
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any moral connotations and it was not associated with collective self-
regulation or with service to others” (Baker and McCullough, 2009: 
290).  
 
Baker and McCullough reinforce this by noting that in 1541 usage 
of the noun phrase “the medicynall profession” indicated that there were 
several medical occupations – at least including the apothecaries, 
physicians and surgeons.   
 
Johnson’s Dictionary of 1755 demonstrated that the term 
‘profession’ was then synonymous with the concept ‘liberal profession’ 
and had clear normative implications deriving from the term ‘liberal’ and 
designating literacy and formal, advanced, education.  The term 
‘profession’ still meant ‘occupation’ (as it always has), but the liberal 
occupations were those of the educated classes (Baker and McCullough, 
2009). 
 
Liberal professions were of course not options available to the 
working classes.  Whilst the upper classes had no need to work, and 
could rely on their inherited estates and wealth, the working class had no 
choice but to work and essentially engage in labour intensive work.  
Middle class gentlemen however, lacking sufficient property, needed 
income but could not demean themselves by labouring.  So it was that 
Percival adopted the Ciceronian belief that “occupations suitable for 
gentlemen…involve special rules that carry with them role-specific duties 
or offices of service to others.  This commitment to service allows a true 
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gentleman to accept the demeaning fact that compensation is associated 
with these occupations; they are thus social ‘roles’ that true gentlemen 
can properly play without lowering their gentlemanly status” (Baker and 
McCullough, 2009: 293).  Percival thus reversed the notion that a 
gentleman could take up certain learned occupations without demeaning 
his status by transferring the concept of a profession into something that 
could make a gentleman of an office holder.  Percival’s goal was to turn 
the mere occupation of medical doctor into a profession, which would 
have a favourable social status against which the consumer or patient 
could contrast the rival healthcare providers of the time.  Howard-Jones 
(1982) in fact claims Percival perpetrated a ‘marketing hoax’ to persuade 
the public to place their trust in the medical doctors rather than with rival 
providers of treatments.  
 
To this end, Baker and McCullough have also explained how 
Percival took the Lockean notion of a ‘social compact’ to legitimate what 
otherwise should have been perceived as an oxymoronic idea - a private 
practice being a public trust.  Percival’s calls for self-regulation were also 
purposively designed as a seemly remedy to the existing practice of 
publically castigating rivals, which only served to damage the perception 
of doctors as a whole. 
 
In Baker and McCullough’s account it was thus Percival who 
invented the concepts of the modern profession, professional ethics and 
medical ethics.  Percival’s concept of a profession was of a self-
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regulating, educated occupation and public trust, bound by its own 
morality and dedicated to serving others.  Of course, the joints of these 
crafted features of the profession came to be loosened over time, and 
then largely concealed by events, persons, myth and the unintended 
consequences of change.  If one were to uncover the layers of historical 
development however, the medical profession as originally envisaged by 
Percival could still be found.  Parsons was thus justified in seeing 
professionals as socially-oriented, and not merely out for their own ends.  
Such an apparently ‘rose-tinted’ view of the medical profession may 
actually not have been so far from the truth - at the time it was still not 
particularly well-paid, and those who went into the profession often did so 
with altruistic intentions.  As Lundberg, an American physician writes, 
“Medicine was a caring profession in those days [and into the 
1950s]…That system stands in stark contrast to the one that exists 
today… Patients knew their doctors then.  Physicians talked to them, and 
they tried to follow the doctor’s advice…” (Lundberg, 2002: 1, 2, 3).  The 
change, Lundberg tells us, came with the commercialisation of medicine. 
   
The commercialism and bureaucratisation of healthcare have also 
been seen by others to have eroded medical autonomy with the dictates 
of corporate or public budgets, or the algorithms of the health 
maintenance organizations, revealed as the true arbiters of what care a 
patient would receive.  
 
“The GP and consultant contracts are de-professionalising, and 
have had the effect of simultaneously demoralising and enriching 
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doctors.  We’ve lost the volitional work of the doctors and far too 
many of us are now just working to rule” (Rogers, 2010b). 
 
No longer was the medical profession seen as solely concerned 
with the centrality of the patient (although this still had its occasional 
heuristic function when it came to ‘clinical decision making’ in the face of 
NHS attempts to manage the service).  The fiduciary relationship had 
taken a bashing on one side, and on the other, patient lifestyle choices 
supported by ‘patient rights’ meant the traditional model of 
professionalism was being pushed to a consumer-vendor model. 
3.8 Scandals 
 
If the separation of the payer (‘customer’) from the patient 
(‘consumer’) was a massive inroad in to the power base of the profession 
as it pitted the doctors’ supplier power against the NHS’s buyer power, its 
timing too was unfortunate for the profession, as other circumstances 
(especially socialism), culminating at around the same time, served to 
weaken the power of the professions.  In medicine for example, the birth 
of the NHS came about the same time as the judgements at Nuremberg 
which cast aspersions on the integrity and trustworthiness of the medical 
profession just as Dr Crippen had seemed to do a few years before the 
war.  The initial response was to shrug off the events as more to do with 
Nazism than medicine, but the World Medical Association recognised the 
problem and began fighting back behind the scenes, eventually 
countering in 1961 with its Declaration of Helsinki to clarify that ‘proper’ 
doctors did not do such things as the Nazi doctors had.   
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The thalidomide tragedy of the early 1960s was a further set-back, 
as were the revelations of Beecher (1959, 1966) and Pappworth (1962, 
1967).  Increasingly, events such as these, and the Tuskegee story 
(Jones, 1993) could not be quite offset by the countervailing success of 
medicines that actually worked, or new technologies such as kidney 
transplants and heart surgery, the conquering of smallpox and the general 
success of other vaccinations.  For far too many it was becoming clear 
that the medical profession needed more supervision, and could not be 
entirely trusted to manage to keep its own house in order.   
 
Scandals such as Alder Hey, the Bristol Children’s Hospital, and 
those involving such disparate medics as Drs Ledward, Meadow, 
Wakefield, and Shipman were, cumulatively, difficult to ignore (and these 
just in the UK).  In South Africa, numerous doctors privileged apartheid at 
the expense of health care (Silvoe, 1990), and in the Soviet Union too 
many psychiatrists conspired with the State to misuse psychiatric 
diagnoses (Pelligrino, 1995).  The mystery of medical professionalism, 
traditionally defined within a foggy construction involving expertise, 
autonomy and ethics, was revealed in moments such as these as 
suggesting that whatever the mystery was, it was not something that the 
medical profession alone could be relied upon to manage appropriately. 
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3.9 Indeterminacy  
 
If it has been the notion that the professional was an autonomous 
expert whose adherence to a code of ethics both acted as a guarantee 
and justified the social licence the public gave them, then the heart of the 
problem of the profession was its indeterminacy: even with a wider level of 
general knowledge the patient still could not always really know what the 
service offer should comprise, particularly when confronted with the 
complex and ‘messy’ reality of their own situation.  Even if the patient 
knew what treatment was required, s/he could neither perform the 
procedure required, nor even keep a watchful eye on proceedings given 
the depth of anaesthesia that usually accompanied surgery.  The 
consumer was thus virtually blinded at times, if not to the ‘what’, then 
often at least to the ‘how’.  Thus the professions had to be given a 
measure of trust, and indeterminacy has been the traditional problem (or 
strength) of the professions.  Jamous and Peloille (1970) however pointed 
out that where knowledge was made exoteric or when it could be 
systematized then there becomes a possibility for both external 
intervention and social control.  Society’s greater knowledge base 
(evidenced in the widened participation in higher education and the ease 
of access to information via the internet) certainly challenged 
indeterminacy.  For the professions, everything hinged on society’s trust.  
The various scandals and social and technical developments – such as 
the introduction of surgical performance tables - have altered the 
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traditional relationship that patients have had with their doctors and have 
largely served to undermine this trust (Dingwall, 2008a; Lundberg, 2002; 
see also Humphreys, 2007d). 
3.10 Medical ethics 
 
Armstrong (2007) saw bioethics, the ‘invention’ of a seamless 
history of medical ethics stretching back to Hippocrates, and evidenced-
based medicine, as three strategies of the medical establishment to 
recapture the traditional notion of medicine as a profession, despite 
encroachments made upon it.   Such encroachments could be regulatory 
(Flynn, 2004; Nettleton et al., 2008), but would also include budgets and 
clinical guidelines; ‘standards’ of care (when surely incommensurate); the 
promotion of patient consumerism and satisfaction surveys; revalidation; 
deliberate destabilizing strategies such as, in the UK, the imposition of 
‘walk-in’ centres and ‘commissioning’; and the self-harming, disuniting 
practices of the profession itself with the incessant specialisation of 
medicine (paediatric histopathology, clinical cytogenetics, paediatric 
neuro-oncology,…) encouraged by both ever easier transport enabling 
greater choice, and increasingly near-instant global informational flows 
(which allowed the patient to contradict the doctor’s ‘expertise’). 
 
However, it was not in the interests of service users to be unable to 
trust the professional, as judging the service quality remained an elusive 
pursuit.  A high standard of conduct was therefore to be required from 
professionals as a sort of alternative metric where it was not desirous that 
the client be expected to assess, or even be asked about the standard of 
64 
 
service they had received.  Professionals were thus expected to live up to 
the public’s (vague but firmly-held) expectations that the professional was 
in fact trustworthy.  This professional obligation to fulfil the expectations 
the professions themselves fuelled was mythically premised on a duty to 
keep a promise (the Latin ‘profiteor’, to profess, emphasized the oath-like 
formal commitment of the professional) to live in accord with their 
professional ethical code. 
 
However, as Hooker pointed out: 
 
“Professional codes of ethics are… not really codes of ethics, but 
codes of expectations.  They represent an attempt to define for the 
public what the profession promises to do, so that professionals 
know which promises to keep. 
 
Professionalism and the promises on which it is based are possible 
only if professional conduct is predictable.  If professionals did what 
they individually think is ethical, rather than what they have agreed 
upon collectively, their conduct would be unpredictable. 
 
 [Thus,]…professional ethics is not ethics.  It is the identification of 
expectations that professions have created” (Hooker, 2006: 3, 6, 8). 
 
In this it could be argued that such an understanding of ethics as 
was promoted by the professional bodies was almost to deny that ethics 
was about the autonomous self seeking to do the right in all things.  
Following guidance could discourage ethical thoughtfulness, and as 
Steare (2006) suggested, such an approach to ethics could be regarded 
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as, at best, at the immature end of the moral spectrum (see also 
Humphreys, 2010a). 
 
Increasingly, the medical profession taught ‘professionalism’ to its 
aspirants.  ‘Project Professionalism’ (ABIM, 1994) sought to identify 
professional traits and, as far as these may be objectively assessed, they 
were indeed taught and assessed in medical schools.  It was as though 
professionalism had been given a life of its own, the artificial creation of 
one man became ‘naturalised’, ‘real’ and objective.  Rather than leaving 
sociologists to attempt to discern the characteristics of the professions, 
the medical profession thus attempted to take back the lead. 
 
Whilst the professions sought to bolster the traditional tools that 
guarded them – their professional ethics, licensure and an emphasis on 
specialist knowledge - the damage to the professions had been done.  
They are no longer excused jury service, and the concept of a 
professional as anything special has nearly collapsed such that a 
contemporary usage of the term would encompass virtually anyone 
engaged in paid employment (Evetts, 2003).  The world has changed and 
any strategies to shore up the dignity of the professions cannot 
realistically now exclude a more knowledgeable public.  Evetts (2003) for 
example has argued that professionalism in general has become less 
about an expert group maintaining its occupational position, and more of a 
mythical-ideal aspiration promoted by owner-managers through which 
they hoped to set the standards they could expect from their staff, 
66 
 
especially when supervision was difficult.  In this, rather ironically, 
whereas a profession once claimed to be the embodiment of trust, which 
the customer could rely upon, increasingly the buyer was expected to 
impose aspects of professionalism on the service worker in order to 
extract some service quality.  In fact, society generally has lost much of its 
former trust in the ‘professions’ and increasingly kept them under gaze 
itself.  One way it has done this has been to impose lay members on the 
professions’ regulatory bodies (Stacey, 1992), and even stipulating what 
the professional was to do in particular circumstances: in medicine for 
example, National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
technology guidance is mandatory and departure from NICE clinical 
guidance can be subject to subsequent requirements to justify one’s 
actions. 
 
Thus the literature on professions indicates that they have been a 
mechanism for control and for the protection of an occupational group, 
and that they have tendencies to mythologize that group’s social role, 
often via a professional code of ethics.  Their power-base has been in 
their indeterminacy but this has been increasingly capable of being 
undermined with wider access to information.  As this study progresses, it 
will be of interest to see not only if and how the heralded changes in the 
fortunes of the professions as they confront, in particular, greater general 
education and access to knowledge, are reflected in the experiences of 
members of research ethics committees, but also to try to discern to what 
extent the concepts of professions has shaped REC practices. 
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  The literature review now turns to review how the literature has 
discussed the ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ roles on ethics committees.  Much of the 
account is seen to be either dated or reflective of practice in the United 
States, and not infrequently both ‘flaws’ can be seen to be simultaneously 
evident. Nevertheless, where RECs are concerned, little has perceptibly 
changed over the decades, and so this literature still has value. 
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4. Literature review: expert and lay roles on 
committees 
 
 
The concern of this chapter is with how the academic literature has 
attempted to account for the roles of the expert and lay members of 
research ethics committees.  Member roles have been problematic, and 
remain unclear.  Indeed, it is the lack of clarity in understanding the role of 
the expert and lay members on RECs as has been revealed (e.g. by Dyer 
2004), and what the implications of this are, which are to be pursued in 
the qualitative research that shall form the substantive element of the 
current research. 
 
Whilst it was the broad aspects of the literature on professions that 
were of interest for the review in the previous chapter, in this chapter the 
requirement was for a greater depth as well as breadth.  For this the 
research necessitated a more extensive literature search.  As bioethics as 
a discipline was established in the USA (see e.g. Fox and Swazey, 1984; 
Evans, 2012) many of the journals that have specialised in research 
ethics over the years have been US-based, and the US too is where the 
specialist on-line search-engine of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics’ 
National Reference Centre for Bioethics Literature is located.  This 
reference centre has intentionally collated relevant material since the early 
days of the discipline and its international scope offered a comprehensive 
coverage of the field of enquiry.  An advantage of its search-engine was 
that ETHXWEB, rather than requiring the insertion of the various possible 
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combinations of terms to capture the different ways of describing RECs - 
IRBs, REBs, “ethics committees, research”, “research ethics committees” 
and so forth – offered a ready code (“18.2”) to designate all such 
permutations.  Thus searching for (“expert” or “unaffiliated” or “non-
scientific” or “lay” or “community” or “member” or “role” or “roles”) and 
“18.2” identified papers of interest which in turn indicated other material of 
interest and so instigated further iterations to identify additional sources.  
Material that had not been digitised, such as the Bulletin of Medical 
Ethics, did not escape consultation either.  The complete set of this 
bulletin was available to me in the library of the Royal Society of Medicine, 
London.  Electronic theses were also searched through the British Library 
(http://ethos.bl.uk/).  
  
It was possible to discern in the literature three broad chronological 
approaches to concerns about REC member roles.  The first, which I date 
from the mid 1970s was primarily based in the USA and largely led by 
philosophers interested in applied ethics and the situation of the new 
ethics committees there.  Representatives of such literature include 
Veatch (1975), Robertson (1979) and Williams (1984).  A second strand 
from the mid-1980s picks up a broader interest group as other academics 
and practitioners gained an interest and the attention began to move 
outside the US.  Here empirical work commenced and Fox and Swazey 
(1984), Nicholson (1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1997) and 
Neuberger (1992) illustrate the attention given by sociology, medicine and 
philosophy respectively, with the latter two attending to committee 
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structural matters in the UK. From the 2000s a more sociologically 
interested set of academics became more critically involved including 
Dingwall (2006, 2008a, 2008b, 2010); Dyer (2004); Edwards (2010a); 
Hedgecoe (2008, 2009) and Hunter (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) to name 
just some from the UK.  In the US and Canada, social scientists such as 
Schrag (2010), Evans (2000, 2010, 2012), van den Hoonaard (2011) and 
Stark (2012) also became interested as the ethics committee scene 
entered a mature stage and it became possible to discern trends and 
practices, and perhaps the unintended corollaries of those practices.  
Their especial concern has been with the alleged imposition of the 
biomedical model of ethics review on to social science research.   
 
Throughout this time – some four decades – proportionately few 
researchers have been able to research the ethics committees from the 
inside, and much of the research that has been done has involved 
surveys, with interviews being something of a rarity.  De Vries (2004) has 
claimed that REC members have been notoriously reluctant to become 
subjects of research themselves, and van den Hoonaard has noted “there 
are virtually no published materials concerning the perspectives of 
committees” (2011: 39) whose activities, he suggested, are hidden by “a 
veil of secrecy” (2011: 10).  
4.1 Committee composition 
 
Veatch (1975) provided one of the earliest accounts of the 
expert/lay issue and argued that the REC was an intermediate case 
between two models of the review committee.  The ‘interdisciplinary 
71 
 
professional review model’ made up of diverse professionals such as 
doctors, lawyers, scientists, and clergy, brought professional expertise to 
the review process, whilst the ‘jury model’ reflected the common sense of 
the reasonable person.  In the latter model, he believed that expertise 
could disqualify one from serving.  However, he felt that both professional 
and jury skills were required on RECs as dominance by the professionals 
made it more difficult to be responsive to the informational needs of the 
reasonable person or to be adept at anticipating community acceptance. 
 
Robertson (1979) argued in favour of correcting the ‘structural bias’ 
of professional domination by the inclusion of a ‘subject surrogate’ – an 
expert advocate for the subjects’ interests.  At about the same time too, 
Department of Health and Human Sciences’ regulations in the US began 
to encourage IRBs to consider including members from relevant 
communities (such as those affected by AIDS if the study was relevant to 
that community) or from persons who know about or are experienced with 
particular subject groups (e.g. paediatric nurses if children are to be 
researched).  The situation is similar in the UK in that, for example, NHS 
RECs may be ‘flagged’ as specializing in particular areas of research.  
However evidence suggested that the spirit of such recommendations has 
not always been embraced by the institutions.  Just as in the UK ‘flagged 
RECs’ were often optional for researchers (NRES SOP v. 5, para 1.13, 
September 2011), elsewhere it remained the case that: 
 
“It’s not unusual for IRBs in large institutions to have three to four 
times the minimum required membership, [whilst keeping] with one 
72 
 
non-scientist, non-affiliated member flying solo.  In the alphabet-
soup world of the highly credentialed, the input of these singleton 
community members is easily overlooked – or, worse, discounted.  
Does this power imbalance make for credible research review?  Not 
really” (Bauer, 2001: 7). 
 
Such a comment raised the suspicion that lay members were unwelcome 
in IRBs, being merely tolerated because of the legislation that insisted on 
them.  There is less overt evidence for lay members being ‘unwelcome’ in 
UK RECs – but in the next section the contributions of Legood (2005), 
Richardson (2007), and Stacey (1994) at least hint that some lay 
members may perceive themselves as positioned as inferior to the 
experts.   
 
Williams (1984) believed that in the case of IRBs, because they  
were so dominated by professionals, they were more likely than a 
layperson to place a high value on the benefit of developing new 
knowledge and so downplay risk.  In particular they (i) shared an 
unwillingness to be thought paternalistic, and preferred instead to 
recognise the autonomy of the subject; (ii) found it easier to adjust the 
consent form in order to assuage their consciences about 
paternalism/autonomy rather than re-write the protocol; (iii) tended to be 
pro-research; and (iv) as a group could be persuaded to accept more risk 
than would individuals. 
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In the UK, a 1986 report by the Royal College of Physicians on 
healthy volunteer research recommended that there be a minimum of 
three types of member: 
 
“Membership should comprise at least:- 
 
(a) Medical: both those occupied chiefly with clinical care as well as 
experienced clinical investigators; a general practitioner should be 
included whether or not the Committee reviews projects in general 
practice. 
(b) Nursing: a nurse who is in active practice with patients. 
(c) Lay: i.e. one, or perhaps better, two persons not trained in or 
practising any medical or paramedical discipline. 
 
It is important that the community should have confidence in Ethics 
Committees and provided that the membership is seen to be broad 
and not exclusively medical and the lay members to be persons of 
responsibility and standing who will not be overawed by medical 
members, such confidence should be forthcoming. 
 
Experience has shown that lay members, though they may not grasp 
some of the niceties of some research projects (nor do some of the 
medical members), are invaluable, particularly on issues of consent 
and information to subjects.  A lay member with legal training can be 
of great value and his/her role should be a general one, not simply to 
answer questions of law. 
 
Both sexes should be represented” (emphasis added, Hoffenberg et 
al., 1986: 16).  
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Interestingly, as the report suggested, ‘nurses’ were then seen as a 
distinct membership category although no reasonable rationale for this 
proposal appeared.  The definition of lay is also of note as, coupled with 
the medical and nursing definition it is possible to see here the origins of 
an option for the lay role being available to retired medical members and, 
as has happened, to non-practising nurses.  Retired medical members 
subsequently managed to maintain their ‘expert’ status. 
4.2 The lay member 
 
Outside of the area of REC investigation, more general research on 
expert and lay roles in other committees has noted dissatisfaction with the 
term ‘lay’ as it has tended to minimise the contribution such a member 
could make and discounted supposedly non-relevant, but equally 
‘professional’, skills. 
 
A strand in sociology, especially that of health and illness, has 
explored lay understandings or knowledge of health.  Stacey (1994), a 
prominent authority on the topic, preferred the term ‘people knowledge’.  
She argued that as all people are of equal worth, all views should be 
heard.  She also noted that people are not just consumers of health but 
that they also produce it: they care for themselves and others for example.  
As Zola (1973) pointed out, they do not always use medical professionals 
when seeking care.  ‘People knowledge’ derives from experience, and, 
being based on personal experience and anecdote, contrasted with 
evidenced based medicine.  Stacey’s dislike of the term ‘lay’ was because 
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it demarcated those not in the relevant profession, who lacked 
qualifications, who were less competent, and for whom the term 
suggested a lesser moral worth.  Instead she emphasized that an attribute 
of professionalism was ‘service’ and so indicated that ‘experts’ should 
respect the views of the ‘lay’ community at least in order to accommodate 
that community’s level of understanding and so assist them in achieving 
their health maximising goals. 
 
Stacey also observed that a health professional “may be an expert 
in their area, [but] faced with expertise of another kind they are just one of 
the people” (1994: 96).  This was a point which Collins and Evans (2002) 
discussed at some length and arose too in other commentaries on 
medical doctors as reviewers of research about which they may be very 
ignorant, yet where they were still accorded ‘expert’ status, as will be 
seen. 
 
Whilst Stacey has been in the vanguard of those sociologists who 
would seek to de-privilege the ontology of expertise and the epistemology 
associated with it, others have chosen to emphasize other aspects of the 
concept.  Jewson (1976) for example, had pointed out that lay subjectivity 
was compromised by the objectivity of the expert, and Prior (2003) 
similarly came to doubt the possibility of ‘lay expertise’, pointing to its 
oxymoronic status with expertise being concerned with generalisable, 
scientific, knowledge rather than experience.  Pasveer (1989) had noted 
that the objectivity/subjectivity divide could only be further widened by the 
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introduction of new medical technologies.  Such developments and 
‘break-throughs’ though mean that the medical profession needed to 
become ever more specialised to manage such emergent technologies, 
and so any of its individual member’s skills and level of expertise had to 
be appraised in this light.  It was also however increasingly possible for 
non-medical people to gain knowledge in very narrow fields of personal 
interest because of widened education and universal access to 
information via the internet.  They could become more knowledgeable 
about certain matters than many medical professionals, whose expertise 
would be in other, usually more general, areas. 
 
Popay and Williams (1996) identified three important contributions 
that lay knowledge might add to professional medical practice.  They 
suggested lay knowledge introduced ideas about social determinants of 
health, informed the appropriate level of communication, and, by offering 
subjective experiences of health (which can be rather different to the 
experiences of those with a scientific understanding of the aetiology and 
characteristics of a condition), could help tailor appropriate individualised 
treatment advice. 
 
Three main rationales have also been offered for incorporating lay 
participation on to predominantly medical committees.  The Merrison 
Committee’s (1975) proposal to include a few lay members on the 
General Medical Council was based on the assumption that “even a few 
laymen will change the perspective of proceedings, for example by 
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preventing discussions taking place which reflect solely the common 
backgrounds which medical graduates will have”.  Hall (1991) claimed that 
lay members were introduced onto RECs in order to alleviate a suspicion 
that self-regulation merely protected professional interests.  Allsop and 
Mulcahy (1996) noted the lay presence on RECs was because: “decisions 
might have to be made about the balance of advantage between gains in 
knowledge…and some risk to participants.  It was argued that such 
decisions should not be left to doctors but be decided by a more broadly 
based group” (p.150). 
 
In a different, but allied, view of lay representation, Hogg and 
Williamson (2001) identified lay people on health service committees (and 
thus not necessarily on RECs) as falling into three broad categories, viz. 
supporters of dominant (professional) interests, supporters of challenging 
(managerial) interests and supporters of repressed (patient) interests.  
 
There exists a general sense that the term ‘lay’ indicates 
unprofessional, and it has been seen by some REC members as 
demeaning, insulting or at least marginalising: “many lay members [have 
stressed their claim that they] were highly professional people in their 
respective fields” (Richardson, 2007: 2).  The term essentially emphasized 
the limited ability of someone in a particular context.   In the ethics 
committee at the University of Limerick’s business school (ULREC): 
 
“There is no lay member on ULREC, the rationale being that this 
committee rarely decides on individual applications.  It focuses 
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instead on university policy, thereby rendering lay members 
unqualified with respect to the requisite institutional knowledge 
needed for committee service” (Mullins and Doyle, 2010: 135). 
 
ULREC appeared to regard ethics as merely about adhering to 
university policies rather than thinking though the moral implications of 
those policies.  In making no attempt to be independent however, it might 
not have met everyone’s definition of what a REC should be about.  
Alternatively ULREC may be viewed as unusually honest – by shunning 
the cynical use of lay members as an ‘independent’ source in order to 
achieve a politically-driven goal, it did not set out to deceive in pretending 
that it particularly welcomed outside interference.    
 
Lay members were likely to believe they add value.  INVOLVE, a 
public involvement organisation associated with the NHS, surveyed lay 
members of NHS RECs in the autumn of 2008 about what such members 
felt they brought to the ethics committee.  The research findings (Simons 
et al., 2009) were essentially of a demographic nature but of interest was 
that 52% described their professional (occupational) background as 
forming the specific perspective they brought to the REC, 39% identified 
bringing a patient, carer or service user perspective and 20% described 
their perspective as being a potential research participant.  The survey 
consisted of check-box solicited responses and less directed responses 
could have been more illuminating.   
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As for the expert role, the literature has generally tended to regard 
this as straightforward: the expert was there to give expert advice on 
matters within that member’s purview (EULABOR, 2005, and see below).  
The role of the lay member though was less clear and several studies 
have looked at this. 
 
Nicholson (1986c) reported that “[a]lthough the principle of lay 
membership of research ethics committees may have been accepted [and 
he dates this to 1967 in both the US and UK], the purpose of such 
membership is by no means certain” (p. 165) and by “no means 
universally accepted” (p. 157).  Dyer too has noted, 
 
“we must be clear what we expect lay people to contribute and how 
we expect them to do so.  In answering these questions we must 
grapple with contested epistemic and socio-political claims about 
expertise… the actual role of lay members is vague and inchoate…  
When we fail to address what we want the public to contribute and 
how, we risk wasting peoples’ time and endangering further the 
relationships of trust between experts and non-experts” (Dyer, 2004: 
340, 347). 
 
The Clinical Trial Regulations define the ‘lay member’ as any 
member of an ethics committee who was not an expert member (Sch. 2 
(1)).  Expertise was defined in terms of science and research such that 
any non-clinical practitioner – even a member of the clergy - was regarded 
as ‘lay.’  The Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committees 
(GAfREC; Department of Health, 2001) took its lead from such 
80 
 
regulations.   As such governance arrangements apparently sought “to 
create a very different lay constituency than that of the hospital chaplains 
and solicitors of the past” (Dyer, 2004: 342), it would be interesting to 
discover to what extent lay membership still consists of clerical members 
in our increasingly atheistic society, and why such religious officers feel 
they make suitable members of such committees.  Whilst NHS REC 
annual reports do show several ordained members, as so many 
committees give the occupation of the lay members as “lay member” (sic) 
it was not possible to use these sources with any confidence for such a 
project.  One or more clerics were included in my research sample, but I 
could not pursue this line of enquiry with them for fear of jeopardising their 
anonymity. 
 
‘Lay’ members then were: 
  
“defined by something they are not rather than by something they 
are.  They are named for the skills or knowledge they do not have 
rather than the skills and knowledge they do have…  The ‘lay’ 
person is, in this sense unknowledgeable, indeed, we might say, 
ignorant” (Legood, 2005: 135). 
 
Porter (1986) has confirmed that this was also the position regarding the 
lay (‘non-scientist’) member in the United States of America. 
 
Both Cownie (2006) and Tucker (2006) have noted how lay 
members, probably because their roles can be perceived as so nebulous 
that they can find little other to do, tended to engage in tinkering with 
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grammatical matters.  Angell and Dixon-Woods (2008) have also explored 
this and found in studying the correspondence sent by RECs when 
explaining their decisions to would-be researchers that grammatical 
matters were not always improved by the REC.  By adopting a role as 
amateur grammarians, one may suspect that lay members have missed 
their true vocation on the committee, whatever that may be.  They have 
seemed in taking this role to have betrayed their sense of having a merely 
tokenistic place on the committees.  
 
This situation was also an international concern as a report for the 
European and Latin-American systems of ethics regulation of biomedical 
research made clear: 
 
“Although the role of professionals is relatively clear and is obvious 
from their professional specialisation, what the role of the 
Community Representative constitutes is not as clear.  UNESCO, for 
example, speaks of the ‘lay’ representative or representative of the 
local community or local values.  The WHO Operational Guides for 
Research Ethics Committees refer to ‘people who represent the 
interests or concerns of the community’, who might be professionals 
or non-professionals.  In some cases, they are put on the same 
footing as ‘representatives of patients with a particular illness’.  In 
others, they are defined by their membership.  For example, this 
occurs in Chile: Technical regulation 57 defines the Community 
Representative as a representative of an ‘organisation with an extra-
institutional basis’, leaving the definition of the individual 
characteristics of this representative broadly free.  The same non-
definition would seem to be perceived by the community 
representatives themselves.  For example, in a survey recently 
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conducted on community representatives of research ethics 
committees in the USA meeting at a conference concerning these 
issues, it was found that more than half stated that they did not know 
the limits of their role” (EULABOR, 2005: 6).  
 
The correspondence between international ethics committee 
arrangements was accounted for by Schrag (2010) who explained that 
other countries followed the US example, in part because of its 
experience, in part because their model was approved by the main 
funding body at the time (the US Department of Health), and now because 
of the International Conference on Harmonisation – Good Clinical Practice 
(see below). 
 
Ghio has suggested that: 
“[lay] members… represent people who have no academic 
background in the medical profession.  Their goal is to represent 
members of the community…  If something is a concern to them, it 
may be a concern to a future research subject as well” (Ghio, 1980: 
7). 
 
  Against this though was the fact that, in the UK, letters of 
appointment to both NHS and IEC members have been clear that 
members were not appointed as representatives of anyone.  NRES’s 
standard operating procedures for research ethics committees also state: 
 
“2.66 REC members do not sit on the Committee in any 
representative capacity and need to be able to discuss freely the 
applications submitted to them.  For this reason REC meetings 
should be held in private, and members should be encouraged to 
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raise any matters of concern” (v.4, April 2009 [para. 2.65, v.5 
September 2011]). 
 
In a questionnaire survey of non-scientist/non-affiliated IRB 
members, Porter (1986) reported that the ideal lay-member was described 
as: 
 
“an assertive, self-confident, and intelligent individual with an interest 
in research and research protections.  He or she should have mature 
judgment, be reasonably well-educated (generally a college 
graduate) with a general knowledge of research programs involving 
human subjects and the purpose and objectives of the IRB.  He or 
she should be a sensitive person with a strong sense of ethical 
values and empathy for patients who may become subjects of 
research programs.  The unaffiliated/non-scientist member has a 
major role in promoting full disclosure to and understanding by 
subjects.  Such a member should have time to devote to studying 
protocols and attending board meetings.  Perhaps most important in 
the opinion of those who responded is the ability to work with 
medical professionals and others on the IRB, and to present 
questions, concerns, and objections to proposed procedures 
articulately and in a spirit of teamwork and mutual respect” (Porter, 
1986: 5-6). 
 
However, it was likely that such qualities could apply equally to all 
members of the committee, just as any or all members could comment on 
the grammar and style of participant information leaflets. 
 
In terms of their contribution to debate, Porter’s survey also 
indicated that lay members “although they were able to make a 
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contribution and [felt] that their views were heard and respected, 
[recognised] the potential for a less-than-equal role for the 
unaffiliated/non-scientist member certainly was present in the IRB” (ibid: 
6). 
 
This finding reportedly also reflected the findings of a study by the 
US National Commission in 1978 which reported lay members to be “less 
active than other members, but … they did bring concerns different from 
those of the scientists on the review committees, and they believed their 
reviews were heard” (cited by Porter, 1986: 1). 
 
In a recent contribution to the literature, Stark’s (2012) 
ethnographic account of IRBs identified three ‘warrants’ by which 
decisions were made in such committees.  The professional warrant 
emphasized a review member’s expertise in the area under review; the 
objective warrant used facts or figures to make a point; and the third 
warrant supported its contention by reference to personal experiences.  
The professional warrant trumped the others and as the objective warrant 
tended to outrank personal experience her account indicated that the lay 
member would be in the weakest position from which to take part in any 
debate.  Bond (2012) subsequently indicated a fourth warrant which 
accorded high value to one who raised an issue of a potential harm.  
Again the medical member was most likely to be able to play such a card.  
Van den Hoonaard (2011) also noted that scientifically trained members 
have tended to have the advantage over lay members in being able to 
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more quickly identify issues of concern in research and so lead the 
debate.  
 
In contrast to a view of medical dominance, Evans (2012) believed 
that a bioethics profession had built up in the USA which influenced much 
of ethics committee activities.  There is limited support for such a view 
however and his analysis did not consider the situation in the UK or 
elsewhere. 
4.3 Recruitment 
 
The methods by which members were recruited have also been 
studied and were of interest.  Porter found that most members were 
recruited via a: 
 
“‘friend or acquaintance’.  A large number indicated that they had 
been requested to serve by the chairperson of the IRB or by 
members or former members of IRBs.  Such members did not 
compete for their membership nor did they present their credentials 
formally or in interviews for the position” (Porter, 1986: 6).   
 
This finding may suggest that such members were not truly 
representative of the public, but chosen for their convenience.  As this 
finding was both dated and in any case related to the then situation in the 
USA it would be helpful to understand this matter in the context of 
contemporary practice in the UK.  Of interest in this connection was the 
following anecdotal account by a lay member in the US: 
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“Two years ago, a friend of mine on the research ethics committee at 
the Sir Mortimer B. Davis Jewish General Hospital suggested I join 
as a community representative… 
 
[Having joined, and] as the months went by…I think that I began to 
identify with the professionals – to think that I was part of the group.  
And since the group was made up of intelligent, hard-working, well-
intentioned people who were trying to do good things, I thought: Who 
am I to question their judgment? 
 
Perhaps I became less effective as a result.  Perhaps I lost my 
outsider’s perspective – the different point of view I brought to the 
table… 
 
…What is my role on this committee?  Am I [a] rubber stamp? Am I a 
necessary bum on a chair or hand in the air required by some 
government regulation?  Am I simply a grammarian, rearranging 
awkward sentences, correcting spelling errors, and throwing in 
punctuation marks where appropriate?  Can I actually contribute 
anything meaningful to this process?... 
 
As a community representative, can I really represent ‘the 
community’?  I don’t think so.  How can I represent a community that 
is multiethnic and multifaceted – old, young, white, brown, black, 
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, agnostic, and atheist?  To say 
that I bring a perspective that is not medical, not scientific, and not 
academic is not to say that I represent ‘the community’” (Slaven, 
2007: 17-18). 
 
Here not only was the lay member recruited by an existing expert 
member but there was an indication of the lack of a clear role for the lay 
member and a tendency towards both capture and group-think. 
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Legood’s comments were interesting in this regard too, and may 
offer a partial explanation of the problem.  He pointed out that: 
 
“…giving no payment for serving on an ethics committee means that 
it is less likely that those from lower socio-economic groups will be 
able to serve on the committee.  As a consequence, lay members 
may be more likely to reflect the membership of the committee that 
already exists.  This, perhaps, detracts from the distinctive role of the 
lay member for which they may have been recruited” (Legood, 2005: 
136). 
 
 
Such views certainly reflected the Ad Hoc Advisory Group’s 
contemporaneous report that membership of RECs: 
 
“is drawn in general from a relatively narrow spectrum of society, 
members tending to be professional in background and from an 
older age group.  We do not have evidence of ethnic mix but doubt 
that RECs overall reflect the mix of the communities that make up 
our society” (Department of Health, 2005b: 10). 
 
Neuberger (1992) engaged in detailed research amongst UK RECs 
in the early 1990s visiting over two dozen (NHS) RECs from amongst 
those which responded to a postal questionnaire (222 out of 241 RECs), 
observing and interviewing members.  Her research concentrated on the 
formal composition of each committee and the way the committees 
operated in practice.  At the time of her research the Department of Health 
guidelines suggested a membership of between eight and 12 members 
from both sexes, to include hospital medical staff, nurses and general 
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practitioners, and at least two lay members.  Her research found the 
greatest breach was in terms of lay membership with 34% of RECs having 
fewer than two lay members; 28% failed to include women whilst 24% had 
fewer than 8 members.  Some 19% of RECs had more than 12 members.  
Hospital doctors accounted for more than half the total membership.  
Neuberger noted that “Among the lay members of the RECs are those 
who by virtue of their training can provide a different professional input 
from that available within the medical profession” (1992: 20).  She noted 
14% of lay members were clergy and 16% lawyers.  However, the 
guidelines did not, and do not, require that the lay membership either 
have, or do not have, a professional background.  She discovered that 
the: 
 
“general view appeared to be that sensible lay people, not moral 
specialists, were what was needed…  Yet it was apparent from 
observing the committees in action that a person who was trained to 
think clearly and analytically about moral questions would have been 
a valuable addition to the committees” (ibid). 
 
Presumably, by ‘general view’, as the majority of members were doctors, 
it was the medical profession’s view that those with a moral philosophical 
skill-set were not needed.  Neuberger herself is implying though that 
ethics training for members would augment their role. 
 
Steare developed an ‘ethicability’ tool (Lewis, 2008) to help indicate 
a person’s ethical preferences.  This may also have been useful for 
achieving a balanced committee, although his published work failed to 
89 
 
explicitly identify that such an application of his tool had been considered 
(Steare, 2006; but now see Humphreys, 2010a for this). 
 
In a summary of what was known of the recruitment of members to 
RECs, Anderson noted that whilst the success of recruitment to IRBs 
could be indicated by how long people stayed in the committee to which 
they were appointed, she also highlighted the fact that information on how 
members are identified and recruited was acknowledged as being 
particularly sparse:   
 
“Although there have been calls for increased representation of lay 
community members on IRBs, little is known regarding their 
experiences or their perceptions of human subject protections and 
the IRB process” (Anderson, 2006: 135). 
 
4.4 Ethics theories 
 
The origins of RECs have been discussed earlier (ch. 2) and were 
seen to have originated following from scandals involving medical 
research.  RECs were put in place in an attempt to curtail further scandals 
in health research.  What ethics was though was never formally outlined 
to these committees and this may be due to its inherently subjective 
nature.  If ethics is about ‘doing the right thing’ this may sound as though it 
is objective, but it is in fact much more a subjective notion.  Guidelines 
can thus be criticised for trying to ‘codify the subjective’, and thus the 
‘ethical’ element – be it in the form of a framework or particular theory of 
ethics - which may be supposed to underpin the workings of an ethics 
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committee, has been more assumed to exist than been demonstrated as 
operative.  As Meslin et al. (1994) noted: “Several sets of guidelines for 
the review of human subjects research are available, but whether 
members of REBs are aware of them or use them is uncertain” (p.9). 
 
  Rothstein and Phuong have noted how several official reports in 
the US have “indicated concern that scientific rather than ethical 
perspectives tended to predominate in IRB deliberations” (Rothstein and 
Phuong, 2007: 76).  This has been reported in the UK too, for example by 
Collier (1997) and by Nicholson (1986c).  The latter reported a survey of 
REC chairs which sought their views on the usefulness of various 
guidelines, and to which their response was that very many of them were 
unaware of or did not use the guidelines at all.  This all raises a question 
of not only how knowledgeable members of ethics committees are about 
theories of ethics, but in turn raises another question about how members 
perceive the functions of the committees – are the members there to 
ensure certain guidelines are adhered to, and if so which ones, or if not 
how do they decide what is ethically acceptable?  Van den Hoonaard 
noted both that “biomedical research… forms the basis of these formal 
research-ethics codes” (2011: 4) and that Canadian conferences for REB 
members regularly “proclaim the supreme validity of ethics codes, [which 
were] seldom punctuated by counternarratives” (2011: 98).    He also 
noted that despite this, REB members were not knowledgeable about the 
ethics codes or guidance (van den Hoonaard, 2011). 
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West and Butler studied their own committee and reported that that 
(non-CTIMP) committee’s ‘ethical preference’ veered towards ecological 
ethics and ethics of caring.  They did not address the ‘purpose’ of ethics 
committees (perhaps because it was thought ‘obvious’) but went on to 
suggest that 
 
“Transparency of the ethical framework that underpins each LREC 
would, if disseminated to the research community, help researchers 
through the process of applying for approval, and could contribute, in 
the long run, to the quality of the research conducted” (West and 
Butler, 2003: 19). 
 
They thus implied that the concern of the committees was with the 
methodology or science underpinning the research.  As to the explicit 
intent of declaring the ‘ethical framework’ in order to guide applicant-
researchers, they do not say how this objective might be achieved and the 
suggestion itself may be regarded as both naïve and problematic.  No 
doubt they had in mind helping the qualitative researcher grapple with 
thorny ethical issues involved in, perhaps, participative or action research.  
Yet, to pursue their logic would seem to deliver one into an unpleasant 
cul-de-sac.  For example, could a researcher apply to the ‘utilitarian’ 
committees; how might the committee decide its ‘ethical framework’ (is it 
decided by the chair?); and how might it adapt to new members - or 
should new members be forced to adapt to it?  Implicit in those questions 
was another issue: how is power wielded in ECs?   
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By contrast, Kent (1997) after undertaking a limited survey of LREC 
members (none of which dealt with Phase I research) believed that they 
were most “concerned with the protection of participant’s rights” followed 
by ensuring scientific adequacy.  
 
Hunter has suggested that “[lay] members with a formal 
background in ethics can be useful for picking up on more subtle ethical 
issues, such as issues of justice” (2007a: 25).  However it is unclear 
whether there are more than a very few such members (and apparently 
none on IECs), or how well informed existing members are about the 
question of justice, the wider set of the four principles approach 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2009), or indeed of any ethics guidance.  The 
topic of how lay members consider such theoretical approaches to ethics 
review will be explored amongst the membership and reported here.  
Members’ attitudes towards such matters as how they go about 
determining the adequacy of the arrangements that are in place covering 
insurance, liability and indemnity, and how they perceive ‘Good Clinical 
Practice’ are also issues that shall be examined.  
  
In terms of Rothstein and Phuong’s own quantitative survey of 
nurses, physicians and unaffiliated members of IRBs, they found nurses 
to have consistently greater concerns about ethical issues than other 
member groups, scoring more categories as ‘very important’ than the 
more discerning physicians.  Whilst they noted that such “below-average 
ethical concerns of physicians [may be] … explained as a generalized 
93 
 
commitment to research.  Physicians might also believe that most 
researchers have high ethical standards, thus reducing the need for 
detailed oversight by IRBs” (Rothstein and Phuong, 2007: 79).  Gender 
differences were not considered, and their observation that “[u]naffiliated 
IRB members rated ethical concerns similarly to all other members” (ibid) 
was ambiguous.  It possibly meant that they consistently but 
independently scored similarly to those professionals associated with the 
institution of whose IRB they were a member, but the authors went on to 
say “[s]ome analysts have suggested that unaffiliated members lack 
understanding of the technical issues and might therefore defer to other, 
more influential IRB members” (ibid).  That non-scientist, but not 
necessarily unaffiliated, members do defer on technical points seems 
reasonable – but surely should be countered at least occasionally by their 
own contributions.  Or do they just follow the pack, having been subject to 
‘capture’?  My research findings concerning how IEC lay members cope 
with the technical issues (and experts) is to be reported below. 
4.5 Training 
 
Any lack of understanding of technical issues might be addressed 
by training, yet Allison et al. reported that in the US (as in the UK): 
 
“there currently is no educational program in place … designed 
specifically for non-scientist IRB members.  Although it is not clear to 
us that such a program is necessary, our study suggests that some 
of these members may view their role too narrowly by, for example, 
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focusing on the informed consent document” (Allison et al., 2008: 
12). 
 
Being forced onto the back-foot of orthography and parsing 
(“wordsmithing”) has been the finding of other research too, as has 
already been noted.  Sengupta and Lo (2003) as a further example 
engaged in a telephone survey of 32 lay members and found that: 
 
“94% reported that their main contribution was simplifying the 
consent forms… 88% occasionally had been intimidated and felt 
disrespected by [scientist members].  Forty-seven percent of 
participants identified lack of education and training as a problem, 
and 78% wanted more intensive education and training for future … 
[lay] members” (Sengupta and Lo, 2003: 212).   
 
Van den Hoonaard reported reasons for lay people joining a REB 
included a belief “that they would learn about research and research 
ethics” (2011: 87).  This could indicate that they were at least prepared to 
be trained. 
 
There have been some moves in both the US (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001) and Canada (Sampson et. al., 2009) towards the 
accreditation of both members and IRBs and this is now developing 
greater momentum.  Appraisal of UK NHS RECs is also now firmly on 
NRES’s agenda.  Freedman and Glass (1990) had predicted a 
requirement for professional standards to be obtained, or at least 
exhibited, by RECs and so some sense of UK members’ feelings about 
the issues of training, education and accreditation would be interesting. 
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In the UK, Jennings (2012) has recognised that “[research] ethics 
committees lack expertise, not just on the research they review, but also 
on research ethics” (p.95) and called for a national consensus on what a 
REC training syllabus should include. 
 
In all, the literature suggested, as Porter (1987) had it, the essential 
roles conceived, by the lay member, as his/her own, were to represent 
and protect the vulnerable mainly by ensuring that the consent documents 
address what a reasonable person might want to know in sufficiently clear 
language.  The lay member though was also revealed to be almost a 
cipher character, subservient to the expert (medical) members.  However, 
the research bases were generally aged, US-based and non-specific 
about the particular type of research the ethics committees studied 
engaged in.  It is thus appropriate to explore these issues within the 
context of contemporary UK practice, and within as restricted a type of 
committee as possible in order to factor out extraneous variables. 
4.6 Objectives 
 
From the literature, a number of issues can be identified as being 
of particular interest because they have not been looked at, or the data 
has become aged, or because of a non-UK focus.  These issues will each 
be addressed in the research which follows, and its focus shall be on UK 
independent Phase I [healthy volunteer] research ethics committees 
(IECs).  These committees have been selected as an appropriate focus 
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because such committees have dealt with a very narrow range of 
research protocols (and, incidentally, it has generally been their protocols 
where risk to the subject has been the greatest and where too there has 
been no prospect of benefit to the participant).  This affords a real chance 
to identify committee roles because in such a setting the roles will not 
have varied depending upon the type of study presented: the ‘study type’ 
variable being naturally eliminated in this environment.  The objectives of 
the study then are: 
 
 To understand how expert and lay members of UK independent 
Phase I [healthy volunteer] research ethics committees view their 
role and what tensions exist between the ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ 
designations on such committees 
 To understand how members were recruited and their motivation 
for joining 
 To capture key demographics of interest amongst the interviewees 
– age range, professional/educational background, training 
engaged in 
 To discover whether such members believe they principally 
respond to the ethical issues that arise from an intuitive or common 
sense perspective, or whether they follow any particular ethics 
guideline(s) or theoretical stance(s) (inc. the ‘four principles 
approach’ (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009)) and if virtue ethics 
has any role to play 
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 To understand how members justify following guidelines when 
ethics is an autonomous discipline 
 To understand how members see their role in relation to the 
science versus ethics debate; and similarly how they deal with legal 
issues or questions about insurance/indemnity, or indeed the 
various Declarations of Helsinki and ‘Good Clinical Practice’ 
 To discern their feelings about accreditation – both of the 
committee and of the individual 
 
Collectively these objectives will enable the following research 
question to be answered: “How do both expert and lay members of UK 
independent Phase I research ethics committees perceive those roles and 
what does this imply?” 
 
Having identified the important background literature, and drawn 
out the key issues of concern, it is now time to introduce the methods by 
which the present research on how members of IECs perceive the expert 
and lay roles was conducted.  This is the focus of the next chapter. 
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5. Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of the current research is to explore, amongst a sample of 
members of independent ethics committees, their perspectives of the 
rationale for, and functions of, the respective roles of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ 
members on such committees.  Greater clarification and understanding of 
these roles will enable focused debate leading to enhanced role 
consensus and hence influence considerations concerning future training 
provision.  Together such outcomes permit strengthening members’ 
mutual appreciation of the two roles. 
 
  In attempting to understand the members’ perspectives, the study 
seeks answers to a number of specific research questions which were 
identified following a review of the literature as detailed in the previous 
chapter. 
 
This chapter describes the study’s research methodology and, in 
particular, it (i) provides the rationale for the research approach and (ii) 
the particular methodology chosen; (iii) offers a description of the research 
sample and explains the logic of sampling from the population of study; 
(iv) gives an explanation of the methods used for data collection; (v) 
discusses the approach used in the analysis and synthesis of the data; 
(vi) discusses how the chosen methodology contributes to the 
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trustworthiness and rigour of the findings; and (vii) discusses the main 
ethical issues attendant upon the research. 
 
Following Silverman and Marvasti (2008) the chapter adopts the 
‘natural history format’ with a preference for use of the personal pronoun 
and a broadly chronological accounting for the research processes. 
5.2 Rationale for the research approach: qualitative research 
 
Qualitative research is anchored to the belief that there is no one 
truth in social matters.  Such an interpretivist position regards social truths 
as relative - being experienced, interpreted and understood at particular 
locations of time and context.  The intent of qualitative research is thus to 
seek understanding by allowing the researcher to enter into the world of 
the researched and attempt an holistic understanding of that world 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2003; Mason, 2002).  The emphasis is on discovery 
and description.  Quantitative research by contrast has an essentially 
positivistic outlook, being posited on the notion that there are facts that 
can be discerned, typically by the testing of hypotheses.  In quantitative 
research small differences can often be discounted in favour of the 
majority.  Data may even be ‘trimmed’ to fit as ‘outliers’ are discarded 
(Helgesson, 2010), and it is the preponderance of numbers that will tend 
to win out as quantitative researchers typically describe the characteristics 
of the phenomena lying immediately beneath the peak of the normal 
distribution curve.  Yet in the real world of real people one must recognise 
that different people have different opinions and that the validity of an 
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opinion is not necessarily proportionate to the numbers voicing it (Sim and 
Wright, 2000). 
 
An interpretivist or constructivist framework of inquiry would 
support the ontological perspective of the existence of multiple realities, 
each of which are constructed and alterable by the knower.  This is not to 
say that different realities are more or less true; rather the view is that they 
are simply more or less informed (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).   
 
Seeking the perspectives of members of IECs about the two roles 
of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ suggests the appropriateness of a qualitative research 
approach.  Bryman (2008) describes the fundamental characteristics of 
the qualitative research strategy as one that rejects the natural science 
model, emphasizes an inductive (theory-generating) approach, and seeks 
to explore the range of interpretations held by the different social actors. 
 
Amongst the methods considered for obtaining my study data was 
the case study (or even a multiple case study) approach, but given the 
small number of IECs, the difficulty of gaining prolonged access to any 
committees, and the desire to sample as widely as possible within the 
small group, this approach was discounted early on.  An ethnographic 
approach was dismissed for identical reasons.  Another approach 
considered was ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) but this 
approach required, amongst other things, that the researcher approach 
the research without a prior set of theoretical expectations and with a 
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somewhat restricted view of the extant literature that concerned the topic.  
I excluded myself from this approach, having too much ‘baggage’ to 
enable this: I was an officer member of an IEC, I have views about the 
role (although they are not inflexible) and I perceive others to have 
different views.  I have even found those differences pushing me towards 
a sense of role ambiguity, and also suggesting that either I or my 
colleagues on our committees must be doing someone – either the 
researcher, or the appointing authority – some disservice by potentially 
vacillating in the role.  Dyer (2004) and others have found that this role 
uncertainty is potentially an issue for other REC members too. 
 
A focus group approach was also considered but discounted 
because of the difficulties I envisioned in gathering participants from 
around the country, and by concerns about how open members might feel 
in such an environment: any issues of confidentiality would be subject to 
factors (other participants) outside of my control. 
 
I became convinced that a series of semi-structured interviews 
would give me an appropriate degree of structure in which to gather data 
confidentially whilst also permitting me some flexibility, which was 
necessary because I could not predict what my respondents would say or 
where their comments would lead.  The interview approach also had a 
particular benefit in that it is the least likely of all the possible qualitative 
approaches to meet with resistance from an ethics committees (van den 
Hoonaard, 2011). 
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5.3 Philosophical hermeneutics 
   
Data gathering is important, but not more so than analysis.  Mason 
(2002) has suggested the metaphor of ‘excavation’ for the process of 
interviewing and revealing data, and as a metaphor it is not dissimilar 
either to Kvale’s (1996) suggestion of ‘mining’ or Foucault’s (1970, 1973) 
‘archaeology’.  Uncovering though is not enough, and one has to 
understand what it is that one has unearthed.   
 
In reviewing the qualitative research literature to identify an 
interpretive approach that would best fit with my own experience and 
philosophical outlook, I was particularly impressed by aspects of the 
Heideggerian phenomenological approach - sometimes described as 
existential phenomenology, or, when it is inspired by Gadamer (1976), as 
‘philosophical hermeneutics’.  Nevertheless, I did not subscribe to all – 
indeed certain key – components of the standard approach to this or any 
other phenomenological approach.  In particular I was not interested in the 
‘lived experience’ of members of RECs not least because their 
involvement in ethics meetings would typically engage them for just one 
meeting a month approximating to perhaps eight hours a month (including 
reading time).   
 
A hermeneutical description of the analysis process emphasizes 
the need for both the researcher and researched to co-construct meaning 
(Koch, 1996).  Kvale (1996) too draws attention to its emphasis on a 
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mutual joining-together and it is within the interview process that issues 
are raised for both parties which, when accommodated, instigate a 
process of coming to an understanding. 
 
Thus the broad approach of philosophical hermeneutics can be 
considered as starting from the epistemological assumption that reality is 
context dependent: there are quite simply multiple realities.  Almost every 
individual has his or her own perspectives on life that have arisen due to, 
and are continuously being re-shaped by, whatever situations are 
encountered on life’s journey.  Our unique experiences of the world, 
coupled with our particular cultural and background experiences (including 
where, when and how we were brought up and by whom) all mean that 
we see things from more, or less, subtly different perspectives.  It is the 
role of the researcher in hermeneutic methodological enquiry to identify 
and interpret the ‘hidden assumptions’ that the participants hold.  
 
Hermeneutics though can be thought of in terms of the Hawthorne 
effect (Miller, 2000) with the researcher having an effect on the 
respondent who in turn will conduct themselves in recognition of the 
interviewer’s presence.  Different answers may be given to different 
interviewers due to their different statuses, personalities, phrasing of 
questions, and so on. 
 
Whereas Husserl’s (1980) phenomenology encourages the 
‘bracketing’ of one’s experiences in an attempt to reduce the prejudice 
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with which one would otherwise experience another’s perspective, 
Gadamer (1998) is more realistic and for that, more honest, in viewing this 
as an impossibility and hence an absurdity.  Indeed one’s prejudices can 
be used to help find intelligibility: they assist understanding.  In 
Heideggerian phenomenology it is in the analysis that “data generated by 
the participant is fused with the experiences of the researcher and placed 
in context.  The interpretation becomes a merger of data sources, or a 
construction” (Koch, 1996: 176). 
 
As the knower and the known cannot exist without the other, 
bracketing is impossible – one cannot stand outside of the pre-
understandings and historicality of one’s experiences.  One cannot 
‘unknow’.  Thus, the prejudices and assumptions of the researcher are not 
to be bracketed or set aside, but rather are to be regarded as essential to 
the interpretive process. 
 
Data can thus include the researcher’s personal reflections on the 
topic, information gathered from research participants, and even evidence 
from outside the context of the research project itself (Polkinghorne, 
1989). 
5.4 Participants and setting 
 
Members of independent ethics committees (IECs) were the target 
population of study.  This group was selected because they comprised a 
discrete group whose members uniquely only reviewed one particular type 
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of study (viz., Phase I “healthy volunteer” studies).  The narrow remit of 
the committees prevented individual members attempting to specialise in 
certain types of protocol as they might on other committees where 
members might have ‘allowed’ colleagues to take the lead on particular 
types of study on an idiosyncratic basis.  In IECs there were no leavening 
studies such as student research or qualitative studies, no one could take 
a particular patient-group perspective (because there are no patients), 
and science and safety were the responsibility of another independent 
body of experts (para. 3.80 NRES SOPs, v.4 [13.8 v.5]).  The singular 
focus of the IECs helped to address one of van den Hoonaard’s (2011) 
methodological concerns about researching RECs.  He has pointed out 
that RECs typically deal with a diverse range of research and that this 
range acts as an impediment to drawing conclusions even about the 
EC(s) under study.  Such diversity was not however a feature of IECs.  In 
IECs the members’ roles can be expected to have become finely-tuned 
over the years of their existence to dealing with those issues that were 
thought appropriate to those members.   
 
Other reasons added to the decision to locate the study in the 
IECs.  Firstly these committees have never been studied before, which is 
of interest in itself and has the corollary that as members they were a 
research-naïve group.  Secondly, the size of the group was such as to 
suggest an adequate sample response would be likely.  Thirdly, as a 
fellow IEC member, I already had a connection with the group and so 
envisaged being able to gain the necessary access. 
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At the time of conducting the research there were six independent 
ethics committees in England and one in Scotland.  Of the 21 NHS RECs 
authorised to deal with Type I research, none of those dealt exclusively 
with Phase I research.  None of these ECs were permitted to have more 
than 18 members (CT Regs sch. 2, s.3 (2)) and at least one-third of these 
members should be ‘lay’ (CT Regs sch. 2, s.3 (5) (a)). 
5.5 Methods of data collection 
  
Before data were collected, consideration had to be given to an 
appropriate sample size.  There is no agreement in the qualitative 
research literature on the right sample size – it must though be ‘adequate’ 
for the methodology employed.  Dey (1999) argues that the issue of 
sample size is almost a hegemonic relic from positivistic science and he 
points out that a representative sample is neither possible nor necessary 
in a non-positivistic paradigm.  What the qualitative researcher is seeking 
is perspective on a topic and whilst this can be obtained from one 
individual such a sample size is unlikely to command any real credence 
amongst those seeking an understanding of a groups’ perspective.  Thus 
sampling should aim to generate a wide-enough range of views to draw a 
picture with sufficient depth of tone and colour, with discordant hues 
supplying further interest.  The maximum variation sample is thus 
favoured. 
                                                     
 Capenhurst, Leeds, Manchester, Plymouth, Reading, Welwyn and Edinburgh. 
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The convention in qualitative research is that the appropriate 
sample size be predicated on the notion of saturation (Morse, 1994).  
Saturation is said to occur where further interviews become increasingly 
unproductive of introducing new perspectives (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
It is however a difficult notion and virtually impossible to demonstrate 
(Morse, 1995), especially in advance of the interview process.  Again Dey 
(1999) goes as far as suggesting that the notion is inappropriate as there 
is always the potential for new data to emerge.  Nevertheless sampling is 
necessary and the experiences of different methodologies have provided 
guideline sample sizes.  Phenomenology has “at least six” (Morse, 1994) 
or “between five and 25” (Cresswell, 1998).  Green and Thorogood (2009) 
suggest little new emerges beyond interviewing about 20 people.   
Despite such ‘target ranges’, I tend to side with Dey (1999) and believe 
the notion of saturation to be problematic for the reasons he gives.  It is 
also alien to a philosophical hermeneutic approach, which would not 
regard ‘saturation’ as crucial given that it regards truth as essentially 
temporal.   However, in consultation with the supervisory team, conscious 
of the size of the population of interest, and being uncertain of the 
response rate, saturation was estimated at 20 individuals.  This proved to 
be achievable (just), and appropriate too as subjects were giving a 
consistent range of responses by that point.  
 
In interviewing a sample of members of Phase I IECs I was 
interested in their subjective experiences about such matters as their role 
(as lay/expert members) in relation to the committee, colleagues, and 
108 
 
Phase I trials.  I wanted to understand their views on such matters as the 
concepts which they were supposed to safeguard – rights, welfare, 
dignity, justice and the like; ethical traditions, especially the ‘four-
principles’ approach (Beauchamp and Childress, 2009); the role of 
guidance versus the autonomous nature of ethics; whether there were 
potential dangers in an orthodox approach to ethical review, and whether 
subjective ethical opinions could, properly, be codified (i.e. what use were 
guidelines?).  Similarly I was interested in how lay members approached 
certain technical issues (such as science, insurance, indemnity) which 
might be involved in the ethics consideration; what role they saw for virtue 
theory; and what they felt about proposals for them or their committee to 
be accredited. 
 
Given this, and within a framework intended to capture issues of 
interest which are consistent with the research question, participants were 
to be asked to describe their experiences and views about the topics.  
However the questions were not always or necessarily going to be 
phrased in a particular way and participants were always to be 
encouraged to engage in follow-up.  I certainly wanted to allow the 
researched to identify their concerns and engage in discussion with me, 
rather than wanting to impose my own pre-conceived notions.  The semi-
structured interview approach was ideal for this. 
 
 
Interviewees were approached via their committee co-ordinators 
(found on the AAPEC website), who were provided with information about 
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the study (see Appendix 3), and asked to forward it to their members by 
way of invitation to participate.  None of those who took up that offer to 
contact me as being potentially willing to be interviewed were denied an 
interview.  Greater depth of interviewing was pursued in some areas with 
some interviewees where their knowledge afforded scope to do so and 
this helped generate greater variety amongst interviewees.  A snowball 
technique (Bryman, 2008) was also planned with the intention that it might 
help in the selection of additional interviewees – for example, recently 
‘retired’ members, or (if it were possible) others who had considered 
membership but decided against it (either before or after applying).  
However no such interviewees were recruited but several interviewees 
were seemingly able to persuade others on their committee to ‘step-
forward’ for interview.   
 
All willing interviewees were thus heard and I interviewed 20 
members representing all the committees apart from the committee to 
which I was attached.  Some interviews lasted longer or covered fewer 
topics in greater depth than others.  Interviews ranged in length from 42 
minutes to 102 minutes, with most taking about an hour.  Equal numbers 
of expert and lay members were interviewed and in a gender ratio of 9:11.  
Some interviewees had to be invited twice, and some may have decided 
to participate only through the auspices of a colleague. 
 
Interviews were all tape-recorded with the permission of the 
participants.  Three interviewees required that I either suspend recording 
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or simply not transcribe certain parts of their commentary as they wished 
to provide me, but not my tape-recorder, with additional information that 
they felt should remain confidential.  
 
Whilst most interviewees had been on their committee for a 
number of years, two interviewees had been associated with their 
committee for a considerably shorter period (I cannot be more precise for 
fear of indentifying the interviewees).  Nevertheless I believe I was very 
lucky to elicit the 20 participants I obtained as there had been a very slow 
start before momentum developed which occasioned some concern about 
recruitment strategies (including preparing a ‘plan B’).  Fortunately, a 
number of interviewees remarked at the close of the interview that they 
had enjoyed the opportunity to discuss the issues as ‘it made them think’, 
and I took advantage of such comments by asking those interviewees if 
they could encourage other members of their committee to contact me.  
This proved a helpful factor in reaching my recruitment numbers. 
5.6 Interview locations and mode 
 
Interviews were conducted in London, the provinces and Scotland, 
in meeting rooms and apparently-quiet areas of restaurants, following 
negotiation with the participants concerned.  Six interviews were 
conducted by telephone where schedules combined with distance to 
make a face-to-face meeting seem unlikely, and at a time when I was 
anxious to progress the interviews rather than lose any potential 
participants to holidays and the like. 
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5.6.1 Telephone interviews 
Initially I had been wary about mixing face-to-face with telephone 
interviews because I had been warned (not least by the ethics committee 
which sanctioned the research) that there could be a difference in the 
quality of interviews obtained via the two media.  The literature however 
did not necessarily indicate there would be a problem. 
 
Bryman (2008) has suggested that telephone interviewing has 
certain benefits.  It is cheaper, useful for hard-to-reach groups, when 
interviewer safety is an issue (the university’s REC had thought my 
research was such an instance and required to know what procedures I 
would have in place to mitigate such a danger), or when asking sensitive 
questions (again the ethics committee wanted to know what arrangements 
I would have in place should any of my interviewees become distressed).  
 
Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) have reported what was in effect a 
‘natural experiment’ when they, for pragmatic reasons, had to interview 
almost half of their targeted respondents by telephone as it proved 
impossible to meet with them face-to-face.  In analysing the responses 
obtained via the telephone interviews as compared with face-to-face 
interviews, they concluded that there were no discernible differences 
between the responses elicited by either method in terms of quantity, 
nature or depth.  Such findings have been mirrored by Bryman’s own 
experience of telephone interviews and he confirmed “interviewees were 
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quite expansive in their replies…the detailed replies suggested that the 
method can generate detailed and considered replies of the kind typically 
sought by qualitative researchers” (2008: 458). 
 
If anything, I believe my telephone interviews were slightly the 
more rewarding because I was less inclined to be distracted by waitresses 
and crashing crockery at one location, by the arrival of an unknown third-
party’s pre-school children wondering what I and my interviewee were up 
to in the airport’s McDonald’s restaurant, or by the next-due interviewee 
barging in and sitting-down in the room the current interviewee and I were 
already occupying.  I believe that the telephone allowed me to better 
attend to each word, which competing sensory inputs would not have 
permitted.  
 
 
5.6.2 Exclusion of my own committee 
 The decision about whether to include or exclude members of the 
IEC of which I was a member was not an easy one to make.  I was 
attracted to the idea of inviting members of my committee to be 
interviewed as I felt this could have enabled a more focused set of 
questions which would help me to penetrate to the issues efficiently.  For 
example I already knew the background of most of my own IEC’s 
members and could thus have launched into questions from a more 
advanced position.  With other interviewees however I would initially have 
to get some personal background from them and then move the interview 
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forward with minimal time in the interview slot to reposition my questioning 
strategy.  With colleagues I could also have attempted a focus group, or 
such a group could have been an option as part of a broader 
methodological approach which would have included an interview stage.   
 
I recognised that there are generally held to be three main areas of 
concern where research involves colleagues: voluntariness; privacy and 
confidentiality; and conflicts of interest (University of Guelph, 2006).  I felt 
too personally involved to make an unbiased decision and decided the 
best course of action would be to adopt the conventional position of 
excluding my own committee from my sample.  However, as I was keen 
not to exclude colleagues’ views from the research, I altered my planning 
a little.  Instead of seeking participant verification of my transcripts and 
interpretation I sought opportunities to ask members of my own IEC what 
they thought about such issues in a general way (indeed I had been 
asking such questions for years).  This helped to ensure that the 
understanding I was developing was still within the range of experiences 
of those members too.  In this way I was also able to avoid the difficulties 
Bosk (2001) experienced when he upset his subjects as, although they 
accepted he had not identified them or misquoted them, they did not like 
his interpretations.  As with Bosk, my interpretations are my own, and if 
they differ from those of any subject(s), like Bosk, I would say that 
research which does not make the reader sit up and think would have 
been a pointless activity. 
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5.6.3 Small sample sizes 
By excluding my own committee I was reducing an already fairly 
small population of interest to an even smaller one.  Two particular issues 
arise with small samples – the pressure to participate can be greater, and 
the threat of identity can be higher. 
 
With a small population there can be a pressure on both the 
researcher to recruit sufficient numbers, and on the researched to 
participate.  The interviewer/researcher has power, as Mason (2002) 
explains, in that they set the agenda, they control the data which 
emerges, they provide the interpretations and they are responsible for 
adequately guarding any promised confidentiality.  The participant’s power 
is in granting the interview and in the extent to which they agree to 
cooperate with the interviewer.  The informed consent documentation and 
its process acts almost as a contract between the two parties – the 
interviewer states what he or she will do, and on this basis the participant 
grants or declines an interview and regulates cooperativeness.  (See 
Humphreys, 2010b for more on the contractual nature of the consent 
process.) 
 
Mason (2002) doubts whether participants in much qualitative 
research can possibly give truly informed consent when not even the 
interviewer will necessarily know quite what they are going to say at any 
juncture in the conversation.  It is also the case that neither party may 
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know what interpretation will ultimately be placed upon the data obtained 
until the analysis of the data has at least commenced.  Nor do they know 
if the research will necessarily be published or, if it is, where and how it 
will be received.  The traditional way such uncertainties are managed is 
by promising not to identify participants.  However even with unattributed 
quotations it is always conceivable that someone may believe that the 
choice of vocabulary, for example, is indicative of a particular individual.  
There is thus risk involved in being a participant in research, which can 
only be managed by the thoughtfulness of the researcher.  Such risk 
increases where small populations are involved because the small 
number increases the possibility of participant identification. 
 
To guard against identity disclosure participants in this research 
are anonymised.  They are designated as ‘E’ (expert) or ‘L’ (lay) with a 
random number allocated to them (1-20 to represent the 20 interviewees).  
It thus cannot be assumed that 01 relates to the first interviewee or that 
consecutive numbers indicate members of the same committee.  Where I 
wished to draw attention to comments being made by a particular 
professional, or I feared that words or context could permit associations, 
reference numbers are omitted and reference is instead made to their 
profession (nurse, pharmacist,…) or member category (expert, lay) as 
appropriate to better protect identities. 
 
Of the six available IECs, a maximum population of (6 x 18 
members =) 108 members was assumed.  Although willing to interview 
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recently retired members too, which would have expanded the numbers 
above 108, no retired members were recruited.  With an intention to 
interview 20 members (10 lay and 10 expert), this represented almost 
one-fifth of the population of interest, and with at least one person from 
each of the committees, it was feasible (though extremely unlikely) that an 
‘insider’, reading the research, might believe they were able either to 
identify themselves, or a colleague, as being quoted.  If someone 
suspects they can identify themselves from a quotation it is suggested 
that they simply do not promote the fact for no one else can know.  And if 
someone thinks they know another person they cannot be certain and are 
advised instead to concentrate on the overall impressions as the findings 
were broadly shared.   
 
Although privacy and confidentiality were both implicitly promised 
by me to my participants, they were unaccompanied by guarantees.  
Participants therefore had to take such promises on trust, and with a 
stranger.  Fortunately, and again, I was not encountering a situation that 
others have not encountered before and the methodological literature had 
advice for such situations. 
 
 
5.6.4 Establishing trustworthiness 
The main piece of advice can be summed up as that the 
researcher needs to demonstrate trustworthiness.  I sought to do this by 
emphasizing my ‘insider’ role.  I tried to underscore the fact that I was not 
117 
 
a complete stranger or total outsider.  I had either met some of the 
potential participants at conferences or training sessions; I was a member 
of their small group (of IEC members) and I had a modest publication 
history in the journal they were all familiar with.  Participants could thus, I 
hoped, see that I did not have a history of revealing identities, nor of 
placing blame.  For example, my own account of a training session I had 
organized for my own IEC in which members’ moral stances were 
discussed had managed to avoid identities such that not even members of 
the committee were able to recognise each other, although they could 
identify themselves (Humphreys, 2010a).   I was also keen to stress that 
there were no right or wrong answers to my questions. I was interested in 
people’s perceptions and I had noticed that there were different views.  I 
would be presenting the findings in such a way as not to ascribe blame or 
censure. 
 
The fact that I was a colleague was meant to suggest that I 
understood their issues and would be able to provide immediate follow up 
and clarification of anything that arose in the interview.  If there was 
anything said that the participants later regretted they need only contact 
me and I would remove the offending material – no questions would be 
asked.  This was stated clearly in the participant information sheet (see 
App. 3).  No one availed themselves of that opportunity, but there were a 
few occasions when I was asked to switch off my tape-recorder to permit 
them the extra anonymity afforded by that measure.  The tapes 
themselves were erased after the transcriptions had been accepted by my 
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supervisory team, and no one outside the intimate team of just me and my 
two supervisors had access to the transcripts.  And the supervisors would 
not know the identities of those involved.  
 
5.6.5 Onerous nature of being interviewed 
Wolff (2004) highlights the fact that the qualitative research process 
places “unfamiliar demands” on its participants.  These include making 
time for conversations; surrendering control of physical space; acceding to 
communicative pressures; limiting one’s own communicative needs (to 
accommodate the interviewer); having to provide interesting data to 
satisfy the researcher; giving information; accepting the possibility of 
embarrassment and the need to question what one has taken for granted.  
Furthermore, such participants are typically expected to engage in a 
number of corollary obligations, including: 
 
 “smoothing the researcher’s path and suggesting competent 
interview partners; 
 answering questions they have never put to themselves, the 
meaning of which is initially obscure; 
 trusting the researcher without guarantees; 
 explaining to themselves and others what the researcher 
and the project are aiming at; and 
 signalling that they are not disturbed, even though they are 
under scrutiny, and so on” (Wolff, 2004:195-6).  
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Put like that it is a wonder anyone volunteers at all, and it is 
perhaps only because interview requests, and their implications, are not 
always consciously thought about in terms of these onerous obligations by 
those who might grant an interview that research interviews occur at all. 
 
Wolff’s advice for gaining access where obstacles were envisaged 
from the potential participants included the need to convince informants 
that the research was serious; that no harm would befall the participants; 
that the research would uphold their right to confidentiality; that it would be 
minimally disruptive; and that it would be over when the interview ended.   
 
Sixsmith et al. (2003) have suggested other tactics for overcoming 
such obstacles including demonstrating credibility and similarity, and 
building a rapport with the participants; Elliott et al. (2002) recommended 
showing empathy; Rist (1981) suggested making “acts of reciprocity”; 
Oakley (1981) advised that the interviewer answers questions and not just 
asks them; and Goode (2000) recommended giving feedback, as did 
Silverman (2005) who also advocated taking a decidedly non-judgemental 
stance.  I would add to these tactics an offer to inform the participants of 
the research outcomes and, wherever possible, tangible recognition for 
the time and effort the participant gives. 
 
Much of this advice was particularly relevant if I was to obtain a 
recommendation from someone who had been interviewed, that I was a 
suitable person for another volunteer to be interviewed by.   
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My experience was that all but one IEC was able to provide at least 
one interviewee initially, and that the interviewees were able to recruit 
others for my project.  My tactic in this was to prompt participants at the 
close of their interview by saying how much I appreciated their time and 
that their responses had been very interesting and gave me much to 
reflect upon.  This was in every case true as even the two interviews 
which revealed relatively impoverished data gave me cause to think about 
my interview skills.  The typical response to such a comment of mine was 
something along the lines of “I’ve enjoyed it too” (L19) or “...yes, it’s 
certainly made me think…” (E03).  As I passed the blank charity cheque 
(see an explanation of this below) with a reminder that the interviewee 
should make it out to, and pass it on to, a registered charity of their choice 
I asked them if they knew others on their committee who might still be 
available to help with my research, and I gave them a couple of spare 
participant information sheets to pass on. 
 
5.6.6 A reluctant interviewee? 
In the case of one IEC I suspect that the co-ordinator passed my 
request for interviewees just to the Chair, and that this individual may 
have decided not to bother members of that committee with the request.  I 
say this because I met with someone from that committee at a training 
session who claimed not to have been aware of my research and my 
quest for volunteers.  Although that individual subsequently declined to 
participate, the information gave me an excuse to contact that committee 
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again explaining that I had now interviewed at least one person from all 
the other IECs, and that it would aid my plans for anonymity if I could state 
that all committees were represented.  The Chair then offered to 
participate, I felt reluctantly.  We arranged a telephone interview.  Initially 
the Chair seemed somewhat curt but after a few exchanges, and, 
especially I think after I was able to impart some news about other matters 
ongoing concerning NRES/ AAPEC the conversation became more 
relaxed and ended with the Chair offering: “I’ve enjoyed it.”  I suspect that 
as I had been able to share a quasi-confidentiality with the Chair and thus 
presented myself as no less vulnerable than the interviewee that this must 
have been reassuring for the participant and aided their engaging with 
me. 
 
5.6.7 Atypical volunteers 
As volunteers, my interviewees were probably typical in being 
atypical.  Generally it is held that volunteers are: 
 
“not likely to be a random sample of the population.  They tend to be 
better educated, of a higher social class, more intelligent, more 
social, less conforming and possess a higher need for approval than 
non-volunteers.  This means that the external validity (the confidence 
to generalise to the population) is reduced” (Burns, 2000: 18). 
 
Fortunately, as the existence of such a phenomenon is recognised 
by a wide group of researchers it has become subject to a number of 
remedial responses.  The relevant remedial factors I would point to to help 
indicate the generalizability of my findings, notwithstanding the self-
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selecting nature of my volunteers, include the commonality of responses, 
that these accord with other findings, and that they are within my 
experience with both IEC and NHS RECs. 
5.7 The analytical approach 
 
 
In order to understand one’s data one has to know it, to see 
features in it (or indeed surprising absences), and to notice linkages and 
emphases.  Coding is often advocated as crucial for organising and to ‘get 
a handle’ on one’s data (as Mason (2002) puts it), yet meaning is not 
inherent in codes and there is a danger that in coding one can distance 
oneself from the very data one is attempting to analyse and become 
familiar with (Seidal and Kelle, 1995).  This was a concern always 
occupying a place at the back of my mind and probably contributed to an 
allied discomfort about whether I wished to avail myself of any software 
that was available to help with the coding process.   
 
I was concerned that having to learn the mechanics and technical 
aspects of such software might only serve to distract me, and further 
distance me from the data (scrolling around a screen is enough to 
engender in me a sense of remoteness from the data which does not 
arise by turning pages).  I was also concerned about the cost, especially 
for a one-off, small-scale project not involving other coders, and I could 
not decide on the most suitable product (an issue compounded by noting 
the frequency with which newer versions were produced).  However, I 
became convinced that the practical experience of using such software 
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had a pedagogic value, and so identified and used the freely-available 
HyperResearch (v.2.8.3) which proved easier to learn and not quite the 
distraction I had anticipated, although I did find I had a clear personal 
preference for having the transcripts physically in my hands (or covering 
the carpet).  I was thus able to immerse myself in the data in my own way 
and was not restricted in this to those times when I had my computer 
powered up.  This was an important factor for me as it often tended to be 
whenever I was doing something else that I had a ‘eureka moment’ and 
needed to quickly check something in the transcripts.  I doubt I could have 
done this as efficiently if I had to wait for the computer to power up as I 
found that the mental contents of such moments were always fragile, 
prone to self-destructing if not dealt with promptly.  Presumably this sort of 
experience is not uncommon, as Lewins and Silver observe “[o]ften the 
most insightful thoughts occur at unexpected times, away from the 
computer, and away from the data” (2007: 228).  
 
As I had already identified certain thematic areas of interest it was 
these that I initially sought to code (advocated by Miles and Huberman, 
1994), but as I was also interested in member-generated accounts of their 
experiences and perceptions I was alert to the possibility of coding some 
of the data in terms of those member-generated categories too.  In 
addition I was especially alert for the presence or absence of certain 
issues being raised by some interviewees which others might not have 
mentioned.  I also recognised that: 
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“Sometimes ideas of considerable interest and theoretical significance 
may be expressed only once…  That which occurs repeatedly is not 
necessarily theoretically significant, and that which occurs rarely is not 
necessarily theoretically unimportant.  Furthermore, some concepts 
may be significant by their absence” (Sim and Wright, 2000: 160). 
 
For me, this recognition underscored the validity of the hermeneutic 
philosophical approach, as I anticipated that my own understandings and 
expectations might themselves, especially in engaging with the research 
subject’s point of view in the hermeneutic circle, spark ideas which could 
themselves become data. 
 
Interview transcripts were prepared and analysed for content with 
the codes (or ‘databits’ as Dey (1993) terms them) and any higher level 
‘themes’ identified as soon after each interview as was practical.  At this 
time too my semi-structured topic guide was reviewed ahead of 
subsequent interviews.  New transcripts also enabled the re-visiting of the 
coding process of earlier transcripts, and codes and themes were 
reviewed iteratively (‘constantly compared’) throughout the data-gathering 
stage. 
 
By gaining familiarity with each interview transcript I thus attempted 
to identify some features within them which ‘spoke’ to me about the 
interviewee’s experiences, thoughts, and so forth.  As several such 
interviews each revealed such data, I was able to re-evaluate topics, 
content, and other data, which caused me to continually re-imagine and 
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develop the eventual codes.  I prefer to think of the process as making 
links and developing groupings of ideas. 
 
 Prior to the interviews and based on the imagined initial interview 
structure, I had anticipated codes that might embrace categories and 
themes that could offer clues to the ethical theoretical bases underlying 
member’s approaches to ethical issues (e.g. deontological, 
consequentialist, utilitarian,…); why members thought there should be 
members designated as ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ on the committees (‘justification 
of role’); their (educational, occupational) background; whether they tend 
to lead or follow (‘negotiation of role’) – whether lay members’ ideas are 
offered in support of the experts’ views, in parallel, or even if they tend to 
commence debate.  Whether they saw certain matters as properly falling 
to the consideration of lay members with others being more in the purview 
of the experts, and if they are, then any joint areas would be of interest.  I 
wondered if the circumstances surrounding their appointment had any 
bearing on their subsequent behaviour.  For instance if they were 
appointed following open advertisement would they be more likely to be 
genuinely interested in promoting ethical research, and self-development 
and accreditation?  Conversely, if they were approached and asked to 
join, would they tend to be more acquiescent and allow others to 
determine the issues to be debated?  What expectations had they about 
the roles and have these changed at all?  What training have members 
had and how did they choose particular training events? 
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Even as the interviews commenced however, refinements to my 
categories of interest began to impose themselves with some immediacy 
as many of the anticipated notions proved to be too broad, and I found it 
would be impractical and far less interesting to pursue all those potential 
links I had in mind.  Instead it was more practical and, indeed, I felt, more 
appropriate, to delve deeper with certain topics which the early 
interviewees raised, as they arose, and because they appeared 
interesting.  Thus, as Mays and Pope (2000) predicted, I moved towards 
an ever tighter coding system, albeit that part of this was during the 
interview stage rather than solely at the analysis stage. 
 
Although inter-rater coding was never feasible within my limited 
resources (itself another factor in my not wishing to invest in expensive 
qualitative analysis software), I did not consider this fact to be 
problematic.  The methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology would 
deny the notion of ‘aberrant coding’ because it is more interested in 
accounts of the evidence as understood by the researcher (there never 
being just one ‘true’ account to be demonstrated). 
 
My supervisory team, faculty and indeed fellow students all offered 
suggestions about the sorts of issues I should consider being alert to.  
There was no shortage of potential coding possibilities, initially including 
such varied issues as a member’s occupational history; where the REC’s 
monthly meeting was located and its times; attitudes to the medical or 
other professions, to AAPEC and NRES; attitudes towards technology 
127 
 
(inc. MHRA, the EU, the pharmaceutical industry); reimbursement levels; 
time commitment; attitudes to training and education, and so on.  This 
was becoming out-of-hand.  However, when I eventually saw, in the 
transcripts, what it was to be an expert my thesis began to reveal itself to 
my conscious mind and I concentrated my ‘coding’ around the evolving 
thesis as I saw explanation dawn over the horizon.  To some extent then 
the codes supported the emerging theory as well as helped to reveal it – it 
was not then a unidirectional activity but involved iterative processes.  
5.8 Trustworthiness and Rigour 
 
Questioning the rigour of qualitative research occasionally provides 
sport for those whose view of the world accepts only that which can be 
shown by positivistic science.  Qualitative research however addresses 
other concerns, such as those tending to begin with ‘why’ or ‘how’ and 
which cannot so readily be considered by numerical analysis, and it 
attempts to explain how the findings have been arrived at from within the 
perspective of the methodological stance adopted by the researcher.  
Koch concisely explains the situation in relation to the approach of 
hermeneutic philosophy: 
 
“In the last two decades the issue of rigour (initially referred to as 
reliability and validity) in qualitative research has persisted as an 
hegemonic legacy of empirical-analytical research, and continues to 
challenge new researchers as they shift from a conventional 
empirical-analytical paradigm to alternative paradigms…  It is evident 
[though] that the language and concepts are changing which… 
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[increasingly] signals a reconceptualising of the notion of rigour” 
(Koch, 1996: 178). 
 
Thus the problem of rigour in part centres on the co-construction of 
data – and the fact that the hermeneutic approach recognises that the 
researcher is not unprejudiced in the matter and that therefore he will 
naturally interpret what is revealed, and come to a view that will be 
reflected in the research outcome.  The reader of the research needs 
therefore to be able to see how the findings have been arrived at, and 
then has a choice of accepting or rejecting the researcher’s findings – and 
may co-construct their own, alternative, findings too. 
  
Silverman (2005) advocates a process of ‘constant comparison’ 
(the term originated with Glaser and Strauss, 1967) which allows the 
researcher to check on the reliability of the findings by constantly 
comparing one set of findings with other findings in an iterative fashion.  
Indeed, he calls for ‘comprehensive data treatment’ such that one’s 
generalisations should apply to every data set, or be explained away.  
‘Deviant-case analysis’ similarly asks the researcher to use the deviant 
cases to re-orient their thinking, and modify their ideas accordingly.  Such 
processes proved invaluable to my arriving at my eventual explanation for 
the phenomena under study, and caused me to discount prior ideas which 
did not fit all the facts. 
 
At a rather different level of concern about validity, Lofland et al. 
(2006) identify three particular “kinds of contaminating error and bias” 
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which they suggest the researcher might unwittingly occasion.  They warn 
against ‘reactive error’ whereby the interviewer or observer’s presence 
alters the scene such as to preclude a true witnessing of what one wished 
to witness or hear; ‘perceptual or interpretative distortions’ which are 
caused by the observer’s personal perspectives; and sampling errors 
caused by failures in obtaining reasonable representation of a relevant 
range of perspectives. 
 
Their solutions for these possible problems include demonstrating 
appropriate sampling strategies to capture the full range of experience; 
having a team of researchers; and a strategic selection of informants – 
selecting informants who are positionally different within the group being 
studied.  Unfortunately, their last two suggestions in particular would have 
proved impractical for my research.  I did not have the resources for a 
team of researchers, nor was I blessed with great numbers of volunteer 
interviewees.  I would also have doubted my abilities to explain to an 
ethics committee that I proposed to engage in a practice that is not clearly 
an example of ‘fair subject selection’ especially given my lack of prior 
research experience.  Nevertheless, and yet again, the impossibility of 
these suggestions, only further justifies the appropriateness of the 
methodology adopted (although this does tend to disregard Lofland et al.’s 
concerns somewhat). 
   
Reliability – or repeatability – as an indicator of the quality of a 
study is a concept that some see as being something ill-fitting with 
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qualitative research as this type of research does not share the positivistic 
paradigm of quantitative research.  Rather, as qualitative research’s 
interest can be in eliciting the range of responses and opinions that might 
be held on a subject, one can expect that opinions will vary between 
individuals and over time.  Nevertheless readers will want to attempt an 
assessment of the quality of the research and there are a number of 
approaches by which this may be done.  Guba and Lincoln (1994) 
suggest ‘dependability’ as a more appropriate criterion (replacing 
reliability), and within this they propose sub-criteria of both 
‘trustworthiness’ and ‘authenticity’.  In terms of these criteria I suggest that 
the fact that I was a fellow REC and IEC member meant that my 
respondents would not be likely to accidentally mislead me and this, 
coupled with the fact that my findings ‘ring-true’ to my own experience 
gives me a sense that the research is ‘dependable’.  However I am clearly 
not without a conflict of interest in such an assessment and so must leave 
that ultimate determination to the reader.  For those qualitative 
researchers (such as Mason, 2002 and Silverman, 2006) who see the 
notion of reliability as being more transferable into qualitative research I 
would refer to my adoption of some of their suggestions to do with 
enhancing reliability such as making the research process transparent by 
describing the research strategy and data analysis methods in a 
sufficiently detailed manner.  
 
On a more mundane level too, Dey (1993) suggests reliability can 
be enhanced by what he terms ‘low-inference descriptors’.  He advocates 
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tape-recording all face-to-face interviews and carefully transcribing the 
tapes but then suggests presenting long extracts of verbatim accounts to 
help contextualise comments to aid the perception of reliability.  These 
suggestions have been taken up, and I have also explained the inclusion 
criteria for the research, which can help the reader to gauge the 
representativeness of the instances reported.  Another technique to 
enhance this would be by demonstrating inter-coder consistency, but as I 
have already explained, this, for me, was unaffordable, as it must be for 
most unfunded student research. 
 
Reflexivity is key to issues of rigour and validity and it requires the 
identification of the preconceptions brought to the study by the researcher 
including such matters as personal and professional experiences, 
motivations and qualifications (Koch, 1996).  Given that my worldview 
regards ‘facts’ as at least potentially subjective, and that all description is 
necessarily interpretation, I recognise that my ‘real world’ may be 
differently perceived from the ‘real world’ of the participants of the 
research, and I have acknowledged that my very presence might have 
affected the behaviour of the phenomena I was observing.  I believe that 
the qualitative research I engaged in can offer only a construction of a 
situation, as I perceived it – but it is submitted that this is all any 
qualitative research can offer (and arguably even quantitative results are 
influenced by the choice, wording and positioning of questions).  This 
‘construction’ is of value nonetheless, for as different researchers develop 
new perspectives, new knowledge emerges.  It is the position of the 
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methodological approach I adopt that the findings should not be regarded 
as universally applicable, but rather should, being inductively generated, 
proffer one or more ‘interesting’ ideographic perspectives which should 
serve to inform about comparable situations.   
 
Although neither theory construction nor generalizability are aims of 
hermeneutics, which seeks understanding rather than theory, I depart 
sufficiently from such a ‘pure’ hermeneutic phenomenological approach to 
enable me to offer a theoretical position as a research outcome.  However 
I adhere to the perspective that it is not the subject-participant’s meaning 
that which is necessarily prime: rather it is the result of the dialectic 
interpretation that is to be regarded as the main outcome, and it will be 
this interpretation that will make the research contribution meaningful to 
the reader/consumer.  There is no ‘objective’ knowledge outside of human 
existence, and it is thus an inter-subjective objectivity which will be 
offered. 
5.9 Ethics considerations 
 
Prior to seeking formal ethics approval of my research I believed 
that its main ethical concern centred on the establishment and 
preservation of the anonymity of the participants.  This would be ensured 
by not referring to any detail or description that could lead to the 
identification of any participant in the final report.  As all participants would 
be familiar with the conduct of ethical research, I supposed they might 
have had their own preferences or requirements for engaging in 
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interviews and accordingly I was willing to engage in negotiating around 
any personal requirements. 
 
  NHS ‘Research and Development’ approval was not required as 
no interviews were expected to occur on NHS premises or involve NHS 
staff (or patients).  Ethics approval for the study was thus sought from the 
relevant REC at the university where my research was registered.  This 
being the University of Hertfordshire’s Faculty of Health and Human 
Science’s Research Ethics Committee for Nursing, Midwifery, Social 
Work, Criminal Justice and Counselling.   
 
A participant information sheet was prepared (see Appendix 3), 
and signed informed consent was to be sought from each participant prior 
to the commencement of each interview and after ensuring that 
participants had had at least seven days to consider their agreement to be 
interviewed.  Participants were to be reminded that they did not have to 
answer any questions they did not wish to and that they might withdraw 
from the interview at any stage – in both instances without having to 
explain themselves.  Interviewees were to be offered a token sum in 
appreciation of their time and trouble.  This was to be paid by a Charities 
Aid Foundation cheque which could only be cashed by a registered 
charity. 
 
Once I “had ethics” (as all researchers say when their research 
proposals have obtained approval from the ethics committee) the 
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interview stage of the research could begin.  In the next set of chapters I 
report the principal findings of those interviews.  The first of these 
chapters looks at the broader issues of lay and expert membership 
including how recruitment to the roles is organized; what has sustained 
motivation for membership; and how members understand the functions 
of the two roles.  Following that, the next chapter concentrates on how the 
committees function – looking at roles in relation to science and safety; 
how ethics theory and guidance materials are utilised; and how the 
adequacy of insurance levels are assessed.  The third findings chapter 
concentrates on members’ training and education for the roles, but also 
includes an important, if parenthetical section, which I offer as a form of 
counterbalance lest any reader form a biased perception of IEC members 
which I recognise might otherwise inadvertently arise from the 
presentation of other findings. 
135 
 
6. Findings: ‘lay’ and ‘expert’ membership 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The literature review revealed a scant, almost non-existent, 
knowledge-base concerning independent ethics committees, and a limited 
one about the internal working practices of RECs in general.  Such 
deficiencies, as has been seen, have partly been due to the confidential 
deliberative processes of ECs generally, exacerbated in the case of IECs 
by the commercial confidentiality surrounding pharmaceutical research.  
Partly they are also due to the concomitant fact that the work of the IECs 
has been conducted in a small and closed community which has largely 
avoided attention.  Although there has been some important research 
carried out in the UK and elsewhere, the majority of the research 
undertaken on the internal workings of ECs has tended to be United 
States-based and/or has now become dated. 
 
The research reported here not only brings matters up-to-date, but 
also addresses, from an emic perspective, how members of UK IECs 
have understood the paired roles of expert and lay members.  An emic 
perspective is that of the ‘insider’.  I was able to engage at this level 
because of my membership of the very type of EC that this research 
concentrates on and my resultant familiarity with the key issues and many 
of the concerns shared by members.  This chapter, the first of three that 
report the findings of the research, addresses this issue of the expert and 
lay roles in an attempt to explore what is distinct about the two roles.  The 
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following two chapters go on to understand the broad areas of 
responsibility that the committees address (chapter 7), and the extent to 
which training and education are required for the roles (chapter 8).  The 
themes explored in these three findings chapters derive both from the 
literature review which suggested them as key topics of interest to the 
overall research question, and in part they emerged during the research 
itself. 
 
The particular themes surrounding the expert and lay roles that are 
addressed in this first chapter of the findings set of chapters are best 
appreciated as a whole.  However, to aid analysis, the themes are 
presented discretely under the following heads (i) recruitment and 
retention; (ii) member categories; (iii) motivations for continuing with the 
role post-recruitment; and (iv) how members conceive the two roles of 
expert member and lay member.  
6.2 Recruitment and retention 
 
Interviewees had been members of an IEC for up to three decades.  
The mean length of service was 9.4 years (lay members 10.4 years; 
expert members 8.4 years). Table 6.1 below illustrates the length of time 
the different interviewees had served on their IEC. 
 
All members were recruited to their EC via a personal contact.  Even 
where the position had been advertised – and this has only begun to 
become the practice relatively recently – it was the fact of a personal 
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contact that had been decisive in the appointment.  Any recruitment 
advertisement for an EC will tend to have a limited circulation, often on the 
practical grounds of cost-effectiveness.  Even whilst it is being displayed 
this is largely for form however as a parallel recruitment strategy will also 
typically be undertaken by existing members of the committee who will be 
encouraged to consider approaching those they know who might be 
interested in joining the committee (on such a practice see McGee, 2009, 
2010; and Humphreys, 2010c). 
 
 
Years Expert Lay 
<5 4 3 
6-10 4 4 
11-15 0 0 
16+ 2 3 
 
Table 6.1: Interviewee length of membership on IEC 
 
All interviewees lent credence to the view that it is not necessarily 
what one knows so much as who one knows that enables advancement.  
Members were typically ‘headhunted’ by those already on the committee 
who knew them, in a personal or professional capacity, as potentially 
interested, probably knowledgeable and/or not obviously difficult, and 
possibly available at a convenient time.   Expert members typically took 
charge of matters: 
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A very good friend…who was a member said ‘we’re looking for 
another physician, with experience of an ethics committee, would 
you be interested?’ (E12). 
 
I’ve also got two of my protégés on the committee (E02). 
 
Lay members were also typically identified by an expert member, 
and of my sample none had been recruited by a lay member.  One lay 
member who had been a clinical trials’ ‘guinea-pig’ was recommended  for 
IEC membership by a Principal Investigator (PI), and recalled: “Someone 
[expert member] just phoned me up and said would I like to be on it” 
(L01).  Another lay member knew a senior member of a pharmaceutical 
company and “he rang me up one day to say they needed a lay member 
[and put me in touch with an expert member on the Committee]” (L07).  A 
further lay member explained “I was approached by one of the other 
committee members [named expert]” (L06). 
 
 It was the expert members who had established the committees 
and it has been these who have tended to become committee officers 
(Chair, Vice-chair) too.  
6.3 Expert or lay? 
 
As all interviewees had ‘professional’ backgrounds, and because 
professionals have recruited colleagues and friends for committee 
positions over the years, and because those recruited have tended not to 
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surrender their positions, the committees even today characterise the 
British middle-class society as it did even several decades ago.  In this 
respect they might be said to reflect the composition typical of NHS RECs 
which have similarly appeared to struggle to reflect the changing ethnic 
background of the UK (Department of Health, 2005b; Simons et al., 2009).  
All interviewees were thus, at least phenotypically, identifiable as ‘white-
British’.  Eighteen of the 20 interviewees were over age 50, and eleven 
were male.  Demographically therefore they were representative of the 
population of interest. 
 
Not all participants could be clear about whether they fell in to the 
‘expert’ or ‘lay’ category of membership.  Initially this was surprising and 
indicated that IEC roles might not be as dependent upon expert or lay 
status as initially supposed.  For categorization purposes in this piece of 
research the unsure (or unconvinced) members were recognised on the 
basis of their status as given in their committee’s then most recent annual 
report (2009/10).   
 
Interviewees spanned a spectrum ranging from those who believed 
themselves to be very clear about their role status, to those who were far 
more uncertain and even rather unconvinced about their expert or lay 
status. Of those interviewed, only the medical members (doctors/ dentists) 
interviewed could all place themselves into the expert category ‘clearly’, 
but even here there was some evidence of discomfort with the term. 
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Well I’m only a professional […] using the term ‘expert’ […] may not 
be fully accurate.  You are only up to the standard that you are in 
your profession.  Are you an expert above other members of your 
profession?  I wouldn’t class myself as an expert above other 
members.  I’m just equivalent to other members of my profession 
(E13). 
 
Amongst the nurses interviewed uncertainty as to their designation 
was evident.  Other lay members, whilst recognising their label, 
nevertheless felt they had valuable expertise to offer too: 
 
[Even though] I’m often asked questions about my perspective and 
I have some insight I’m not regarded as an expert member (L01). 
 
Although recorded as a ‘lay’ or ‘expert’ member in the annual report 
and for ‘official’ purposes, the categories had limited practical value: 
 
[W]hen I am in the lead role I am usually under the heading ‘expert’ 
because I understand the science […] I don’t really care what you 
call me [‘expert’ or ‘lay’]” (L11). 
 
I’m supposed to be an expert but…well I haven’t got expertise 
obviously (E14). 
 
[T]he terms are a bit elastic (E20). 
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Of the two role categories (expert and lay), toxicologists could be 
found in three categories as one interviewee was unable to decide with 
which category to align, suggesting that even the ‘official’ record of their 
status might not be wholly reliable: 
 
[A]ctually, I might be in transition to expert because I’ve some 
involvement with clinical trials… the actual tipping point is 
involvement with clinical trials. 
 
No statisticians were interviewed, nor were any such members of 
an IEC during the period when interviews were being arranged.  Whilst 
potentially eligible for an ‘expert’ status, such a role is not particularly 
pertinent to the type of protocol seen at an IEC meeting where the 
research looks primarily at establishing the safety and tolerability of the 
novel compound. 
 
A hearing aid dispenser - or any other member of a profession 
allied to medicine referenced by article 5 of the Health Professions Order 
2001 - by contrast would be deemed a healthcare professional and so 
whilst still practising would be regarded as an ‘expert’.  Thus an ‘expert’ 
member need not have relevant clinical or research experience.  With the 
exception of doctors and dentists who are regarded as experts ‘for life’ 
(i.e. even decades after retiring), healthcare professionals such as 
pharmacists and nurses are only regarded by the clinical trials regulations 
142 
 
as ‘experts’ whilst they remain in practice.  However it is unclear how 
much practice is required to maintain the status.  For some professions, 
registration with the professional body - such as the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council - could be regarded as a basis because that requires 
evidence of practice.  Other professionals, such as pharmacists, can set 
themselves up in a consultancy role, never really retire, and remain on 
their professional register.  They can thus keep a claim to their ‘expert’ 
status.  This pharmacist, in a rather circular fashion, believes that being 
on an ethics committee, 
 
Keeps me right up to date with developments.  I learn a great deal 
(Expert, pharmacist). 
 
Equally, in addition to being uncertain about their expert or lay 
status on the committee, several interviewees admitted to being equally 
uncertain about the status of their colleagues.  Interviewees were thus not 
apparently aware of the detail of the legislation that defines and regulates 
the composition of the committees: 
 
I’m 99.9 per cent sure [the committee] only have the one lay 
member [me] (L10). 
 
[T]he retired nurse I would count as an expert really, I don’t know, I 
don’t know her official title.  I’m not the Co-ordinator, I don’t know 
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who is an expert and who is a lay person but I would count [the 
retired nurse] as an expert (E20). 
 
I: What about [your committee] now, is it chaired by a lay person? 
R: Let me just think... [long pause] No (E18). 
 
I: You must have more than two lay members, haven’t you? 
R: Oh, perhaps we have…How many are you supposed to have?  
About three or four? (E08) 
 
I: So what’s a typical lay member on your committee, is there such 
a thing? 
R: Um, well, I suppose they are mostly people who are clerics, I 
would have to look through our list of attendees to see who is down 
as ‘lay’.  We’ve got quite a few nurses…? (L11) 
 
Thus the evidence here suggests that official member roles are not 
regarded as crucial to the operation of an IEC by the members, who 
remain untroubled by their or their colleagues’ designations on the 
committee. 
6.4 Motivations 
 
When asked what had motivated them to join their committee, 
many interviewees referred to the personal contacts that had initiated their 
membership.  Outside of the research ethics committee community few 
had occasion to be aware of the existence of IECs at all.  Such 
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committees were largely unknown even to members of NHS RECs.  In 
such circumstances advertising committee vacancies has not been a 
straightforward task – not least has been the question of where one 
should advertise to best effect.  To circumvent this difficulty, as many 
interviewees were able to testify – and as has been noted - traditionally 
members have been headhunted, rather than being personally motivated 
to seek out and join a committee.  So why did they continue to serve on 
these committees once they had experience of them?  Their answers 
ranged from the purely altruistic to its opposite. 
 
I think it’s interesting, it’s not a huge demand on my time, it’s 
contributing in a very small way to medical progress, because I 
have a background knowledge I haven’t found it a problem.  It’s as 
simple as that.   I mean there are people who come on [to the 
committee] who have no background who seem perfectly happy to 
do it (E04). 
 
I really enjoy it.  I don’t enjoy seeing what the post brings for it.  I 
just find it very interesting…and there’s the charity side of it of 
course (L17). 
 
The ‘charity side’ referred to here, reflects the fact that the 
members of IECs, although volunteers, have not done their work 
gratuitously.  For their committees there have been numerous overheads 
that have needed covering such as indemnity cover, administration, 
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training, travel costs of members and so forth.  IECs have charged those 
seeking an ethics review of their protocols and the pharmaceutical 
industry has thus paid for the services of these independent committees.  
Any ‘surplus’ has been distributed amongst committee members to donate 
to one or more charities of their choice. 
 
[W]e had always met and donated the money to charity every few 
months.  You know each of us would have a thousand quid or 
whatever to donate to charity and we could split it I don’t know 
£800 to one charity, so much to another… (E08). 
 
This position ended when AAPEC took over the managerial and 
appointment role for the IECs in late 2007.  At first AAPEC was unwilling 
to pay members anything over and above their expenses, but the 
volunteers were quick to point out that the necessary expertise would not 
stay where it went unrewarded and they initiated negotiations over the 
matter.  According to one interviewee: 
 
In the end AAPEC said ‘OK we’ll pay £50 a protocol.’  We basically 
said, we don’t want £50 per protocol because that’s like piecework, 
a plumber gets more than that and we’d rather not be paid than be 
paid per protocol.  We’re not on piecework, a lot of our work is 
involved in looking at…er…monitoring premises, doing site visits, 
doing amendments to protocols, looking at advertising material er 
and a whole range of other activities as well as the protocol so we 
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said we could have a meeting which we used to do where we had 
no new protocols but we had a three hour meeting looking at 
amendments, looking at safety reports, looking at end-of-study 
reports all of this and so what we then, we made a very strong case 
to the AAPEC board.  What we said was take the average number 
of protocols over the past five years and pay that.  And our average 
worked out at four times £50, £200 per meeting.  For those who 
attended.  And that’s what happened (E18). 
 
This amount was in payment to both expert and lay members 
equally and coincidentally was the same amount as Hedgecoe et al. 
(2006) had noted members of Swedish RECs received.  Ironically though, 
instead of receiving a sum of money made payable to a charity of the 
member’s choice, with the arrival of AAPEC, charity payments were 
deemed too administratively complex and eventually all members had to 
be paid directly so that tax and national insurance could be deducted at 
source.  Even this situation could not be sustained however, and 
members were surprised to discover a changed set of arrangements set 
out in the revised GAfREC (Department of Health, 2011): 
 
4.3.9 REC members are unpaid volunteers.  RECs may not charge 
an application fee or seek any other financial contribution or 
donation for or on considering a research proposal for which their 
review is required…  Members receive no payment for contributing 
to the review of applications at scheduled meetings or for attending 
such meetings. 
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    As one informant had already noted though, whilst “[members of] 
the NHS Committees don’t get paid” (E14), NHS REC members who are 
employed by the NHS had the time they spent on the committee and any 
associated training classed as ‘official duty’.   GPs and dentists, who are 
not normally employed by the NHS but who are more typically self-
employed and contracted to provide services for the NHS, may obtain 
payment for locum cover whilst on committee work and whilst undergoing 
approved training.  Non-NHS staff who are members of an NHS 
committee by contrast do not get paid for their time or effort.  Any such 
people are likely to be retired lay members.  IEC members were not paid 
for attending training but they were paid for attending site-specific 
assessments.   The situation could be described as convoluted, although, 
as another interviewee was keen to point out, “all these things about 
Independents [IECs] being grasping isn’t true” (E20). 
 
In April 2011, just as paragraph 4.3.9 was announced, it was also 
decided that the (NHS/IEC) Chairs’ honorarium would increase to £3500 
per annum. 
 
As most members (whether expert or lay) had referred to their 
charity payments as a significant motivating factor in their continuing with 
the role (many being members of long-standing) it was of little surprise 
that the withdrawal of payment resulted in the dissolution of the AAPEC 
committees with their functions transferring to NHS committees from 
October 2011.  
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6.5 Roles 
 
Despite there being tension about undertaking voluntary roles for 
money, interviewees were sure that there were distinct roles for members.  
The experts were thought to comment on the science involved, whereas 
the lay members were thought to put themselves in the role of the 
volunteer and consider if the information to be given to the participants in 
the information sheet and in consent documents fairly represented the 
reality of the situation so that participants’ consent could be properly 
informed. 
 
For the expert I think it is an evaluation of the science behind the 
proposed study… What I am looking for from the lay people is to 
catch the things that the layman is not going to understand in the 
consent form (E12). 
 
However, despite a generally held view of there being at least 
theoretical roles, in practice the distinction was never held and any 
distinctions broke down in several ways.  Firstly, although an expert 
member could include virtually all clinicians, interviewees tended to 
conflate ‘expert’ with ‘medical member’ thus suggesting the latter group 
held a privileged position: 
 
Well…the experts are there purely because they do understand the 
medical side of it and you must have that if it’s a medical problem, 
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you can’t possibly expect lay members to make decisions on 
medical questions without any background knowledge at all (E04). 
 
The interview sample was thus clear that the experts who mattered 
were those who could say something about the investigational medicinal 
product (the test drug) – this might be from a medical, pharmacological, or 
toxicological point of view.  Typically this was in terms of either experience 
with the specific drug or with the class of drugs to which it belonged.   No 
other expertise gained recognition in practice and this despite a ubiquitous 
presence of nurse members who are potentially recognised as belonging 
to the ‘expert’ group in the governing legislation.  It was thus clear to the 
members what the expert role was – even if it was less clear to many of 
them who the experts were.  (Toxicologists are not classed as ‘experts’ by 
the legislation, but often have been considered as such by IECs 
notwithstanding this fact.) 
 
Another way in which any role distinction was essentially ‘technical’ 
rather than practical was that no group wanted to be restricted.  Thus for 
the expert members there was no desire to confine their roles too rigidly, 
and they wanted to be able to comment whenever so minded: 
 
I think everybody has got to look at everything really (E04). 
 
The thing is, I don’t think the role is as distinct as may be [members 
on] other committees might think, I don’t know if that is the case.  I 
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guess that you might say, and people may have said to you, that 
the lay members play a bigger role when it comes to deciding 
whether the language and the content of the volunteer information 
document, or whatever you want to call it, information sheet 
whatever, is couched in such a way as to be intelligible easily to 
prospective volunteers and that may be more of a lay thing but I 
don’t think that happens too much at our committee.  I think the 
expert members have a say, quite a big say in the way in which the 
volunteer information document is written (E20). 
 
As the experts took an interest in the information sheets, the lay 
members might also involve themselves in the drug’s mechanism of 
action: 
 
I’m also interested because of my background in how the drug is 
working and what the outcome is going to be and I find that very 
interesting and, but I sometimes have to struggle to keep up with 
some of the toxicological and all the rest of it as I suspect most of 
the committee does…I want guidance from the experts on the 
committee (Lay member, former nurse). 
 
I’ve occasionally looked up the drug for myself and raised 
questions about dosing levels, side effects, whatever, purely 
because I couldn’t understand the logic behind the plan (L01). 
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This latter quote, whilst not the typical perspective of a lay member on an 
IEC, nevertheless demonstrates that as the issues raised in committees 
tend to be standardized ones involving these sorts of matters, and 
because the relevant logic is always presented in either the protocol or the 
investigator’s brochure, both of which accompany an application, given 
time, lay members can learn the process for determining whether a drug 
protocol is likely to be ‘approvable’ by their IEC.  The lay member here is 
also revealing how central to the IEC’s ethics review is the science. 
 
Whilst lay members are typically expected to deal with matters 
such as the ‘readability’ of the information sheet, and are not expected to 
comment on the drug’s pharmacology they may do so if inclined and feel 
capable of doing so.  The following excerpt demonstrates that, over time, 
there is often almost an expectation that all members will come to see the 
review in the same process-driven way: 
 
I: How does that differ from the lay person’s role? 
R: It doesn’t, it’s both.  But if you are the so-called expert on the 
committee there’s certain things you have knowledge of that the lay 
people may not simply because of the work that you have done in 
the past, so you come from a different angle… 
I: But going back to the expert role on the independent ethics 
committee, what is that role? 
R: There is a wide variation […] the separation into lay and expert 
seems to be a bit odd in some ways […] we’ve a wide spread, and 
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it seems a little bit arbitrary at times when it is decided whether 
someone is an expert. 
I: …I wonder how that differs from the role of the lay member? 
R: It doesn’t, it doesn’t 
I: Is there any differences in roles – expert, lay – in looking at the 
informed consent documents? 
R: No, I think once people have been on the committee for any 
length of time […] we ask each other, can you add anything? (E16) 
 
Similarly, the expert member cannot be artificially divorced from his 
or her membership of the human race and thus cannot be excluded from 
having a view on any matter that might interest anyone.  The expert 
member is inevitably effectively a ‘lay member with more’.  Thus there 
cannot be a rigid demarcation as to who does what unless the expert 
member was given an explicit (and thus effectively a veto) function. 
 
This expert’s experience though had suggested to him/her that the 
lay members cannot be relied on to fault-find the readability of information 
sheets: 
 
I often read more closely the patient information sheet which isn’t 
written clearly or as much in layman’s language as perhaps it 
should… 
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I do wonder quite how the lay people fit in.  Some people go 
through and find typos and things like that, word-smithing, frankly 
they don’t know much, well nothing about the pharmacology when 
it comes to procedures and what goes on.  They pick that up over 
time I suppose, given time, but it is a bit hit-or-miss really.  A 
strange set-up, an ethics committee (E08). 
 
E08’s reference to the importance of pharmacology indicates a key 
role for science and other experts emphasized the importance on their 
committee of their scientific backgrounds. 
 
You need to have a very good knowledge of pharmacokinetics; you 
need to have a good knowledge of pharmacology (Expert, 
pharmacist). 
 
A toxicologist is vital, according to one toxicologist, in order that the 
committee can “interpret the animal tox[icology] data because a lot of 
medics can’t in fact do that terribly well”. 
 
[Y]ou look at the specific drug and based on your background 
knowledge you […] make a reasonable decision as to whether it’s 
going to be reasonable to use it at the dose that they suggest or 
not […] safety is rather crucial (E04). 
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Indeed safety is very much a concern for the whole committee as 
the following quotations demonstrate. 
 
I: What are expert members looking for? 
R: Basically the safety is huge [… you need to] know that what they 
[the sponsor, the personal investigator] are saying has been 
researched and they’re not just saying [so…] we have to… [ensure] 
just as far as we can see everything has been covered from the 
safety point (L09). 
 
[T]he main concern [for the IEC] is the patient or the subject.  The 
subject’s safety is the number one priority […] So the first thing is, 
what I think that, I think what the lay people expect from the experts 
are…is the information with which we have been supplied at this 
moment, adequate to allow you – experts – to believe that the 
protocol doses are reasonably safe? (E12). 
 
I aim to make a useful contribution to their safety and managing 
risk (E13). 
 
To ensure that the [trial will be]…definitely safe, safe for the 
volunteer… (L14). 
 
But always coupled with the safety aspects is the scientific rationale: 
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We have a strong consensus for if the science isn’t valid it isn’t an 
ethical trial so we have to find at least a reasonable scientific 
justification before we’d approve a trial (E20). 
 
[W]e can interpret most of the scientific stuff and look to our 
experience with similar drugs (E02). 
 
Yet there are occasional clues that the concentration on the science and 
safety of the research reviewed in IECs may be over-emphasized: 
 
  [W]e might pick up something fairly obvious (E12).   
 
It’s been put to us…that we should look to the validity of the study, 
is it justifiable and the answer is always ‘yes’, is the design going to 
accomplish those objectives, and the answer is almost always 
‘yes’, we almost…take them as read, we have debated them 
occasionally but they with us are rarely a problem.  Then you say is 
it safe?  And that can be a debate at times…but generally safety 
isn’t too big a problem.  The real difficulties we have…is the 
communication of the information to the volunteers where we can 
get tied up in minutiae (Toxicologist).  
6.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter investigated member roles and found that a number of 
members did not know whether they themselves, or which of their 
colleagues, were an expert and who was a lay member, and thus could 
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not be clear about whether there were particular roles for the different 
member types. 
 
Whilst both expert and lay members get involved in deciding if the 
information sheets adequately express the reality of the trial, the scientific 
rationale for the trial and its associated safety connotations privilege the 
opinion of those advocating the medical model approach.  This means the 
experts – and within this group, the medical members – are the key 
actors.  It was this group too that was found to organize the committees. 
 
In the next chapter the findings of how IECs performed their 
specific tasks in coming to an opinion on the ‘ethics’ of research are 
presented.  In this a privileging of science was seen.  
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7. Findings: the committees at work 
 
This chapter concentrates on how the committees have functioned.  
The particular themes addressed are (i) how the committees have 
understood their role in relation to science and safety; (ii) whether, or to 
what extent, members employed particular ethics theory approaches and 
articulated ethics review guidelines; and (iii) how the committees ensured 
the adequacy of trial insurance arrangements.  This chapter also 
addresses the concept of ‘dignity’ as an issue of committee responsibility.   
 
Whilst each interview addressed all the themes reported on in 
these findings chapters, emergent themes also arose which, practically, 
could not be discussed with all interviewees.  One particular additional 
theme that arose during the interview phase of the research concerned 
the concept of ‘dignity’ as an ethical issue in research.  Because this topic 
arose following some national debate about the issue after the interview 
process had commenced, only eight of the 20 interviewees could be 
asked about this concept.  
 
7.1 Science and the MHRA 
 
For eighteen out of the 20 interviewees, issues of safety were 
always the main concern, and thus a distinct role for their IEC to police.  
Their committees addressed safety very carefully by ensuring that the trial 
was scientifically sound; that the drugs involved were administered at a 
dosage level commensurate with either what the toxicological data or 
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previous human studies had indicated was a likely safe initial (often sub-
pharmacological) dosage level; that dose escalation levels were 
appropriate for the type of molecule in question, that procedures were in 
place for monitoring any adverse side effects, and that appropriate 
stopping rules had been established.  All interviewees were clear that no 
protocol would be approved by the IEC unless the members were 
satisfied about the trinity of the science, safety and methodology.  All of 
these specific matters were considerations that the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) have had within its 
established remit to consider when it has looked at the proposed identical 
protocol that the IEC was considering.  So given all this, what did 
members believe to be the role of the MHRA?   
 
I: What’s the role of the MHRA? 
R: …I haven’t really looked into it (L14). 
 
I: Well what do you think the role of the MHRA is, if it’s an ethics 
committee’s role to look at the science and safety? 
R: [long pause] ehm… 
I: I didn’t say these were all going to be easy questions. 
R: No [laughing].  I think, I think, erhm…. The MHRA… I’ve never 
worked with regulatory bodies so I don’t know the details but from 
what I understand they have erhm physicians, statisticians, …erhm 
some lay people… they have expert chemists, 
…pharmacokineticists,… toxicologists, vetinary surgeons and their 
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task, I think, is to review all the animal data…to ensure that as far 
as possible, the next step of taking the drug into man is reasonable 
(E12). 
 
There was universal uncertainty about the role of the MHRA 
amongst the interviewees, which raised the question of whether there was 
potential for ‘double jeopardy’, with the ethics committee replicating a role 
that the MHRA was specifically constituted to address.  Interviewees 
however emphasized the need to ensure safety, and had no concerns 
about ‘double-checking’.  
 
We’re looking at it only in as much as we’ve got to make sure that 
the protocol defines what doses are going to be used and why 
doses have been picked and that those are sensible doses and 
that the escalation rate is sensible.  Now the MHRA do this as well 
(E03). 
 
I would hope that they [MHRA] are […] looking at the drug profile 
[…] But I don’t know [what they do] is the answer.  They must do, 
mustn’t they?  I wonder…whether they look at it [the research 
proposal], you know give a kind of broad-brush approval and then 
leave us to read the small print and sort out some of the typos … 
do you know what I mean? (E08). 
 
In part this double-checking could be attributable to an uncertainty 
about quite what each party – the IEC and the MHRA – was to contribute 
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to the trial application process, even though interviewees acknowledged 
that the MHRA was there to check the science, safety and methodology of 
the protocol. 
 
Er…well… the MHRA are, they are looking at the safety of the 
molecule, they are looking at the animal work, they are looking at, 
we hope, the science and methodology (E18). 
 
Well obviously that is technically the role of the MHRA; they are the 
ones who should be reviewing safety of drugs.  However the 
MHRA are not infallible. (L01, making reference to the Northwick 
Park incident where both the MHRA and an NHS REC approved 
the protocol.) 
 
Another lay member whilst acknowledging that the MHRA was 
officially supposed to look at the science and safety behind the IMP 
argued that the MHRA were “so new to it” after the Clinical Trial Directive 
that they could not be relied upon: 
 
[T]here was actually very little experience in the MHRA of looking 
at the data for Phase I studies (L11). 
 
When pressed, respondents had difficulty in providing credible 
justification for their committee’s involvement in considering the science of 
the protocols: 
161 
 
 
I: Well what do the MHRA do that expert members on the ethics 
committees don’t do, or vice-versa? 
R: I think it’s a grey area.  I mean the MHRA obviously have 
defined responsibility, [and] they are looking at a much bigger 
dossier of information [too] (L05). 
 
I: [S]o there are two groups looking at safety? 
R: Two groups.  Yes. 
I: Is that the intention, do we need both of them? 
R: I think we do, I think we do because some ethics committees are 
not as on the ball as we are and therefore I think it is a good idea.  
You can’t have too much checking (L09). 
 
R: The expert members generally are those who are able to look 
rather further into the detail of what is being asked and presented 
and in effect to back-up MHRA in trying to work out whether there 
is any wool being pulled over anybody’s eyes… 
I: The experts are there to sort of act as a backstop for the MHRA? 
R: Yes.  Now this is one in which I am still finding out as I go… 
[T]here is always the possibility that there is something they 
[MHRA] miss that our experts will pick up (L15). 
 
The expert members were just as uncertain: 
 
I: [So] whose role is it to look at the safety? 
162 
 
R: Yes it seems two people [IEC and MHRA] are, and maybe one 
could say that is a double safety-net…I am still unsure of where the 
ethics bit fits in versus… assessment of toxicology, safety data, the 
science of it (E13). 
 
Well it is double checking in a way, there’s no way around it (E20). 
 
The MHRA is very hot on stopping rules and so is our committee 
and that’s one of the areas where there is overlap (E03). 
 
One toxicologist agreed that “we can leave it to the MHRA to make 
appropriate decisions on the science and safety” but elsewhere in the 
interview acknowledged personally looking at these very issues in some 
depth on their IEC. Indeed the consensus view, if there was one, was that 
even if there was ambiguity about whether the MHRA should have the 
role of being responsible for the science, safety and methodology, it was 
still the role for the IEC too. 
 
One ‘expert’ though did emphasize a slightly different 
understanding of the main role of the MHRA and suggested that it was the 
MHRA’s role to look at the protocol with more attention to the facilities and 
skills available to the research unit where it was proposed that the trial be 
undertaken: 
 
They [the MHRA] scrutinize the proposed protocol or study.  They 
have to satisfy themselves that the unit that is carrying out the 
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study is capable of doing it and have good practices for all the 
various things that are involved in the study and that can vary from 
study to study.  They have a role in inspecting the units as well and 
ensuring that they have Good Clinical Practice and good methods 
for everything, so that is their role and periodic inspection to make 
sure that the unit keeps up its standards as well and to investigate 
if anything goes wrong in a trial whether there was any set-back in 
standards or anything like that (E16). 
  
Thus the members – both expert and lay – were demonstrably 
unclear about their committee’s role in relation to science/safety and its 
overlap with that of the MHRA.  However it was at least ‘probable’ that 
their committee’s role was to be satisfied about the science, safety and 
methodology of the protocols, and that if this was the case then this was 
ultimately in the ‘experts’ domain.  
 
This was the key difference between the expert and lay members.  
The findings were indicating that the experts (and generally the medically 
qualified) decide whether the trial should go ahead in their traditional peer 
review professional approach to the science.  They approved or rejected 
proposals.  It was thus, as was seen in the previous chapter, that lay 
members are expected to concentrate more on the information sheet and 
consent form and whilst their concerns could cause a non-rejected 
protocol to be subject to provisos, it was the expert view of the science-
safety-methodology tripos that was crucial and even though this was also 
164 
 
considered by the MHRA.  Arguably ethics have not been a feature of IEC 
review. 
 
Nevertheless, even where other areas of potential concern which 
may be more distinctly – and perhaps less controversially – attributable to 
the IECs, an absence of clarity persisted, as the next following sections 
demonstrate. 
7.2 Ethics 
 
If the members of IECs – both expert and lay – largely believed it 
was their role to ‘ensure’ the MHRA’s job was done properly (by 
duplicating the MHRA’s role) and so also sought to review the science 
(methodology) and safety aspects of the trial, how did they regard the 
‘ethics’ issues, which must have been for the members of the IEC alone? 
 
The evidence suggested that the ethical (as opposed to the 
scientific) aspects were immaterial to the committees’ deliberations: 
 
I: When you look at a protocol do you have any particular ethical 
approach? 
R: I’m not in any school of philosophy or ethics.  I just look at it from 
a fairly broad view and decide whether it’s safe or not…I don’t think 
that ethics comes in to what we do a lot to be honest.  We’re 
basically just making sure that these drug companies don’t do 
dangerous things (E04). 
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Debates about ethics hardly apply [it’s more about the science and 
safety… I]n Phase I we are not taxed by what most people think of 
as ethics (L11). 
 
I’m not sure about the ethical aspects (E02). 
 
 In contrast, one member actually complained that expert 
colleagues strayed away from issues of ethics and concentrated on the 
science: 
 
[T]here was almost power-play between different experts on the 
committee. … [T]he terms of reference should be clearly displayed 
if not electronically through a projector…  [they] should be sent out 
with every pack to remind committee members what it is they are 
there to consider (L10). 
 
Although this member (who was cited earlier as indicating that he 
or she understood him or herself to be the sole lay member on their 
committee) was unique in some ways, the immediately preceding 
quotations also demonstrate that ethical issues, as distinct from issues of 
science and safety, did not feature prominently in IEC discussions. 
  
Another member, who acknowledged having learnt ethics theories 
as a student, was asked: 
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I: [Have you been] able to bring in any of those theories into play in 
your Phase I ethics committee? 
R: No, not really (L15). 
 
And with this the respondent gave signals that the interview should move 
on, presumably feeling that there was no role for an ethics theory 
approach in IEC review.  Indeed, throughout the interviews with both 
expert and lay members it was very clear that ethics theories do not 
feature in IEC discussions, and that science is privileged. 
7.3 Guidelines 
 
Despite there being a plethora of guidelines available to help 
ensure ethical research, how EC members utilise that guidance has been 
unclear.  Eckstein (2003) had referred to the existence of several hundred 
such guidelines.  In order to gauge awareness of the breadth of medical 
research ethics guidance amongst the interviewees, the researcher noted 
that the three most frequently mentioned in the literature are (i) the 
Declaration of Helsinki (“Ethics review in the UK is largely based upon the 
Declaration of Helsinki” (Academy of Medical Sciences, 2011: para. 8.2.1) 
as subsequently endorsed in para. 5.3 of the revised GAfREC 
(Department of Health, 2011)); (ii) the International Conference on 
Harmonisation – Good Clinical Practice (E6) (ICH-GCP, henceforth GCP) 
because it is ubiquitously cited in pharmaceutical protocols presented for 
ethical review; and (iii) Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, because this is often said to be the lingua franca of 
ethics review (at least in the West).  Although personally familiar with this 
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latter work, my own experience was that few fellow EC members had 
heard of it.  Yet because it has been so frequently cited in publications on 
research ethics, an awareness of it might still be a reasonable surrogate 
marker for someone’s general level of reading around the topic.  
Awareness of the work could thus indicate some wider research ethics 
reading whereas no awareness would indicate little, if any, extra-curricular 
reading. 
 
The following lay member, having acknowledged some ethics 
training as an undergraduate, was asked if familiar with the four principles 
approach of Beauchamp and Childress: 
 
R: O yes.  I’ve read it all. 
I: What’s the four principles approach in… [Respondent cuts in] 
R: Pass.  It’s gone in one ear and out the other (L15). 
 
Similar responses were obtained from all the interviewees, thus again 
indicating a limited expectation that any debates which address wider 
aspects of matters from ethical viewpoints were likely to have occurred in 
IEC meetings. 
 
 
If members were largely unacquainted with this classic, if not 
wholly uncontroversial, research ethics work they were also largely 
unaware of the other ‘classics’ selected as representative of the field, 
such as the Declaration of Helsinki or GCP.  This was the case whether 
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the interviewee was an expert or a lay member, as the following 
illustrative quotations demonstrate. 
 
I: Well in your reading have you come across things like the 
Declaration of Helsinki, Good Clinical Practice, the ‘four principles’ 
approach’, anything like that? 
R: Yes. 
I: [Waiting for more] 
I: Well, when you look at a protocol do you consider those 
principles at all? 
R: Yes I suppose so.  More subconsciously now than actively I 
suppose.  In what way are you thinking? 
I: Well, sometimes you read something that more or less says, 
implies, that the four principles approach is the approach that all 
ethics committees everywhere follow, and yet my experience is that 
no committee follows it. 
R: Well they probably don’t (E08). 
 
 
I… [D]o you follow any particular ethics theory approach?  Are you 
familiar with Beauchamp and Childress?  The ‘four principles’? 
R: No. 
I: No?  What about theories of ethics? Do you follow any? 
R: Well… in terms of do I apply any particular theory? No.  Have 
we received any training in that?  No.  Would training in that be 
beneficial?  A question I should ask myself, well, obviously, yes.  
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And I don’t see anyone else [on my committee] applying particular 
sets of ethical theories.  As members we read the material and it’s 
just a gut reaction.  Does this seem right? (L01) 
 
I’m not sure the Declaration of Helsinki and its various updatings 
still exists (L11). 
 
7.4 Virtue ethics 
 
Given that so few members of ethics committees (and none of the 
interviewees) acknowledged engaging in debates in which theories or 
principles of ethics were brought into explicit discussion in committee, I 
considered whether, perhaps in an unrecognised way, notions of virtue 
ethics were employed in IEC review.  As a minimum I wanted to know if 
ethics reviewers attempted to take a view of the character (or ‘virtue’) of 
the principal investigator whose protocol they would review. 
 
Interviewees had acknowledged that their committee originated to 
serve one particular research organisation, and that the situation changed 
with the introduction of the Clinical Trials Directive.  In the light of this 
Directive, IECs could no longer remain (independently) tied to one 
research organization and typically physically moved their meetings away 
from the host pharmaceutical research site and accepted for review 
studies from any researchers.  These relocations were intended to signal 
greater independence, but potentially meant that the committee members 
would not know the investigators so well and thus would presumably find 
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it harder to determine their character and suitability as a researcher.  
Virtue ethics concerns itself with a person’s character, and could help 
address this matter.  For this reason it has been the practice that the 
investigator’s curriculum vitae is requested by ECs as being potentially 
helpful to committee members in obtaining some understanding about the 
investigator.  It will say something about his/her experiences, research 
interests and level of training amongst other things.  However all 
interviewees saw the résumé as another formality which apparently added 
nothing to their review. 
 
This interviewee was not unusual in seeing both the insurance 
certificate and curriculum vitae in similar lights - as something to be 
checked off, but no more: 
 
All we are doing is saying yes.  We’re ticking a box.  And similarly 
with the CVs of the investigator. Tick (E03). 
7.5 Insurance 
 
Not all interviewees saw the matter of insurance as appropriate for 
a perfunctory act and agreed that it was an area of difficulty for them.  The 
fact that “[w]e’re not insurance experts” (E20) was evident from all 
interviewees. 
 
I think it’s very important [coming to a view about the level of 
insurance cover arranged for the proposed trial] but I place my full 
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trust in colleagues on the committee because they know more 
about these matters than I do (L09). 
 
I trust that the other members of the committee are dealing with 
that aspect, I hear the comment ‘Is insurance in place?’ and the 
response is ‘yes it is’.  I don’t ask the figure.  I haven’t specifically 
thought about it myself (E13). 
 
Another respondent, acknowledging that it was the ethics 
committee’s responsibility to ensure an appropriate level of insurance was 
in place, also acknowledged that there were no guidelines, and that no 
one really knew how to go about it.  IECs had been awaiting guidance for, 
at the time of interviewing, some eighteen months.  In the intervening 
period members had felt that the best that could be hoped for was that the 
committee make: 
 
sure […] as much as possible that the volunteer knows what the 
position is with indemnity […] Everyone is sort of hanging up in the 
air a little bit [ahead of the guidance] (E16). 
 
Insurance documents are always looked at; they are sort of global 
documents often out of date.  We pick people up on expired 
documents, but I don’t think we have ever said ‘no’ based on the 
                                                     
 Guidance was finally published in late June 2012.  See 
http://www.nres.nhs.uk/applications/guidance/phase-1-trials-guidance/?entryid62=143941 
(accessed 13.7.12) 
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amount of cover… We’ve never […] rejected any trial based on 
them (E08). 
 
Some informants though felt the review of the adequacy of the 
insurance in place for the trial was not a responsibility of the ethics 
committee: 
 
I would have thought the responsibility for insurance should be the 
responsibility of the MHRA (E03). 
7.6 Dignity 
 
During the period when the interviews were being conducted, 
NRES announced a review of its ‘mission statement’ - that NRES 
committees are to protect the health, safety, welfare and dignity of 
participants in research.  Although this review was subsequently 
abandoned because it was thought to potentially conflict with the 
independence of the Academy of Medical Science’s (2011) review of 
health research in the UK carried out on behalf of the new coalition 
government, opportunity was taken, as and when a situation arose, to ask 
some of the interviewees about their thoughts on these terms.  Some 
interviewees could not be asked because the issue arose after they had 
been interviewed, others were not asked because the topic did not fit in 
well with the interview.  Of the 20 interviewees only eight were asked 
about the notion of dignity, and in hindsight inadequately so in view of its 
complexity. 
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Although ‘dignity’ is a multivariate concept (Humphreys 2010d), in 
Kantian terms humans have dignity because a price cannot be placed on 
their worth – the very fact of their humanity means they are uniquely 
valuable.  Whether others view dignity in this way may of course be 
questioned but because in Phase I studies there always exists this 
potentially undignified element of paying the participants, the term 
seemed to have a valence in Phase I ethics review where members of the 
committees are obliged to look at the amount offered to the study subjects 
in exchange for their participation and cooperation.  There is however no 
record of an IEC having ever prevented, or even delayed, a study on the 
basis of questioning the sum offered to subjects and so I believed it would 
be interesting to know whether members understood dignity in this 
Kantian sense. 
 
One informant believed the broad-term phrase about ‘safety, 
health, well-being and dignity’ derived from the European Directive (in fact 
the phrase pre-dates the Directive), and that dignity meant:  
 
[N]ot asking volunteers to do something that they feel 
uncomfortable doing, medically or whatever, treat the person the 
same as you would want to be treated yourself (L05). 
 
For E13 dignity was about “caring,… integrity”, and for L06 it was 
about recognising the subject as “a human being with emotions…under 
levels of pressure or perhaps doing something which could be potentially 
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embarrassing, or uncomfortable…”; L01 saw it as treating the subjects “in 
a way which doesn’t embarrass them, which doesn’t abuse their goodwill 
and the fact that they are volunteering, that makes sure they have a 
certain standard of comfort, and also don’t take advantage of them”.   L09 
too took dignity as about respectfulness for the volunteers’ feelings (as did 
E14 and E03).  Unsurprisingly, none of the interviewees was really clear, 
and they could not easily distinguish wellbeing from health or from dignity, 
and safety for them was allied to health too.  None of them though chose 
to relate the idea of paying a participant for engaging in research with the 
notion of dignity, and the NRES mission statement was not referenced by 
any in the subgroup of interviewees with whom it could be discussed. 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has revealed the findings concerning the IEC’s work – 
members’ (preeminent) engagement in science/safety, their lack of 
knowledge of ethics theory, their non-adherence to guidelines, their 
difficulties with ensuring adequate insurance, and their lack of clarity 
concerning terms such as dignity, welfare and the like.  It has indicated 
the absence of a clear structure of approach for members, so, in the next 
chapter, in the final part of the findings chapters, attention is turned to the 
training that members have received for their role and to how they regard 
member training and education. 
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8. Findings: training and accreditation 
 
In this final chapter of the set of findings chapters, members’ 
opinions of their research ethics training and education, which might be 
supposed to have prepared them for their respective roles, are presented.  
The chapter then moves on to illustrate members’ views of how their 
training and education might be developed in the future. 
 
8.1 Training and education 
 
According to the original version of GAfREC (Department of Health, 
2001) current at the time of interviewing: “5.6 As a condition of 
appointment, a member must agree to take part in initial and continued 
education appropriate to his or her role as an REC member”.  This is 
clarified in a member’s letter of appointment as meaning at least one day 
of annual training each year.  The commitment is not rigorously enforced 
but rather relies instead on an honour-code.  Members were asked about 
the extent of their participation in the training made available to them. 
 
I: In your [almost two decades of IEC membership]… have you 
found any training of any use? 
R: I haven’t been on any, and that’s not because there hasn’t been 
any provided it’s just that it didn’t fit in with my work (L09). 
 
L09 was not unique in not having attended the obligatory ‘regular’ 
training expected of members.  It was a minority who had been to at least 
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one training session over the period of their IEC membership (the average 
length of membership of the interviewees exceeded 9 years).  This lay 
member had been only to an initial introductory day course: 
 
I don’t think it made any huge difference to me… I can’t say it 
particularly changed my view in any way (L06). 
 
Another member recalled going on Phase I-specific training when 
first appointed but nothing since and certainly nothing about ‘ethics’: 
 
I haven’t.  No I haven’t actually.  I suppose in the beginning it was 
time…so …no I didn’t.  Um.  I’m not sure there seem to be too 
many general ones [courses] (L05). 
 
For others the training they have attended was so far back in time 
that they could not recall its content, and the interviewer’s line of 
questioning presumably pricked some consciences as one member 
admitted to “beginning to feel a little guilty” about this (E02). 
 
But that member was by no means atypical in terms of how 
engaged he/she had been with training over the period of membership: 
 
I‘ve not been for ages…a long time ago.  Gosh…years ago (L07). 
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When I joined the committee there was no training available, well 
you observed at one meeting and then at the next meeting you 
were in (L11). 
 
This interviewee however was not the only one who felt the training 
was unnecessary, believing “my knowledge of clinical trials was enough 
not to require it” (L17), and similarly 
 
[B]ecause I’ve grown up in the business you see […] there’s not 
[…] much that NRES could provide for me.  On the other hand the 
courses that are provided can be very valuable for people who are 
coming into it as a true lay person (E03).   
 
This might sound terribly, terribly…contrite, egoistic but I’ve been in 
the game long enough now and courses are only for new people 
coming in, they are good courses but they are no value to me 
(E18). 
 
Presumably such assessments of the usefulness of the courses 
were made, not on the basis of actually having attended any courses 
personally, but rather reflected experiences of (those few) colleagues who 
had attended.  Some though had attended and found they got little from 
the training: 
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R: I went to a one day meeting in [location] in my first year after 
joining the committee […] I thought it was poor. 
I: What was the subject of the event? 
R: That’s a good question.  I’ve no idea. 
I: Well you must 
R: If you can find out, let me know […] I wanted to go on a formal 
course to see where I might be hopelessly weak (E12). 
 
Several members had only gone on what they described as 
‘relevant’ training: 
 
[S]uch training as I’ve done so far has been entirely on the context 
of Phase I trials and IMPs (L15). 
 
Three interviewees had been on a course run by the Clinical 
Contract Research Association, a trade body which exists to promote the 
interests of Contract Research Organisations and the pharmaceutical 
industry in the UK.  The course was highly regarded by those 
interviewees. 
 
It’s supposed to be a conference but it wasn’t really a conference it 
was a course and they gave an indication of what, the first time 
ever I’ve heard it as to what they would expect a Phase I ethics 
committee to talk about and how they should structure the 
meeting… (L11). 
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This ‘Cambridge conference’ was residential and ran for some 
eighteen years between 1992 and 2009 at one of the Cambridge 
Colleges, usually at the end of September and lasting for two or three 
days.  Typically it comprised a series of plenary lectures interspersed with 
streamed classes of which participants could select two from eight.  These 
conferences proved very popular with those members who attended, 
although one interviewee complained of: 
 
… endless lectures.  I think you can have too much quite honestly, 
sometimes it’s totally irrelevant and sometimes…I think as with 
anything, you do have to keep up to date, and I think all members 
of a committee should attend a course every…that’s why I’m going 
on one later in the year because I felt I have not been since I went 
to Cambridge [three years previously] (E04). 
 
Not all members of IECs could afford at least the time (or 
inconvenience) incurred by attending such training events, and a major 
part of the problem which was voiced by all of those interviewees who 
were in employment (inc. self-employment) was that:  
 
[T]he problem is …[our] jobs, some of us are self-employed and the 
difficulty is, if you are self-employed, during the working week… 
you can’t just take a day off work to go to training.  Most of which is 
some distance away.  London particularly.  It means taking, well 
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more than a day off because of having to go down the night before 
and staying overnight and returning late the next day (E19). 
 
[O]bviously everyone has busy lives […] And most training is in 
days and most people are working, to take a day off from work.  
For those working in the NHS fine [because approved training 
leave is classed as working time and no pay is lost…] but for half of 
us that wouldn’t apply.  I mean I’m self employed, if I take a day off 
I’m losing money, all I get back is my expenses […] another 
member who’s retired goes quite frequently…they have the time 
(L01). 
 
Part of the reason I haven’t gone to anything more […] is because I 
think a lot of it is not particularly helpful, and when you look at an 
agenda, particularly when you live …[a long way from London], 
well, you could get a night out in London, but generally it’s so far 
away you think of the disruption to work usually, as it’s never fallen 
on a convenient time and that’s partly why I haven’t gone on more 
(E08). 
 
At initial training, some interviewees felt there should have been 
others from their type of committee if they were to have got best value 
from it, yet “there was no one else on our type of committee” (L06).  
However this point of view was probably reflective of the expectation that 
particular committees should look at particular issues, such as the science 
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involved.  This though was arguably based on a false, or at least 
controversial, premise – that ethics committees should always review the 
science – as it wholly discounted the role of the MHRA or whatever other 
appropriate independent scientific review had been undertaken before any 
research proposal was submitted for ethics review.   
 
Thus few members actually went on the training provided except 
perhaps the induction training for new members.  However at any one 
time there have been few new members on an IEC.  The non-attendance 
was not clearly related to the member’s expert or lay status – although 
there was a belief widely held by members that experts did not need to go 
on training because it would offer them nothing they did not already know.  
A major non-attitudinal obstacle though was the failure to pay members to 
give up a day of work or annual leave to attend.  For this reason, as a few 
interviewees noted, it was those members who were retired who were 
more likely to attend training events. 
8.2 Competence 
 
In the USA it is possible for members of ethics committees – 
‘Institutional Review Boards’ (IRBs) - to become ‘credentialed’ members.  
Interviewees were asked whether a similar practice might have helped 
either give more role clarity to the expert and lay members, or at least 
helped them as individuals, and thence as whole committees, to see the 
bigger picture of research ethics review. 
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In the United States, IRB members may study a syllabus (see: 
www.primr.org/certification) covering the history of research misconduct, 
ethics review guidelines, and the extensive federal rules regarding the 
ethics review process.  Candidates can then sit a multiple choice 
examination which, if they pass, is demonstrative of their knowledge of 
research ethics review, and consequent certification would be valid for 
three years.  Certification can thence be maintained either by 
demonstrating continual education in research ethics review or by 
successfully re-sitting the examination.   Interviewees were asked if they 
believed British IEC members would be interested in a similar approach to 
ethics review training and education. 
 
Given that training events had just been discussed as largely an 
irksome irrelevance (at least for some), surprisingly most of the lay 
interviewees expressed enthusiasm for this latter approach: 
 
Yes it could be interesting.  Very interesting indeed.  Probably the 
sort of thing which is worth you or somebody raising with [AAPEC] 
as a possible training for all the committees (L15). 
 
The expert members, whilst not dismissive, were though distinctly less 
eager for the idea, and raised more caveats: 
 
I suppose initially it is important that everyone knows why they are 
doing it, I mean you can’t just join and pretend, be carried along by 
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everyone else… but the more regulation you have I think, the more 
life just gets complicated (E04). 
 
[I]t depends what the syllabus was… [but] I think there is merit in 
[the idea] (E18). 
 
I don’t think it addresses any ethical issues but it does address a 
quality issue […] training can be quite important…but I’m not keen 
on…multiple choice format.  Some form of training where there was 
some sort of assessment at the end, but not multiple choice, would, 
I think, be quite useful (E20). 
 
The evidence of these interviews also suggested that the topic of 
training had not been greatly discussed on committees: 
 
[I]t would raise the standards …[however] there might be a 
transition period when members of the committees felt it wasn’t 
worth it and you might lose people who have quite long expertise in 
ethical review (E13). 
 
Well, seems like a good idea but I get the impression that certainly 
new members tend to go on training whereas perhaps those who 
have been doing it for years, decades, tend to think that the training 
is not for them for whatever reason.  Certainly fewer older ones go 
for training in my experience from my committee.  They’ve largely 
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picked it up on the run which is what I did when I started.  But I 
think there is some merit in the idea; it must be quite interesting for 
the lay members… I would have liked something like that when I 
first started especially if I was a lay member (E08, again suggesting 
that the role is perceived to be about science/ methodology rather 
than matters of wider ethical import.) 
 
This member’s proposal for an exchange of members in order to 
spread good practice caused the researcher to make a subsequent 
enquiry in which no one could recall such an idea ever having been 
operationalized in the three decades of IEC existence.  This suggested, 
again, that training had been overshadowed by other, presumably more 
pressing, priorities: 
 
In principle I have to agree because it’s good.  We should swap 
members or let members sit on other committees to observe and 
criticise and so ensure good practice becomes the norm (E02). 
 
More than any other single topic discussed, the issue of training 
and certification generated a more engaged level of response, indicating 
that the matter was something that members had real feelings about, 
although these feelings may not have achieved full clarification in 
members’ minds.  That training was an issue that members had 
personally – if not collectively - thought about was indicative of role 
uncertainty. 
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I think education is an excellent idea and I think that this is the thing 
rather than, because within each particular committee you’ve no 
idea how new members are inducted in, about whether they have a 
mentor to help them through the first few protocols […] so I think 
certainly education is an important thing however as you’re no 
doubt aware is that we are a number of very small committees, and 
it’s getting smaller each time around, the only thing that does worry 
me somewhat is that already on the courses going, a lot of it does 
not apply to, does not really pertain to us, a lot of the training is 
directed towards NHS committees particularly, and to involve and 
enthuse people really the training has to be directed, has to be 
targeted towards them… But I also have to say that I do believe 
that a standard training throughout all of the independent 
committees would be a good thing but I have to look at both sides 
to the coin there (E19). 
 
If members believed that training was a potentially important issue, 
this did not exclude the possibility that some members understood that 
such training should address science and safety matters.  Unless the 
training addressed ‘research ethics’ there thus remained a potential for 
each member of a committee to address the same points in review as the 
separate independent scientific assessment body arranged by the 
sponsor would do, and to the exclusion of a wider ethics agenda.  The 
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following member was not alone in suspecting that training could result in 
a rather inflexible review process: 
 
R: That’s an interesting idea.  I don’t think it [training] would be a 
bad thing…    The down-side, but I don’t think it’s a serious 
downside is that everyone will begin to think in the same way 
whether you like it or not but that can be overcome. 
I: Another criticism might be that, well do volunteers want to do, sit 
an exam? 
R: They might not want to but it might not be a bad thing.  I know 
one or two members of our committee who come in, say nothing, 
pocket the money and then disappear, because I don’t think they 
can make a contribution.  And you think, that’s not right is it?  They 
are very pleasant people with, maybe very sincere, but just not 
there…The benefits far outweigh the downsides” (IEC member). 
 
This latter quotation was telling in that the “I don’t think they can 
make a contribution” indicated – again - that there was a perception that 
an ethics review in Phase I committees should be about the science. 
 
  If members were to take the view that the science and safety was 
in fact the responsibility of the MHRA and sponsor, the role of the ethics 
committee would need to shift to address something else.  If this 
something else was to be a wider ethics agenda then there was no reason 
why such ‘very pleasant…very sincere’ members cannot be ‘there’ for the 
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non-science and ethical aspects of research.  Such a situation was 
perhaps how things were originally envisaged by those who advocated lay 
involvement in ethics review.  (Many of the Nazi doctors’ medical 
experiments were, after all, methodologically sound, but just simply 
ethically atrocious.)  
 
It was possible that all the experts’ comments (and several coming 
from lay members) about ‘credentialing’ (as it is termed in the States) can 
be read, in retrospect – regrettably not noticed during the interview phase 
- to have indicated, again, that it was an assessment of the science and 
safety that was the IEC’s prime role.  Lay members however appeared to 
perceive, albeit uncertainly, that there could be some scope for extending 
their role – if only they knew in what way it could be extended. 
 
Thus, overall, the greater enthusiasm for the ‘credentialing’ 
approach amongst lay members compared to the expert members, and 
despite both groups’ near-derision of the training days, can be accounted 
for (albeit speculatively) by the promise that it might grant the lay 
members credentialed (but not ‘expert’) status or at least a clear role. 
8.3 Chapter Summary 
 
In this chapter, together with the previous two, which collectively 
make up the findings chapters, several key discoveries have been made.  
Chief amongst these were that science and safety were the crucial issues 
determinative of ‘ethical’ acceptability in IEC reviews, notwithstanding the 
MHRA’s role in more expertly assessing these very features of the 
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protocols.  Another interesting finding was that members were neither 
very clear, nor did they appear particularly interested in, who amongst 
them had the expert or lay designation.  Simultaneously however they 
were very supportive of a medical model approach towards review even to 
the detriment of wider ethics matters.  Training and guidance were found 
to be regarded as essentially unnecessary because the relevant 
experience and knowledge, it was thought, could be gained by simply 
observing colleagues in committee and thereby picking up what needed to 
be attended to.  However the current chapter has also indicated that if the 
training was authoritative, followed a syllabus and was ‘credentialed’, this 
could give definition to member roles in a supportive manner hitherto 
unattained. 
 
In the next chapter the findings reported in this and the previous 
two chapters are explored further in a discussion which relates these 
findings both to the extant scholarly understanding of EC roles and 
procedures more broadly, and also to the literature on professions. 
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9. Discussion 
 
Having presented the study’s findings in the previous three 
chapters, it is the turn of this chapter to relate those findings to the 
existing relevant scholarly literature.  In order to help ground the 
interpretation presented here, the sociological understanding of the 
professions is additionally recruited for its insights and upon which to 
fasten the emergent thesis. 
 
The research reported here contributes to the scholarly study of 
RECs in two main ways.  It is significant on one level because so little has 
been known about the workings of ethics committees in general (Citro, 
Ilgen and Marrett, 2003; De Vries and Forsberg, 2002; Hedgecoe, 2012a; 
Speers, 2008; Stark, 2012; van den Hoonaard, 2011) and this is the first 
detailed account of the workings of IECs.  On another level the research 
identifies the prevalence of distinct uncertainty held by IEC members 
about several core areas of ethics review.  Such uncertainty as to role has 
been observed in relation to other ethics committees (e.g. Dyer, 2004; 
EULABOR, 2005).  The current research though broadens the range of 
matters where the uncertainty is seen to exist, extends it into IECs, and 
also offers an explanatory account for this uncertainty.   
 
This explanatory account draws attention to the medical (‘expert’) 
dominance on IECs and argues that all the findings reported here are 
consequent upon this feature.  As this feature shares much of its 
topography with Freidson’s theory of professional dominance discussed 
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earlier (chapter 3.3 above) it is appropriate to compare the findings of the 
current research with that theory.  Freidson’s theory (1970) has been seen 
by some to have fallen into disuse due to the rise of other competing 
professions, with the inroads made by managerial impositions (such as 
evidenced based medicine, performance tables and targets) and with the 
access to wider knowledge permitted by both the internet and a more 
educated general populace.  Dingwall (2008a) for example alludes to the 
theory being considered an obsolete one.  However Dingwall was 
simultaneously able to revive it by suggesting the addition of a ‘control 
function’ feature.  By this he drew attention to the medical profession still 
having a key role as a gatekeeper to other services, professions and 
resources.  The doctor had to refer the patient, and so medical dominance 
was still extant. 
 
What the research here shows is not the Dingwall-variation but the 
continued existence of the original Freidson theory of professional 
dominance in action.  This may be accounted for by noting that the IECs 
(and indeed RECs) have existed in unreconstructed form since they were 
first created.  They were modelled on committees that grew up in the 
1960s (Hedgecoe, 2009) and so were part of the scene Freidson was 
then witnessing.   
 
In IECs, practices were seen to have been shaped, not by the wide 
knowledge or experiential base of committee members as a whole, but 
just by the activities of a single profession.  The expectations of the 
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medical model are thus seen to have become fundamental in ethics 
review.  This finding supports the idea that professional dominance has 
survived in certain niches, if not more widely, and thus invites 
consideration that the theory is not ‘obsolete’ as Dingwall (2008a) has 
suggested it has sometimes been perceived to be.  This finding also 
supports other research which has noted the fate of, for example, social 
science review succumbing to the disciplinary expectations of the medical 
profession rather than those of social sciences (Schrag, 2010, 2011; Van 
den Hoonaard, 2011).  However this finding must be treated with caution 
as Hedgecoe (2008) has demonstrated that it is not all (even NHS) RECs 
which are anti-qualitative research. 
 
Although specifically addressing the situation of IECs at a particular 
juncture in time, this research offers an approach for considering too the 
workings of other RECs.  This is important because society relies on 
these committees to sanction human subject research and so such 
committees have an important role in shaping health research and the 
general scientific progress society makes.   
 
Society reasonably expects that clear objectives should guide the 
committees, yet the evidence presented here is that this expectation is 
unmet. 
9.1 The members’ roles 
 
The research sampled an equal number of expert and lay 
members.  What became obvious and surprising very soon in the 
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interview process and data analysis stages was the proportion of 
members expressing their uncertainty not only about what their roles 
should entail, as Dyer (2004) and others had found, but also even about 
their role designation or that of colleagues, and often of both.  Members 
were unsure whether they were expert or lay members.  The literature 
review had not anticipated this finding.   
 
NRES has agreed that a problem has been identified concerning 
member categorization and I have offered a potential solution which 
involves NRES no longer relying on asking for a would-be member’s 
curricula vitae in order for an NRES member of staff to deduce the 
appropriate membership category.  In future members are to be requested 
to complete a simple algorithm form to demonstrate their membership 
category (see draft at Appendix 4, and Humphreys, in press). 
 
In part this finding about role designations can be accounted for by 
the fact that a non-medical clinician is regarded under NRES policy as an 
‘expert’ until five years after giving up practice, and thus some 
interviewees could simply have been uncertain about where they were on 
this timeline.  However, on pressing interviewees this proved not to be a 
significantly causal issue in the situation.  As was seen in the findings, the 
issue of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ hardly arose in the committees and so members 
were simply not obliged to consider the matter.  No duty or role in relation 
to any specific aspect of the review was formally incumbent on members 
by virtue of their expert/lay position on their committee.  Instead though it 
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was regarded as self-evident that members would generally address 
those issues they believed they were capable of addressing by virtue of 
their professional or life experiences: thus expert members would critique 
the science (method/methodology) implicit in the protocols. 
 
All members could comment on the participant information sheet 
(PIS) simply because they could all read it for themselves and decide if 
they understood it.  Lay members however could choose to pay special 
attention to it, and its clarity of expression.  When asked about the main 
purpose of the ethics review the respondents unanimously cited the 
importance of the safety of the study.  This was regarded as particularly a 
matter for those with a medical or allied background (e.g. pharmacy, 
toxicology).  The medical model was thus seen to remain dominant in 
review, just as it always has been (Freidson, 1970; Nicholson, 1993).   
 
When interviewees were asked to relate the role of their ethics 
committee to the role of the MHRA they universally acknowledged that the 
latter body had the legal responsibility, and the greater technical 
competence, to adjudicate on the science involved in the drug trial.  
Members however then struggled to explain the specific role of the ethics 
committee, or to justify the dominance of a scientific review within a 
committee established to address the ethical concerns that might 
underpin the proposed study, given that the MHRA was to concentrate on 
the scientific (methods, methodology, safety) aspects of the study.  
Although some commentators have recognised that the science of studies 
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has often been the main emphasis in ethics review, such findings (e.g. 
Cheung, 2007; EULABOR, 2005) were made in situations where there 
was no specific body (such as the MHRA) having a separate but specific 
involvement, or where the science had already been subject to an 
independent competent review.  As such the findings of uncertainty of role 
vis-à-vis that of the MHRA (several years after its establishment with that 
role) represents an important new finding.   
9.2 Medical professional dominance 
 
To begin to account for this phenomenon of there being a 
conflation of science review with an ethics review, it is pertinent to note 
that so ubiquitous are medical members on the relevant ethics 
committees that the legislation does not even find it has to stipulate them 
as being necessary members.  It has been almost unthinkable that they 
were not to be members of such committees.  Indeed no NHS REC or IEC 
has operated without their presence amongst the membership, despite 
this being legally possible (Art. 2(k) Clinical Trial Directive requires only 
‘healthcare professionals’ – these may be nurses or members of 
professions allied to medicine).  In the case of IECs, medical members (as 
defined in sch.2, para.3(5) of the Clinical Trials Regulations, S.I. 
2004/1031) comprised more than half of all expert members (see 
Appendix 2b) and as such could be described as the modal member.  In 
NHS committees they also form the majority of expert members (see 
Appendix 2a) despite the ostensibly easier availability of other clinicians in 
the NHS setting.  Even in situations where, for unusual (or simply sick-
absence) reasons, no medical member has been available on a quorate 
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REC, the REC members left still adhere to the profession’s medical model 
approach to the review – so the medical members retain a ghostly 
presence even in their physical absence.  The medical profession thus 
keeps control of the ethics committees that adjudicate on the ethical 
appropriateness of all medical trials.  And this medical control, via the 
medical model, extends beyond medical trials.  According to Schrag “[i]n 
the United States, at least, committees [IRBs] treat the Belmont Report as 
a guide to all research ethics [and not just biomedical research]” (2011: 
125).  Such a situation can be explained by, and gives credence to, 
Jones’ (1993) claim that “[r]esistance to lay control … [is] the cornerstone 
of [the profession of] medicine” (p.95). 
 
Bond has accepted that, even in Britain, social science has been 
“unjustifiably mauled” (2012: 95) by RECs.  He believed that such 
“[p]roblems are at their most acute when social scientists are reviewed by 
panels more used to biomedical research” (Bond, 2012: 111), thus 
implying that the lay members add little counterweight to the medical 
members on those RECs.  Interestingly too he suspected that biomedical 
dominance may lead to both “conscious and subliminal influences in 
ethical reviews” (Bond, 2012: 98), indicating how pervasive the medical 
model had become.  Again though, Hedgecoe (2012a) acknowledges this 
can happen, but reminds us that it is not every REC that operates in this 
way. 
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Abbott (1988) predicted defensive or even expansionary tactics 
being employed by the professions in attempts to secure an ever-tighter 
hold on any aspect of control over what their members could do.  Indeed 
the broadening of ethics review beyond the field of biomedicine into social 
sciences and indeed anywhere where it is proposed to engage human 
subjects in research, demonstrates the success of the medical 
profession’s strategy.  That others have not formally drawn attention to 
Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (1970) in this is surprising.  
However it is easily understood when one considers just how inaccessible 
the internal workings of RECs (and IECs especially) have proved to be 
over the years to the community of researchers. 
 
This aspect of the ethics review process – that it has been 
dominated by the medical profession - is of significance.  This chapter 
describes the evidence for this, and offers Freidson’s theory of 
professional dominance (1970) and the concept of the professions (here 
the medical profession) seeking to take charge as providing an 
explanatory model for the workings of IECs (and thence other ECs).  
 
This explanation also bears similarity in its structure, but not in its 
components, to a model recently introduced by Evans (2012).  Evans’ 
model argued for the existence of an influential ‘bioethics profession’ 
which exerts control over much of ethics review.  He indicated that 
evidence for this included the number of university courses teaching the 
subject, its numerous journals and professional associations and, 
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especially, the widespread use of principalism.   If his evidence was good 
in the USA where his focus admittedly was, it does not hold up so well in 
the UK where the evidence, for example, of awareness of principalism 
was noted to be almost non-existent amongst those involved in the 
research reported here.  However his model need only be slightly 
adjusted (to recognise that the UK has not caught up with the US in terms 
of a bioethics profession) to note that the UK’s medical profession has 
maintained control of the IECs (if not its RECs too).  Also contrary to 
Evans’ arguments for the existence of a powerful bioethics profession is 
that the research reported here noted a lack of training and education 
amongst members and it is also the case that few universities in the UK 
offer taught degrees in the subject.  However both Evans’, and a UK-
adapted version of his model, share the imprint of the sociology of the 
professions, and especially the latter’s notion that professions are about 
using abstract knowledge as a lever to control the content of debate. 
 
Schrag (2010) has accounted for how members of the medical 
profession and their colleagues in the health departments of the US state 
government consistently and deliberately marginalized non-medical 
disciplinary concerns over ethics review, over decades, to establish the 
biomedical model of modern Western medicine as the model to follow in 
ethics review.  This (US) model of ethics review as a biomedical model 
has been copied world-wide (Fitzgerald et al., 2006; Myser, 2011; Schrag, 
2010). In this light then, it is thus unsurprising that qualitative research 
often encounters an (arguably) disproportionately rigorous review as its 
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methodologies are alien to those whose expertise lies securely in the 
quantitative research paradigm (on this see Boden et al., 2009; Bond, 
2012; Dingwall, 2006, 2008b; Gunsalus et al., 2007; Hammersley, 2009; 
Murphy & Dingwall, 2007; Schrag, 2010, 2011 - and c.f. Hedgecoe, 2008, 
2012a). 
 
 The medical member is always an expert member, yet the term 
‘expert’ is problematic as the literature review indicated.  It promotes a 
logical fallacy that suggests that because someone is an ‘expert’ then 
whenever they say something – especially concerning, but not limited to, 
their area of expertise – they must be correct: it is at least difficult for a 
non-medically qualified individual to dispute such an expert’s abstract 
knowledge.  By indicating a greater, almost unchallengeable, level of 
knowledge it marks those so designated as due a degree of deference 
which contrasts with those to whom the appellation is not applicable.  
Where discourse is controlled in this way (and professions were noted to 
be very concerned about ‘control’), the experts’ consensus wins out and 
marginalises other (‘lesser’) concerns.  This was seen to occur so much 
so that interviewee L10 for example believed him/herself to be the only lay 
member on their committee because discussion was so dominated by 
matters scientific and medical.  Such findings also support Stark’s (2012) 
observations that professional warrants trump all other warrants. 
 
In the nomenclature of ethics committees, ‘expert’ promotes the 
profession of medicine such that its concerns are accorded pre-eminence 
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and other, non-medical concerns such as the broader ethics debate to be 
had becomes marginal, an optional extra, to be accommodated if time and 
the inclination of the medical members permit. 
 
Being considered an ‘expert’ enables one’s pronouncements to be 
determinative.  Hunter (2011) for example notes Confucius’ belief that 
people react to descriptive titles.  Thus the term ‘expert’, it could be 
argued, tends to inhibit the REC from acting ethically.  As Black puts it: 
 
“Defining an issue as one appropriate for pragmatic, technical 
discourse is at the same time a decision that deliberation should only 
occur between those who are competent to deliberate in a technical 
manner – it’s a decision for ‘experts’.  Defining it as one appropriate 
for ethical or moral discourse broadens the range of deliberants” 
(Black, 2001: 45). 
 
Someone who is accorded expert status is often accorded 
expertise in lateral aspects of their profession too – so a gynaecologist 
might well be assumed to have moral expertise in matters of fertility, 
abortion and even cloning.  Indeed those so labelled are likely to come to 
regard themselves as experts and so perceive their knowledge as 
especially determinant in decision making.  Thus the thinking is that as X, 
Y and Z are ‘expert’ members, what they say must be right, and as they 
are concerned with science/medicine/methods, that is what the IEC 
should be principally concerned with.  Again this reprises another feature 
of professions - their concern not just about control but the allied notion of 
‘content’.  Here the expert members are seen to privilege matters 
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scientific and especially medical as the appropriate content of debate in 
ECs, as distinct from ethical matters more broadly.  
 
Indeed a lay member could succeed to para-‘expert’ status by 
talking knowledgeably about medicine/science – this is why the 
toxicologists were assumed to be in the expert category (and even though 
the legislation points to a lay classification for them).  Other lay members 
could also demonstrate quasi-expertise if they could talk technically about 
medical and allied matters.  Thus it does not actually matter on IECs who 
are the ‘experts’ - rather the fact that there is an expert group is enough 
as science and medical concerns code ‘expertise’ and such issues 
achieve pre-eminence in debate. 
 
The findings of the current research thus indicate that Moreno 
(2005) was correct to suggest that it is the consensus amongst the 
experts on such committees that carries the decision and this even when 
they are not the majority grouping.  Presumably if experts were 
significantly in the majority on a REC and the task seen as more 
administrative (e.g. deciding on the adequacy of the science or safety) 
rather than a distinctly ethical issue (such as whether to perform an 
abortion in particular circumstances) then voting might not upset the 
medical members’ sense of being part of a professional grouping, nor 
need it cause any lay members present to feel that there was any serious 
weakness in the structure of that profession).  Thus, as Moreno 
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suggested, and as the research here finds, little can be expected to 
happen without the agreement of the medical members of the committee: 
 
“Medicine is a consensus-driven system.  That is, the practice of 
consultation among experts relies on a standard of intersubjective 
agreement, as is true of any practice that relies on scientific 
generalizations implicitly viewed as warranted.  In an area like 
medicine, where objective information is often inconclusive regarding 
particular cases, consensus has an explicit role.  But of all the 
committees in the healthcare institution only the ethics committee 
appears to be as consensus-oriented.  One reason for this may be a 
widespread sense that it is unseemly to ‘settle’ ethical questions by a 
mere vote” (Moreno, 2005: 85).   
 
If the experts on the committee are expected to come to a 
consensus (known as the expert opinion), then the lay members are at 
present automatically overwhelmed as it is the experts who form the 
majority in practice.  For this reason – and the research here notes that 
the medical model’s advocates have formed the majority on IECs – there 
is again no requirement to refer to membership categories.  The majority 
will inevitably succeed in their view, and so labels become redundant. 
 
A proposal to split the committee such that there become specific 
roles for the ‘experts’ on the one hand and ‘lay’ members on the other can 
be seen to raise difficulties.  Ethics committees function as a ‘committee’ 
and it is the consensus of the committee that produces the ethical opinion.  
To have a committee comprising of distinct roles or groups, with each 
grouping having its own objective can thus be seen as a potentially 
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unhelpful step, heralding fragmentation and limiting the opportunity to 
reach the necessary consensus.  In such a scenario, a split decision could 
represent a blatant ‘failure’ for one side or the other to achieve their aims, 
and it would signal that the research was of dubious ethical merit. 
   
Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (1970) implied that in 
the dominance an imbalance in proper relationships resulted and led to 
the suppression of other views than those matters that the professionally 
dominant medical model would advocate. 
  
Expert dominance is a problem where moral issues, as distinct 
from scientific issues, are at stake.  For, whilst there may be medical 
experts, arguably (and see e.g. Steinkamp et al. (2008) for this debate) 
there can be no moral experts for there is nothing to be objective about 
with the notion of morality, and so no possibility of demonstrating that one 
approach is correct whereas another is incorrect.  On IECs those 
members selected for their science/medical credentials are termed 
‘experts’, and as experts their views predominate: they are deemed to be 
‘right’ in virtually whatever they say, and permit.  The term has power, 
owing much, as Hughes (1958) long ago observed, to the public relations 
successes of professions. 
 
It thus follows that the terms ‘expert’ and ‘expertise’ are problematic 
in ethics review.  ‘Expert’ indicates a distinct professional recognition of an 
individual’s level of acquired knowledge in a given subject area.  The 
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content of that knowledge constitutes the expert’s expertise.  Each term 
thus defines the other in a circular fashion.  The conceptual linkage is 
made explicit by Freidson’s (1970) professional dominance theory which 
notes that the knowledge-base which constitutes expertise is defined by 
the profession.  The expert is someone who has a sufficiently high-level of 
expertise and this is typically ‘objectively’ evidenced by reference to 
particular sets of qualifications.  Expertise is thus the property of the 
expert and so any notion of there being ‘lay expertise’ is rejected as 
oxymoronic under this model.  However, if one can put aside the 
legitimacy of a professional dominance in a situation, one can 
reconceptualise expertise as being available to those individuals with 
mere access to knowledge rather than a professional background 
buttressed by a series of formal qualifications.  ‘Expert systems’ or 
‘intelligent knowledge-based systems’ provide examples.  Such tools 
permit an ‘expert answer’ to follow from a given series of factual answers 
to a set of subsidiary component questions. 
 
But such notions as expert and expertise, whether or not they 
include the ‘lay’ versions, tend to miss the point in ethics review if one can 
allow that an ethics review is separable from a scientific review.  In ethics 
review the decision about what is morally the correct act does not require 
experts or expertise so much as mere humanity or sociality: competence 
as a socially-operating human is enough for such a decision-base.  
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The findings of the present research though confirm that it is still 
the science that is regarded as determinative, rendering other 
experiences marginal.  In this the lay role on IECs is thus seen to have 
failed to achieve the expectations given by the Merrison Committee 
(1975) that lay involvement would “change the perspective of 
proceedings”, or by Hall (1991) that professional interests would be 
challenged, or even by Allsop and Mulcahy (1996) that more emphasis 
would be placed on deliberation about gains in knowledge versus 
potential risks to participants.  The evidence here also confronts Hogg and 
Williamson’s (2001) view that there could be as many as three categories 
of lay person who might join a health committee as it finds only those of a 
single category - those supportive of the dominant interests.  This must 
though be at least in part due to the controlling strategies used to select 
recruits and thence ‘capture’ the lay member.  Indeed the notion of 
‘capture’ can here be seen to have been either inadequately anticipated, if 
not cynically employed, by those who devised the REC constitutions as a 
tactic with which to confound the influence of lay members.   
 
It is the influential nature of the very term ‘expert’, the concept of 
‘expertise’, and that on IECs this expertise has been specifically animated 
by the model of medical science – as have been revealed in the current 
research – that opens up a new thesis which exposes the ethics review 
process as thereby potentially flawed because it is seen to be essentially 
a re-review of the science involved.  The research has demonstrated the 
dominance of scientific considerations in ‘ethics review’ even though the 
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scientific, safety and methodology considerations are all the responsibility 
of another separate and decidedly expert body.  An EC’s emphasis on 
reviewing science which has already been reviewed is to ignore its own 
standard operating procedures and GAfREC, and is such as to 
marginalise lay considerations.  In this the public are funding, but not 
obtaining, an ‘ethics review’ they may expect.  The situation has arisen 
because of the medical professional dominance and that it is incumbent 
on these experts to perform according to their professional status (and 
when they are not instructed otherwise). 
9.3 Recruitment 
 
The way in which members were recruited has secured the 
experts’ position.  The research sample provided a consistent account of 
how individuals had been recruited on to their IEC: the recruitment 
approach was often initiated by an extant committee member (“I’ve also 
got two of my protégés on the committee” E02), and to this extent 
replicates Porter’s (1986) findings.  Although the data for this research 
had not been generated in anticipation of specifically seeking to establish 
which category of member acted as the recruiter, clearly potential 
members had to be acceptable to the committee as a whole and in this 
context it should be recalled that the medical members form the largest 
single professional group on the committee.   
 
Neither the demography of the interview sample nor the general 
make-up of current committees suggests the operation of an extensive 
range of recruitment practices.  Elsewhere I have noted the social 
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similarities (and consequent implications) of, on the one hand, members 
of IECs and, on the other, members of the research community 
(Humphreys, 2007c).  Schuppli and Fraser (2007) noted that word-of-
mouth recruitment is typical in the case of animal ethics committees too. 
 
  Membership of ECs is thus seen as representative of a rather 
narrow section of society, mirroring previous findings.  Its dangers are 
illustrated by Fisk’s (1980) argument that ethics are but class-created 
mechanisms for reinforcing extant social divisions.  In this light, members 
of the medical profession are seen to be securing their dominance in the 
EC.  An illustration of this occurring can be seen in the minutes of Welwyn 
Garden City’s Queen Elizabeth II Hospital’s medical staff committee of 9th 
July 1982: 
 
“(5) Local Ethical Committee for Clinical Research: 
[The Secretary]…asked the medical staff to reconsider their rejection 
of the proposed ethical committee.  The medical staff agreed to 
accept the proposal with one alteration, that it should include three 
senior medical staff, i.e. medical, surgical and investigatory 
specialities.” 
 
Such evidence invites speculation that the medical staffs were to have 
considerable influence in what got approved in that committee and it is 
difficult to foresee lay concerns ever becoming paramount in any EC 
which has ‘expert’ designees. 
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In the current research, whether or not interviewees were in the 
‘expert’ or ‘lay’ category, all had a professional background.  All were (or 
had been whilst in employment and before retirement) eligible for 
membership of a professional body and, with the exception of the nurses, 
all had had a tertiary education.  Not all members of an IEC necessarily 
have such a background, but the majority of them do, as they do in NHS 
RECs (Department of Health, 2005b).  Earlier findings of REC 
memberships more generally (e.g. Department of Health, 2005b; 
Neuberger, 1992; Nicholson, 1986a; Porter, 1986) have noted the lack of 
ethnic variety amongst REC membership and although I did not 
specifically look for the ethnic category of my sample, my observations 
were not inconsistent with previous findings.  
 
In this context, Groenhout’s (2010) argument that European-
Americans understand bioethics (ethics applied to matters of human 
biology within the Western tradition of medical practice) as essentially a 
reflective activity to be conducted in the comfort of one’s home or office 
(i.e. private and mental) whereas for African-Americans it is something 
more appropriate to public settings is interesting.  If there is indeed such 
an ethnic difference (and Bujo (2001) suggests there is), perhaps the 
latter would make for better members of ethics committees, but at present 
there is no empirical evidence in the UK for such a view.  Similarly, no 
interviewee had an obvious disability (hearing aids excepted) although 
again this was not formally noted.  The demographics of IEC membership 
therefore were seen to remain consistent with previous findings in both 
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the USA (Ghio, 1980) and the UK (Neuberger, 1992), where the higher 
level of education and the professional backgrounds of members of IRBs 
and NHS RECs respectively were noted.  When one considers the 
manner of recruitment these findings are unsurprising: current IEC 
members have tended to be recruited by those they already know, and 
often from a time when British society was even more socially segregated 
than it is today.  This all reinforces the position of the medical expert who 
can but find deference from the lay members. 
 
It has been argued that such narrow demographic attributes 
increase the perceived distance of members from general society (Hinde, 
2007).  This restricts the range of issues that are likely to be discussed in 
committee (Humphreys, 2009 and 2010e), so favouring a more traditional 
view of society, which may not correspond with the groups which might 
like to participate in Phase I research (i.e. the lucrative trials).  By 
representing such a narrow constituency, discriminatory practices can too 
easily be overlooked in ethics review (Humphreys, 2010c; see also 
Hunter, 2006).  This too is a feature Freidson’s theory of professional 
dominance (1970) predicted, for where professional dominance occurs 
other interests are easily pushed aside, and not necessarily in a manner 
obvious to those involved.  
 
The consistency of membership has been a greater factor in IECs 
than amongst NHS RECs because in the latter the role has been linked to 
a member’s career in a way that it was not on IECs. Whilst NHS staff were 
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regarded as ‘at work’ whilst sitting on their committees and so they have 
in effect been paid for their role, there has been no remuneration for 
retired members on NHS committees.  Conversely IEC members were 
paid a stipend regardless of their employment status.   
 
This payment may have contributed to the finding that interviewees 
had been on their committee for periods in excess of the ten year stated 
maximum time that NRES advises (GAfREC para. 4.3.2, Department of 
Health, 2011).  Indeed, the present research found, just as Nicholson had, 
“[s]everal…long standing committee members…one of whom has been 
on a committee for nearly 30 years” (1997: 15).  (When IECs closed in 
late 2011 some members had been on their IEC since its inception.) 
 
Long-serving members emphasized their experience.  Indeed, IEC 
members have approached reviews in a consistent manner over the 
years.  Many acknowledged either never having had any training (other 
than ‘observing’ and then subsequently emulating what they saw the other 
members do) or but very little training, and then generally only in the 
technical aspects of Phase I protocols.  In this they have not been 
required to keep up to date as their role has been perceived to be in 
‘steady state’.  These findings can be interpreted to demonstrate another 
feature of the professions which was revealed in the literature and that is 
that they can be aggressive in developing their status against non-
professionals, and also against other professions.  An inter-professional 
hierarchy tends to arise, with doctors vying against all competitors for the 
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top position (Freidson, 1970).  The medical profession has for example 
traditionally been seen to have tried to shape the nursing profession as 
having a professional duty of obedience to the orders of medical doctors 
(Burkhardt and Nathaniel, 2002; Small, 2010): 
   
“The traditional nurse was expected to obey the physician, much as 
the wife was expected to obey her husband.  Physicians demanded 
obedience, and nurses hesitated to disagree with physicians even if 
there was good reason to do so” (Burkhardt and Nathaniel, 2002: 
166). 
 
 
Although there was no evidence for such bullying, and none is 
suspected, it is nevertheless arguable that with the ‘expert’ status there is 
an expectation that medical concerns will find deference.  This feature 
was seen to be of relevance in how the members under study were 
recruited onto their committees and again supports a view of medical 
professional dominance in review.  After all, given that they are 
professionals, it is difficult to conceive of them wishing to dilute the very 
expertise that brought them to the committee by their then encouraging an 
alternative set of competencies and approaches to ethics review.  This 
finding reflects Larson’s (1990) observation that the profession will have 
wished to keep its knowledge abstract and skill set intact and so 
emphasize ‘expertise’, and is further evidence of Freidson’s theory of 
professional dominance being in action in the IECs. 
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9.4 Safety first 
 
 The background chapter (chapter 2 above) explained the 
establishment of IECs as a consequence of the Declaration of Helsinki, 
the introduction of the Clinical Trials Directive as a harmonizing instrument 
within the European Union and the establishment of the MHRA as the 
competent authority established (1st April 2003) to consider the safety of 
proposed drug trials.  That chapter also explored the model process of 
research ethics review and observed that a typical medical person’s 
knowledge is most unlikely to be capable of adding anything to the 
science or safety of Phase I drug trials (Abadie, 2010; Hubbard, 2009; 
Petryna, 2009).  
 
Despite all this, the findings of the research reported here 
demonstrated very plainly that members of IECs follow what has become 
known as the Georgetown mantra - that ‘bad science means bad ethics’ 
(Angell et al., 2008; Hunter, 2007b) - and insist they need to check the 
scientific adequacy of the proposed trial.  Whilst it is undoubtedly true that 
bad science can mean that determinative results may not be obtained, 
and so resources expended on fruitless research will be wasted, which 
can be especially serious in Phase I studies where there is no prospect of 
benefit to a participant who is guaranteed only risk, this does not excuse 
the waste of time and opportunity created by an ethics review which 
emphasizes a re-review of the science at the expense of an ethics 
appraisal.   
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Dyer (2004) had noted that members of RECs are unclear about 
their role and suggested, whilst that remains the case, that it results in a 
waste of people’s time and effort which in turn constitutes an unethical 
situation.  The findings of the present study demonstrate that her findings 
persist. 
 
The literature review demonstrated that the IEC could legitimately 
rely on the MHRA to adjudicate on the science and safety of the trial (e.g. 
Edwards, 2010a) and turn its attention to how the participants are to be 
treated, whether the insurance is at an appropriate level, whether certain 
groups of people are being unfairly prevented from participating in 
lucrative trials, whether the money on offer is too much (or inadequate), 
whether the information sheet is sufficiently comprehensive and clear, 
how incidental findings are to be dealt with, and so on.  These are all 
more clearly ethical concerns yet are currently relatively under-
emphasized in a research ethics review which, as the research reported 
here again demonstrates and reiterates, instead continues to concentrate 
on the science and safety of the trial – an adopted role which merely, if 
inadequately, attempts to imitate that of the more expert teams utilised by 
the MHRA. 
 
Arguably such an approach represents a lower standard of ethics 
review and so constitutes a wasted opportunity which serves only to 
subject the sponsor to unnecessary delay and potentially further costs.  
Indeed it could be regarded as a situation of ‘double jeopardy’ which itself 
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might be regarded as unfair, wasteful and thus unethical.  But it does 
perpetuate the experts’ professional role, and as has been demonstrated 
in the literature review, professions are about maintaining position and 
status against competing interests. 
 
Evidence was also found of lay members reporting that they had 
attempted to emulate the experts (attempting to assess the science and 
safety of the pharmaceutical protocols) and the experts wanted a say in 
assessing the participant information sheets.  Such findings support 
EULABOR’s own findings that “more than half…did not know the limits of 
their role” (2005: 6).  It is unreasonable though to expect the professional 
to act unprofessionally and so if there is a problem with ethics review it 
may not be the fault of the experts, but of the system coupled with the 
nature of the professions as being (in part) about protecting members’ 
interests.  In the context of ethics committees, it is the dominance of the 
science, supported by the notion of ‘experts’, where the science has been 
independently approved elsewhere, that this research calls into question. 
 
The professionalism of the expert – and most especially of the 
medical – members of the committees may be preventing an approach to 
ethics review that sees it as about ethical issues (as opposed to the 
science involved), as for that, what is required is debate, for: 
 
“The Good … is not a mere static thing, but a project – one that is 
undertaken, not by isolated individuals, but by social individuals, 
generally persons working together, even if often at odds… What 
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is…important is the quality of the deliberation… This underscores 
the fact that bioethics is a social activity” (Moreno, 2005: 60-61). 
 
Evidence of expert/medical dominance was apparent throughout 
the interviews as no interviewee could conceive of not considering the 
science/medicine/safety of the IMP, despite all ultimately acknowledging 
that the MHRA both had specific responsibility for this and had more 
appropriately qualified staff and more information available to it.  To 
recognise the MHRA’s ability in this matter would imply a concomitant 
recognition that the level of medical-model expertise in an IEC was 
excessive.  This would be to betray the profession as a barrier against the 
entry of amateurs (such as influential lay members) on to the IEC. 
 
As Caminiti et al. (2011) and others have also noted, technological 
and scientific progress is becoming increasingly complex such that any 
attempt to review it requires a level of knowledge and skill unlikely to be 
present on an EC.  Thus several interviewees made reference to the 
Northwick Park incident as evidence that the MHRA was not perfect, but 
none could demonstrate that their IEC’s review would have been any 
better.  Such findings indicated that it is at least arguable that EC review 
should no longer attempt to address scientific matters where the science 
is the known responsibility of another – better qualified, if not infallible – 
body.  No special skills should be required for an ethics review which is to 
ensure the moral and social acceptability of the research proposed, yet – 
and ironically - training and certification could help demonstrate this, as 
will be discussed below. 
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9.5 Clarity or ‘readability’ of Participant Information Sheets 
 
Whilst a focus of the literature on the ethics review process has 
concerned itself with the varying standards by which RECs ‘improve’ the 
grammar of the documentation presented to would-be subjects, the 
findings of the current study demonstrate that the process is not wholly a 
lay members’ role.  This finding was not apparent from the extant 
literature.  That it is no one’s specific role goes to explaining the varying 
quality of such revisionary activity.  It is also further evidence for expert 
dominance.  It is not the experts’ obvious role to correct someone else’s 
grammar and, in the model of expert-scientist dominance presented here, 
whether the task is performed, by whom and to what extent, becomes 
merely arbitrary.  The only issue that really matters for the reviewers is the 
adjudication on the science.  This is disappointing because it has been 
suggested that when the PIS are constructed, risks can be underplayed, 
attention distracted, inconveniences minimized and so forth (Lignou and 
Edwards, 2012; Menikoff, 2010). 
 
The evidence of the data gathered in the present study indicates 
that the lay members believe their primary role – if they have one - is to 
ensure the documentation presented to potential participants by way of 
initiating ‘informed consent’ is likely to be understood by a typical 
volunteer (lay members cannot be expected to know if the PIS is accurate 
in its portrayal of the medical risks involved).  However this role is always 
subordinate to the medical acceptability of the study.  Neither do all IEC 
members have personal experience as clinical trial volunteers, nor do 
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their professional backgrounds suggest they have a greater ability to 
anticipate true volunteers’ difficulties with comprehension than the expert 
members.  The expert members are not however denied the opportunity 
to contribute to enhancing the clarity of the documentation (and it has 
been noted that distinctions in roles are rarely apparent on committees).  
Interviewees in this research were insistent that the safety of the trial was 
the sole determinative factor; anything else was thus effectively an 
optional luxury.  Nor did the grammatical review ever extend beyond a 
subjective evaluation, despite the existence of objective tools to calculate 
‘readability’ being freely available (Goldfarb, 2005).  
 
By contrast, concerns about the science or safety can be referred 
to an external independent expert for an ‘objective’ opinion – even though 
the MHRA will also provide such an opinion.  This route is now 
discouraged by the committee’s standard operating procedures (SOPs), 
as seen above, and the facility is a relic from the time before the MHRA.  
Its continuance owes much to the fact that some applications coming 
before RECs (as distinct from IECs) may not necessarily have had an 
adequate independent scientific review (e.g. where the sponsor of a 
medical device is also its inventor and principal investigator (and see 
Humphreys, 2012a)).  It is though also homage to the fact that ECs want 
the facility as it reinforces ‘expertise’ and the medical model, and they 
would use the mantra of ‘bad science means bad ethics’ to press for its 
continuance. 
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The contrast illustrated by the findings between the priority given to 
an (arguably) unnecessary science review and the consequent relative 
denigration of all other issues (such as ‘readability’) which thus effectively 
escape greater attention, illustrates the power of the committees.  Whilst it 
is for ECs to decide what is ethical, when members take this duty beyond 
their remit (as given to them in GAfREC, their standard operating 
procedures, and their terms of appointment) they are, arguably, exploiting 
their power.  Despite the presence of such guiding strictures, only 
members of an EC can know what is acceptable to it, and in this 
subjectivity their power becomes great indeed.  They decide either to 
permit research to occur in a particular way, or prevent it altogether.  Thus 
the findings of the present research would offer an alternative 
interpretation of the situation described by Juritzen et al. (2011). 
 
Instead of the members’ knowledge/power modality creating ‘docile 
bodies’ of researchers who go on to police themselves in accordance with 
what is created and legitimated by the committees as Juritzen et al. 
(2011) suggest, Dingwall (2010), Schrag (2010) and others have noted 
that researchers do not typically come to ‘own’ the ethics committee’s 
stipulations.  The findings from the present study suggest that it is not 
necessarily the researchers who are made into ‘docile bodies’, but rather 
it is the lay members on the committees who are made subject to the 
‘technologies of the self’.  The lay members come to see the medical 
model of the experts as that which it is legitimate to model all research 
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and its ethical territory upon.  Again the medical profession is seen in this 
analysis to have dominance. 
9.6 Insurance 
 
Although interviewees noted that their committees were in the 
position of waiting for guidelines on insurance which had been promised 
following the tragedy of Northwick Park, this did not answer the matter of 
how an IEC assesses insurance.  IECs have been legally responsible (Art. 
3, para 2(f) Clinical Trials Directive) for satisfying themselves about the 
adequacy of the insurance arrangements in place for clinical trials since 
before the events of 13 March 2006.  Interviewees acknowledged that 
their committees have addressed this topic inadequately to date, with only 
luck preventing a situation of inadequate insurance materializing earlier 
than it did.   
 
Clearly, insurance is not a ‘medical’ matter and because the 
committees have concentrated on the medicine or science, other matters 
– so the findings demonstrate - such as insurance have been overlooked, 
or treated in a cursory fashion because there was no guidance available 
to the IECs upon which to base any concerns.  Again this finding that 
IECs have not known how to deal with insurance has escaped the 
attention of the literature but can be explained by the implications of the 
thesis that where there is a medical dominance other matters become 
marginalized (Freidson, 1970).   
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When the IECs were associated with a pharmaceutical company it 
may have been accepted by the IEC that the pharmaceutical concern’s 
resources would be sufficient to cover any potential claims.  Now, one 
may speculate, if IECs were lay - rather than expert-dominated, the 
question of checking the adequacy of the insurance would have occurred 
earlier in time because a lay-dominant membership would realise that the 
weight of ethical consideration was to be given to the participants’ 
interests, and not to issues of scientific validity.  Similarly if guidance had 
been available perhaps this would have steered committees towards 
concentrating their review towards issues other than the science and 
safety which are addressed by a more competent body.  Again the 
dominance of the medical profession evidences itself.  Interestingly too, 
when the guidance was finally published (ABPI/BIA/CCRA, 2012), the 
NRES guidance for REC members revealed that it had been “developed 
by the BioIndustry Association… with observers from NRES and the 
Department of Health” (emphasis added, NRES, 2012: 1).  Again the 
advocates of the medical model are seen to be dominant in that 
relationship.  In fact the guidance can be criticised as constraining RECs 
from voicing concerns, as it is easily envisaged that researchers or their 
sponsors might just point to the guidance as allowing the levels of 
insurance they obtain. 
9.7 Guidelines 
 
The literature on ethics committees often supposes that either one 
particular model of ethical reasoning is adopted by these committees or 
there exists a competitive “normative polyphony” (Shergold, 2008: vii) as 
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members vie to adopt their preferred choice from amongst the numerous 
normative guidelines that are available to the bioethics community.  
Eckstein (2003) indicated in excess of 350 guides as far back in time as a 
decade ago and Karlberg and Speers (2010) indicated that over 1100 
laws, regulations and guidelines were extant to govern human participant 
research in some 96 countries.   
 
Despite this, for many researchers it seems that when their 
protocol goes to an ethics committee it enters into a black-box of sorts, 
such that the outcome is unpredictable.  The application process has even 
been described as akin to “a game…using a Ouija board… no one knows 
who answers or determines approval” (National Communications 
Association, 2005: 233).  The four principles approach was intended to 
make the ethics review process clearer, even commensurate (Evans, 
2000).  It has also been claimed that principles-based reasoning 
(Beauchamp and Childress, 2009) is the model of ethical theorizing most 
widely used (e.g. Fox and Swazey, 1984; Macfarlane, 2009; Tranøy, 
1990) and indeed that it has become the ‘lingua franca’ of bioethics 
(Grouenhout, 2010).  Rawbone (2000) noted that ethics committees are 
obliged “to ensure research is conducted to acceptable ethical standards 
[a phrase apparently taken from paragraph 2.1 of GAfREC (Department of 
Health, 2001)] using, for example, the application of the four principles of 
biomedical ethics” (p.16, emphasis added).   
 
221 
 
Beauchamp and Childress’s (2009) four-principles is a framework-
approach for thinking about ethical issues in medicine and medical 
research.  It suggests that virtually all ethical issues can be considered 
within the concepts of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence and 
justice.  
 
It was anticipated that interviewees might not necessarily favour 
the principalism approach (it being just one approach that might be taken), 
but that no interviewee was familiar with it was not predictable from the 
literature, and thus suggests that Evans’ (2012) belief in the presence of a 
significant and powerful ‘bioethics profession’ is not supported by the 
evidence in the UK.  Only three interviewees (two experts, one lay) 
indicated that they ‘might’ have heard of the component concepts when 
the researcher explained them, but none of them personally had used, or 
been aware of colleagues thinking in such terms in IECs.   
 
The Declaration of Helsinki similarly is but one of the many ethics 
guidelines which are available to help ethics committees to do their work.  
The Declaration is referenced, as one of the interviewees phrased it, as 
part of the ‘boiler-plate’ seen in virtually every pharmaceutical-company 
sponsored protocol submitted for ethics review.  As such members might 
have been thought to have read it and perhaps taken a view of ethics 
review from it.  If they had studied it they might have recalled that it claims 
to be supreme of all ethics guidance (art 10) and all ethics reviews should 
be “in accordance with the principles of the declaration of Helsinki” 
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(Caminiti et al., 2011: 220).  However the interviewees certainly had not 
read a recent version of it.  Several interviewees believed it was no longer 
even published – probably being confused by the fact that it has been 
revised numerous times.  Part of the confusion for some interviewees was 
that it is the 1996 version that is cited by the pharmaceutical industry.  
Again though, this represents a situation where ‘rules’ can blindly block 
members’ autonomous view of ethics (for another example in the 
pharmacy setting see Humphreys, 2012b).  For many, ethics cannot be 
codified because, as discussed earlier (chapter 4.4 above), it is an 
inherently subjective notion.  Despite this though the US Food and Drug 
Administration will only accept the 1996 version of the Declaration 
because it does not approve of the post-1996 versions, largely because 
these versions denounce the use of placebos in therapeutic trials.  As two 
of the interviewees recognised though, the use of placebos in healthy 
volunteer (non-therapeutic) trials is not controversial. 
 
The responses do suggest a significant proportion of IEC members 
would happily adopt the rules given to them by industry: they would be 
content simply for their ethics review to conform to industry ethics rather 
than represent a more socially nuanced moral stance.  IEC members 
were content to rely on the industry-produced guide for ethics committees 
(Goggin, 2005) as instructive of what they should consider in an ethics 
review.  There is irony in this reliance on the very industry to be checked 
itself instructing ‘independent’ ethics committees what it is they are to look 
for (Humphreys, 2007c).  What the research here points to is that this 
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acceptance of such guidance is likely to be directly influenced by the 
reverence for, and be inculcated by, the expert members’ interests and 
the concomitant status given to science.  
 
This finding that guidelines are almost entirely ignored is 
interesting, and perhaps surprising.  It can be accounted for though by 
realising that the IECs under study were still relics of the original IECs.  
They were bodies set up by members (but aided by the industry) to do 
what they thought best, and which eschewed much in the way of training 
and guidance, preferring to follow the professional interests of their 
dominant (medical) members.  Instead they approached any ethics issues 
- or in reality all the issues they considered as it was difficult for them to 
decide what was an ethical issue and what was not – on the basis of 
instinct or gut-feeling.  Such an instinctual response is really only suited 
for when “one has no time to think what to do, and so one relies on one’s 
immediate intuitive reactions; [although]…these give no guide for what 
critical thinking would prescribe if there were time for it” (Hare, 1981: 139).  
This instinctual response is also plausibly a factor accounting for 
applicant-researchers’ complaints that EC decisions are unpredictable.   
 
A reliance on visceral, ‘gut’, responses rather than a stable, 
thought-through, moral framework and not even being aware of research 
ethics guidelines can be morally legitimate in that it can reflect honestly 
held, but possibly subconscious, attitudes.  But it can also mean that 
decisions are likely to be capricious, and/or be prone to such a fall-back 
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position as is offered by the medical model which is ever present amongst 
the experts.  Not being aware of such guidance on the one hand can 
suggest a lack of either commitment or engagement with one’s role.  
Equally though such guidance can appear as largely superfluous if those 
present in meetings are content to rely on the medical model approach.  
The medical – or expert – approach to IEC review incorporates the 
Declaration of Helsinki within its medical ethics (it is authored by the 
World Medical Association) and thus the key requirements of informed 
voluntary consent are mandated with no further exploration of additional 
guidelines being considered necessary.  In fact no explicit reference to 
Helsinki is required as its approach is taken for granted by the profession.  
Guidance beyond that offered integrally by the medical model is not 
perceived as necessary.  This could explain Nicholson’s (1986a) 
surprising finding that REC chairs were unaware of the guidance available 
to them, and their apparent continued avoidance of such ‘external’ 
assistance.  It can also account for van den Hoonaard’s (2011) 
observation that whilst REB conferences in Canada “proclaim the 
supreme validity of ethics codes” (2011: 98), individual members of such 
committees were rarely aware of a code’s guidance and preferred to rely 
on disciplinary-inspired positions.  Medical members by contrast can be 
expected to be well-versed in their medical ethics codes, as any failure to 
adhere to such codes can result in disciplinary sanctions. 
9.8 Members’ vague terms of reference 
 
During the interview phase of the research it became apparent to 
the researcher that many of the interviewees had only a vague awareness 
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of the role prescribed to them by the mission statement of NRES.  If they 
did not understand the terms of their mission statement, how could they 
articulate them in ethics review? 
 
NRES’s mission statement refers to the fact that RECs are to 
safeguard the rights, health, safety, dignity and welfare of participants.  
Such terms are known to be subject to misunderstandings (Seedhouse, 
1998) – or at least different understandings will be held by different parties 
and individuals such that the terms cannot provide any real direction to 
those to whom such words are meant to give guidance. 
 
Roy-Toole, a barrister and REC member, has argued that the duty 
to safeguard participants’ rights requires the committees to protect the 
‘legal rights’ of participants and he makes an eloquent case for this (Roy-
Toole, 2008).  However his view was declared “erroneous” in a joint letter 
of response to his article in the subsequent issue of the journal in which it 
appeared, when it was alleged that he had taken the term “out of context” 
(Taylor et al., 2008).  The matter is however, for many, still shrouded in 
uncertainty – what, after all, is the relevant context? 
 
Seedhouse (1998) is well-known for his exposition of the difficulties 
inherent in conceptualizing the term ‘health’, which, as he pointed out, had 
numerous meanings, so much so that it could be said to have no meaning 
other than the one agreed between those who choose to use the term. 
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‘Safety’ too is a subjective concept and, often under the heading of 
‘health and safety’, has been used to put a stop to various traditional 
activities despite there having been no evidence of any harm ever having 
arisen from the activity in question.  Children have been prevented from 
playing conkers in case the shattered seed damaged their eyes, and in 
the run up to the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II, local councils 
were reportedly refusing to put up bunting because it would necessitate 
‘stress-testing’ the lamp-posts. 
 
‘Welfare’ too is so unclear that, for example, despite being subject 
to a legal duty on all employers by virtue of the Health and Safety Act 
1974 (“s.2(1) It shall be the duty of every employer to ensure, so far as is 
reasonably practicable, the… welfare at work of all his employees”) – all 
the evidence points to a universal failure to understand what the legal duty 
might entail and it has never founded a successful prosecution 
(Humphreys, 2007a; 2007b).  The term ‘well-being’ is increasingly used 
instead of ‘welfare’, but suffers from the same ambiguities. 
   
Groenhout noted that such hard-to-define concepts as members of 
ethics committees are supposed to have regard for, require for “their 
definitions … a variety of controversial assumptions about group 
membership, collective responsibility, and [even] the [very] existence of 
standards for defining [for example] well-being” (Groenhout, 2010: 224).  
Rawlinson (2010) went so far as to suggest that such abstract terms are 
in fact designed to deflect the attention of ethics committees from more 
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concrete duties.  The findings reported here incline towards supporting 
these observations.  Such distraction contrasts with the clarity of what the 
medical model advocates and so helps to suggest that as the model to 
concentrate on.  The terms in the NRES mission-statement thus fail to 
provide an abstract-knowledge set capable of countervailing that provided 
by the medical model. 
 
 ‘Dignity’ too is another abstract term which defies pinning-down 
(Harris, 1997; Humphreys, 2010d; Ida, 2004; Pellegrino et al., 2009).  
Several interviewees were asked about this term in particular and those 
who were asked tried to explain it in terms of a then current concern about 
mixed wards in NHS hospitals and the new government’s promise to 
eliminate the practice.  The term had been chosen to ask interviewees 
about because it was felt to have potential to be particularly relevant to 
healthy volunteer trials if one took Kant’s view that dignity is so inherent to 
humanity that it precludes putting a price on any human’s worth.  As such 
this could have afforded a discussion of how the IEC decided whether the 
financial inducement offered to the trial subjects was appropriate (and see 
Humphreys, 2010b, 2010f).  On reflection, and from the experience of the 
interviews, the topic may have been either too advanced or optimistic a 
subject matter, or simply poorly managed.  However it was clear that no 
interviewee was familiar with this philosophical notion.  When asked about 
how they determine whether the payment on offer was appropriate 
interviewees all referred to the fact that their committee required the 
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sponsor to calculate payment on the basis of so much per procedure, per 
diem and so forth. 
 
Another concept that ‘dignity’ could have conjured is the legal one 
of ‘dignity harm’ – the idea that one can be: 
 
“wronged (even though not physically damaged) by having things 
done to them without their full understanding.  If courts…adopt the 
dignity harm concept in the medical research arena, it would surely 
lead to a rapid increase in the number of lawsuits brought against 
researchers” (Menikoff, 2006: 194). 
 
The limited data elicited in the present study though suggested that this 
notion had also not become a prevalent one amongst IEC members, and, 
with the emphasis on the medical model approach, this was unsurprising. 
 
Despite the lack of clarity around these key terms, the out-going 
Chair of the Association of Research Ethics Committees was still able to 
claim that “[t]he main purpose of ethical scrutiny should be to achieve a 
balance between safeguarding the dignity and rights of the research 
participants…” (Anderson-Ford, 2010).  He did not elaborate on the 
meaning of the terms, and the interview data reported here suggest that 
his audience, at best, would perceive such advice as vague – not wrong 
but not helpful either. 
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9.9 Ethicists 
 
Just as Neuberger (1992) complained, some two decades ago, in 
her analysis of NHS RECs, no ethicists were members of IECs.  Hunter 
(2007) has suggested that an ethicist is ideally suited to the lay role and 
Emmerich (2009) bemoaned their ‘surprising absence’.  One (lay) 
interviewee expressed surprise that formal ethics training was neither 
required nor particularly valued.  Two (expert) interviewees however felt 
there was little scope for ethics in Phase I ethics review as both perceived 
the role of the IEC as being to do with science and safety – if the proposal 
passes those twin-criteria, for them, there would be no additional ethical 
problems to be addressed as everything else about the trials was 
perceived as ‘standardised’.  The other interviewees could only express 
uncertainty at best, which the researcher subsequently interpreted to 
indicate an absence of knowledge about the role of ethics.  Hunter and 
Emmerich by contrast concur with the broader literature on bioethics 
which largely favours a place on such committees for sophisticated ethics 
consideration (e.g. Beauchamp and Childress, 2009; De Vries et al., 
2009; Neuberger, 1992). 
 
One problem that might occur with an official ethicist member on a 
committee has been pointed out by a feminist bioethicist who has 
suggested that where, as in some IRBs, bioethicists are involved in 
performing ethics reviews, they can replicate some of the errors they were 
to help prevent: 
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“Too many bioethicists have proudly assumed the same problematic 
role we have criticized in physicians.  It is all too easy to present 
ourselves as neutral, objective experts on dilemmas that touch the 
very essence of the people experiencing them.  According to 
conventional wisdom, the absence of a personal connection to these 
dilemmas is one of the bioethicist’s virtues, enabling her to consider 
all perspectives and interests with fairness and wisdom.  
But…this…too often leads the bioethicist simply to parrot accepted 
principles, pronounce an ideal resolution, and make a quick 
getaway…To a great extent, ‘Doctor knows best’ has been replaced 
by ‘Bioethicist knows best’” (Dresser, 1996: 156-7). 
 
 
This situation again indicates that the ‘expert’ label is itself 
unhelpful.  The term suggests the ‘expert’ is alone privileged with the 
requisite knowledge, and thus cannot be gainsaid:  the experts’ 
pronouncements are those that matter.  By suggesting there is one 
correct way, the expert view always wins out: morality though, as was 
argued earlier, is not about ‘expert’ matters but rather it is about wider 
social concerns. 
  
Under this view one cannot have ‘expert’ ethicists, at least in terms 
of someone indicating that only one moral solution is possible, for: 
 
“moral inquiry is an effort to develop plans for dealing with 
problematic situations that can evoke a shared social commitment, 
the determination of morally appropriate behaviour requires the 
contributions of other members of the moral community who 
participate in reflective moral inquiry.  Thus the ethics consultant 
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cannot simply step in and announce that he or she has the ‘right 
answers’” (Moreno, 2005: 68). 
 
Ethics is then always subjective and as there is nothing to be 
objective about, there can be no experts.  To be moral is merely to have 
concern for others.  Ethics theory, it is true, can provide some tools to 
engage with, but the nearest ‘ethics expertise’ gets is to a depth of 
relevant knowledge and a skilful application of the tools of theories of 
ethics – but this is not moral expertise.  If there was such a thing as moral 
expertise of course there would be no need for a REC as currently 
constituted and determinations would be subject to an expert-only 
membership (albeit with a differently constituted expertise). 
 
Another reason though for the ‘absent ethicist’, it could be argued, 
is that such a position could be perceived as a threat to, or at least 
inconsistent with, the medical professional perspective (Gesang, 2010).  
Medical experts were the least enthusiastic of all the interviewees about a 
training syllabus.  Their scepticism about the value of such an approach 
would certainly be warranted as it would tend to undermine the 
indeterminacy of their professional skills, and result in a rather different – 
less medically oriented – research ethics review.  As peer review by the 
sponsor team of the methodology of the protocol may be relied upon 
(Edwards, 2010a; Humphreys, 2008a, 2011) in combination with the 
separate, independent, review by the MHRA of both the methodology and 
safety aspects of the study, IEC review could have concentrated on other 
matters.  The IEC members interviewed did not see matters quite as 
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clearly however.  Nevertheless NRES, now under the umbrella of the 
Health Research Authority (HRA), has more recently proposed to “explore 
how closer working with funders and the use of information and standards 
from funding decisions, as part of the assessment for regulation and 
governance, could avoid duplication of the review of scientific quality and 
study design [by RECs]” (emphasis added, HRA, 2012: 7).    
 
IECs or ethics committees generally, were not comprised of 
persons who were necessarily expert in the methodology or science of 
any particular study which they may have been asked to review (Collins 
and Evans, 2002).  The interviewees in the study reported here 
acknowledged this fact, but so entrenched was their view of their role that 
they could not clearly foresee such a change in emphasis.  Despite seeing 
the logic of it, they preferred the situation of ‘double checking’ to ensure 
the safety of participants and the very notion that they might leave the 
review of the science to the MHRA was not something members had 
seriously considered.  
9.10 Training   
 
Because IECs have operated as independent bodies for over three 
decades with little, if any, external interference until very recently, they 
have been able to decide what it was that they considered in their review 
and, as the evidence suggests, they had not perceived a particular 
requirement for continual updating or indeed for any initial formal training 
for their members.  Rather, members were made aware of what was 
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expected of them by existing members in an ‘apprentice model’, and as 
IECs were established originally by medical professionals and 
pharmaceutical scientists it was the experts’ biomedical model that was 
always followed.   The existence of this apprentice model, and the degree 
to which training had been neglected, are again findings previously 
unnoticed by the scholarly literature. 
 
As trained clinicians, the findings indicated that they perceived that 
they needed no additional training for their work on an IEC, and that they 
could explain to the lay members what was required.  Within such a 
closed-circle of belief, alternative approaches would betray the certainty of 
the medical profession in its own abilities, competence and jurisdiction 
and could engender cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957).  Their 
professional background may thus have framed their perspective and so 
precluded their seeing the situation any differently.  Thus it is not that 
medical members are deliberately closing out others and alternative 
perspectives, but rather it is simply that their professional background 
urges them to act as the medical professionals they are.   
 
Medical members give expression to their expertise and so to their 
expert role merely by being accepted as members of the profession.  By 
discussing the medicine (IMP) at issue they, in a strong, indeed an 
‘expert’ (and thus clearly ‘right’) sense, have defined what the issues were 
which should be discussed.  If they did not bring in ethics theory this is 
because they did not see it as relevant in their expert-defined approach.  
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Their ‘expert’ role has thus shaped and delimited the scope of what might 
be discussed in the committees.  This has obviated an ethics-focused 
agenda (in favour of a science review) which would be about what was 
the right thing to do so far as society thought it was the right thing to do, 
and expertise was not necessarily so paramount in such a discussion.   
 
The ‘expert’ can thus prevent the full range of ethics issues being 
discussed by privileging certain topics for discussion in the limited time 
available.  This has shackled the ethics from being aspirational, and 
instead limited it to a medical-model of acceptability.  The fact that there 
were ‘experts’ on the committees indicates that it was these individuals’ 
profession’s (fixed) world-view that was to count.  The medium was the 
message (McLuhan, 1967) which the lay members understood. 
 
However this was not at all blatant or overt and it was for instance 
true that the designations of ‘expert’ and ‘lay’ have become largely 
irrelevant to the committees.  As this NHS REC Chair put it “…such a 
distinction seems to be absent or irrelevant these days with the quality 
and quantity of training that is available together with the experience that 
accumulates over 10 years” (Chair, Northern and Yorkshire NHS REC, 
Annual Report 2009-10). 
  
Yet the evidence from the current research qualified such a 
statement by noting that if the training made available could have such an 
effect, the fact that so few have had the training weakens the contention.   
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The evidence does show that members may not necessarily make the 
expert/lay distinction – with members not being clear who was and who 
was not in which category ‘without looking it up’.  One lay member even 
thought him or herself to be the only lay member on their committee, so 
powerful was the capture of members to the biomedical agenda. 
 
 
  So long as the members were capable of performing the functions 
they have defined for themselves, such terms were unimportant, even 
alien.  The committees saw themselves as in existence primarily to protect 
the safety of the participants and to ensure the trial was likely to produce 
the sorts of results expected of it.  Yet such concerns were also the 
concerns of the trial sponsors who will have wished to ensure the trial is 
likely to produce a clear ‘go/no go’ outcome without risking the safety of 
participants, and for these reasons will have ensured that the protocol had 
already have been internally peer-reviewed.  Taubel et al. (2011) even 
noted that the MHRA offer to hold pre-submission meetings with the 
pharmaceutical companies to discuss research before protocols are 
finalised.   Moreno (2005) argued that the clinical researcher already 
typically focused on the science and expected to leave it to the ethics 
committee to straighten-out the moral aspects.  If this is so then it 
becomes more urgent that the roles are thought through, agreed and 
understood widely to ensure sensible use of people’s time and efforts.  
This suggests that education may have a role in helping enable the 
change in existing practices that may be required. 
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9.11 Education 
 
The findings strongly indicated a limited experience of training and 
education of members and that they have essentially learnt their role on 
an apprenticeship model without a clear syllabus (they simply attended 
meetings and replicated what they saw go on).  As such they have stuck 
to the familiar precedents and have tended not to venture into new ways 
of looking at matters.  No interviewee was found to have questioned, for 
example, issues of justice (the most recent addition – or afterthought – to 
the research ethics review process as mandated by US authorities) and 
the findings were that they were largely unaware of what this concept 
meant. 
 
Despite this, when asked, lay members felt that they would be 
better enabled to define their role and have greater confidence vis-à-vis 
the expert members if they had access to education and training that 
adhered to an accepted syllabus.  This approach was seen to be available 
in both the USA and Canada.  In addition there are several university-
based on-line ethics review courses that are freely accessible to anyone 
(Humphreys, 2008d; Ruyter, 2006; Schuklenk, 2005; ten Have, 2007).  
This approach could represent an appropriate way forward for members if 
the science review emphasis is to be thought in need of modification in 
favour of a broader ethics review. 
 
Members of RECs have an obligation, under the terms of their 
appointment, to undertake both initial training and a “minimum of two 
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days’ training a year” (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 
2005: 4, emphasis added) or “You will be required to attend a minimum of 
one training event per year” (letter of appointment) or, at the very least, 
“5.6 As a condition of appointment, a member must agree to take part in 
initial and continuing training and education appropriate to his or her role 
as an REC member” (GAfREC, Department of Health 2001 (para. 4.3.11 
GAfREC, 2011); see also NRES’s Terms of Appointment, 2011, para. 6).  
Whilst Hibbert (2008) gives potentially contradictory information about 
how much training IEC members have received (see her paras. 4.4.10; 
5.5.2 and table 11), the data from the current research indicate that few of 
the interviewees had engaged in much by way of training.  Nevertheless, 
any confusion about the exact ‘requirement’ becomes immaterial as that 
requirement is seen to flex over time and catch up with, rather than 
inform, practice.  As it was, many interviewees did not regard training as 
necessary and several resented having to give up their time without being 
recompensed for it.  The problem has been a contention of long-standing: 
“lay members are not paid, and may even lose income from their regular 
employment” (Nicholson, 1993: 14) and: 
 
“…training.  That’s a real problem.  Most members still have none. 
When we interviewed for a new member recently no candidates 
thought they even needed it!” (Saunders, 1995: 17).  
 
The situation more than a decade later is that little has changed. 
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9.12 Summary and future directions for research 
 
NRES SOPs and GAfREC are clear that a review of the scientific 
merits and design by ECs is inappropriate.  ECs are instead to ensure that 
an adequate independent review of the science, methods and 
methodologies have been undertaken - yet despite such instructions the 
science remained the key focus of IEC review.  If practice differs from 
policy (as expressed in GAfREC and the Standard Operating 
Procedures), the policy was clearly ineffective and the practice arguably 
unethical.  This was a major lesson from this study of the IECs but the 
other findings are no less significant for the scholarly understanding of 
RECs, as much of the extant literature concerning them is now aged.  Of 
particular interest was that ethics guidelines including the Declaration of 
Helsinki were unfamiliar to members of ethics committees.  There was no 
engagement with formal ethics theory; training and education were 
deemed of limited importance, although perhaps more useful for lay 
members; and the expert and lay roles were essentially fictional and even 
unhelpful categories so far as ethics review practice was concerned.  But 
above all the main lesson from the research was that the medical 
profession, at least via its medical model approach to ethics review, was 
still so dominant and shaped the nature of ethics review such that it could 
often more accurately be described as a scientific review – and this even 
where an independent and truly expert scientific review had already 
occurred.  Rather than Freidson’s theory of professional dominance 
having become obsolete (Dingwall, 2008a), the evidence of this research 
suggests that it has been alive and well and can account for the internal 
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workings of IECs and, although further research needs to confirm this, of 
RECs generally too.  It is thus by appreciating the expert-dominance of 
the committees that an understanding of ECs can be best obtained. 
 
No individual is an expert on how other groups should lead their 
lives or how society should respond to particular situations.  If change is 
needed in RECs, as so often it will need to begin with education, but there 
will also be a need to reconsider member roles and for this reason it 
would be appropriate for research to extend the findings reported here, 
and to understand how the (trained) lay members who have either a 
majority, or at least equality in numbers, on their ECs - as is the case in 
New Zealand, Denmark and the Netherlands - operate and perceive their 
role.  The experience of RECs in other countries too, where membership 
of the committees includes more disciplines than just professionals allied 
to medicine will also be of interest – not least under the prompting of 
Hedgecoe’s (2012a) notion of isomorphism: clearly there are different 
ways of organizing RECs, and there is a need to better understand how 
these affect matters. 
 
Quantitative research (not least to anticipate objections from those 
who disfavour qualitative approaches) to identify the extent of role-
understandings of members in NHS and other RECs would also be of 
interest, and for example a survey-questionnaire to discover how familiar 
members are with their SOPs, GAfREC, relevant legislation, guidelines 
and so forth would be of particular interest.  Research amongst members, 
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researchers and the general public would be of great assistance in 
clarifying where the science should be adjudicated upon in the approval 
process.  An understanding of what motivates membership would also be 
of much interest. 
 
Following Evans’ (2012) recent contribution to suggest that there 
was a bioethics profession, it would also be appropriate for comparative 
research into the practices and experiences of members of NRES RECs 
and the numerically much larger body of IRBs.  Although some NRES 
RECs are recognised by the US Federal government for the purposes of 
IRB review, it has anecdotally been reported (personal communication, 
2011) that such RECs are not required to adhere to the federal legislation 
when they come to their decisions. If this is indeed so it is a very odd 
situation indeed and would form the basis of a small but interesting study 
in itself.  
 
The present research has highlighted a concern that traditional 
practices not challenged by sufficient training and education to grant 
independence of thought, reinforced by labels such as ‘expert’ and ‘lay’, 
can occlude from ethics review a broader agenda and so perpetuate a 
professional dominance the committees were composed to tackle.  Such 
findings also have relevance in other professional committee settings 
where a sprinkling of lay representation is intended to act as a mediating 
agent, for the findings have cast a concern over the effectiveness of 
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interposing a few lay members and then expecting the problems they 
were intended to tackle to be resolved. 
 
It is also the case that both the methodology and theoretical 
perspective employed in this research were of particular kinds.  
Theoretical accounts of the professions supervening upon a 
phenomenologically-inspired methodological approach were used to gain 
important insights, and other methodologies and theoretical perspectives 
could have provided other interesting insights.  Thus the research does 
not so much claim to have proven anything, but rather it has revealed a 
situation that has hitherto not been brought to the prominence it is 
suggested that is deserved.  Part of this too has been in the showing that 
Freidson’s theory of professional dominance (1970) still has relevance in 
contemporary society, even if it does not quite have the wider import it 
had when he first developed it. 
 
It is hoped too that such concerns as this research has highlighted 
can now be aired for wider clarification and, the researcher hopes, the 
development of the ethics review system.  Ethics review needs to 
consider the scientific and methodological aspects of studies – but only to 
the extent of confirming that such considerations have been given the 
specialist, independent, attention they need.  For a REC to again review 
the science, is to do an injustice to the research process.  This issue 
needs to be agreed upon if progress is to be made.  One starting point 
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would be to consider specifying the duties of, or even the need for, expert 
members on a REC. 
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Appendix 1 
Glossary 
 
 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
AAPEC Appointing Authority for Phase I (independent) Ethics 
Committees 
AREC Association of Research Ethics Committees 
Authorised REC able to provide an ethics review of non-CTIMP research 
involving NHS patients 
COREC Central Office for Research Ethics Committees (predecessor to 
NRES) 
CTIMPs Clinical trials of investigational medicinal products 
Declaration of Helsinki Medical ethics guidance issued by the World 
Medical Association 
FTIH First-time in human trials 
GAfREC Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics Committee (see     
Department for Health (2001, 2011)) 
HRA Health Research Authority 
IMP Investigational Medicinal Product 
IEC Independent Ethics Committee 
IRB Institutional Review Board (USA) 
LREC Local [NHS] REC (term now replaced by committee types) 
MHRA Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency 
MREC Multi-centre [NHS] REC (term now replaced by committee types) 
NRES National Research Ethics Service (successor body to COREC, 
managerially responsible for the organisation of NHS RECs) 
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Phase 0 The pre-clinical stage of drug testing in animals (in vivo), using 
human and/or animal cell-tissue (in vitro) and/or by computer simulation 
(in silico) 
Phase I First clinical stage of a drug trial, involves humans (healthy 
volunteers) for whom there is no expectation of gaining any medical 
benefit from the trial.  Aims to identify the safety and tolerability of the 
compound.  Usually involves up to 100 volunteers, and lasts up to several 
months.  Includes FTIH studies. 
Phase I/II Sometimes used to describe a Phase I trial of an oncological 
(or other) preparation where toxicology is expected such that the IMP 
cannot be given to a healthy volunteer  
Phase II The IMP is first tested in a patient group.  Usually double-blinded 
and involving several hundred patient-volunteers.  May last up to two 
years. 
Phase III The IMP is tested in much larger groups of patients often 
involving thousands of patients in several sites and countries.  May last 
several years.  Provides the data required to decide if the medication can 
obtain a marketing authorization 
Phase IV Post-marketing testing of a drug (usually in comparison with 
other marketed drugs) 
PIS Participant Information Sheet(s) 
REB Research Ethics Board (Canada) 
REC Research Ethics Committee 
Recognised REC able to provide an ethics review of CTIMP research 
SOP Standard Operating Procedure 
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Type I REC able to provide an ethics review of CTIMP research in healthy 
volunteers 
Type II REC able to provide an ethics review of CTIMP research involving 
NHS patients in a single (NHS) region 
Type III REC able to provide an ethics review of CTIMP research 
involving NHS patients anywhere in the UK 
USPHS United States Public Health Service 
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NHS REC Composition 
    
Appendix 2a 
 
Number of members 
   
 
Experts Lay 
   REC Medical  Other 
    Derbyshire 4 3 5 
   IoW, Portsmouth & SE Hants 5 3 4 
   London (N) East 1 10 2 6 
   Essex 2 4 7 4 
   Newcastle & N Tyne 1 4 8 4 
   Sunderland 4 6 3 
   Oxford C 4 6 8 
   Kent 3 9 5 
   London (N) North 2 3 6 6 
   Bradford 6 4 4 
   Leeds East 4 5 5 
   Leeds West 9 0 5 
   Cambridgeshire 4 4 7 4 
   London (N) East 2 4 6 7 
   South West 1 3 5 2 
   London (S) SE5 5 4 6 
   North West 5 5 5 4 
   Leeds Central 4 4 5 
   Norfolk 2 6 5 
   North West 4 4 6 4 
   London (N) N.West 1 4 1 9 
   Cambridgeshire 1 3 8 6 
   Cambridgeshire 3 3 8 6 
   Lincoln, Northants, Rutland 1 6 3 4 
   Lincoln, Northants, Rutland 2 3 4 5 
   North West 3 6 2 6 
   West Mids 6 4 4 
   South West 2 5 4 4 
   London (S) SE4 3 6 8 
   Notts 1 4 3 5 
   North West 1 5 5 6 
   North West 2 4 6 6 
   North West 6 5 5 5 
   North West 7 5 4 5 
   North West 8 4 5 7 
   North West 9 5 2 7 
   North West 10 3 6 6 
   North West 12 4 5 6 
   Southampton & SW Hants 1 3 9 5 
   London (N) Central 4 8 2 6 
   Essex 1 4 3 9 
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Co. Durham & Tees Valley 6 4 7 
   North West 11 4 4 5 
   Berkshire 6 4 5 
   Oxford A 4 4 6 
   Oxford B 2 5 5 
   Southampton & SW Hants 2 6 2 6 
   Coventry & Warks 5 4 5 
   South West 4 4 2 5 
   South West 5 5 3 5 
   London (N) Central 2 4 4 6 
   London (N) North 1 3 6 7 
   London (N) North 3 2 6 8 
   London (N) N. West 2 5 5 5 
   London (N) West 1 5 4 6 
   London (N) West 3 7 4 6 
   London (S) SE2 6 4 4 
   London (S) SERec 7 3 7 
   London (S) SW1 4 5 4 
   London (S) SW3 3 4 8 
   Sheffield 6 5 5 
   S. Yorks 8 4 5 
   Cambridgeshire 2 7 4 5 
   Hertfordshire 5 4 7 
   Notts 2 5 4 4 
   Trent 6 5 5 
   Newcastle & N Tyne 2 6 3 4 
   Northern & Yorks 7 4 5 
   Brighton East 6 6 5 
   Brighton West 7 2 4 
   Surrey 6 3 5 
   B'ham, East, North & Solihull 5 4 6 
   Black Country 8 2 5 
   S. B'ham 7 4 3 
   South West 3 6 3 5 
   London (N) Central 1 5 4 7 
   London (N) Central 3 7 3 7 
   London (N) East Central 4 6 4 
   London (N) East 3 5 3 7 
   London (N) West 2 8 2 6 
   London (N) SE1 4 4 5 
   London (N) SE3 7 2 4 
   London (N) SW2 8 3 4 
   
 
415 358 448 
   
 
33.99% 29.32% 36.69% 
   
 
63.31% 36.69% 
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Appendix 2b: Proportion of members by category in IECs 
 
 
IEC Medics Other experts All experts Lay 
Capenhurst 2008/9 4 3 7 6 
Capenhurst 
2009/10 
4 3 7 6 
Edinburgh 2008/9 8 3 11 7 
Edinburgh 2009/10 7 3 10 7 
Plymouth 2008/9 4 3 7 4 
Plymouth 2009/10 2 3 5 6 
Reading 2008/9 1 6 7 3 
Reading 2009/10 1 6 7 5 
Welwyn 2008/9 3 7 10 9 
Welwyn 2009/10 4 7 11 9 
Yorkshire 2008/9 4 3 7 5 
Yorkshire 2009/10 4 4 8 4 
Totals 46 (47.5%) 51 (52.5%) 97 (57.75%) 71 (42.25%) 
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Appendix 3 
Participant Information Sheet               
 
1. Study title: Member role perception in independent Phase I research ethics committees 
 
2. Invitation 
 
You are invited to participate in a one-to-one interview to discuss your experience of being a 
member of an ethics committee which reviews Phase I studies involving healthy volunteers. 
 
3. What is the purpose of the study? 
 
This qualitative study seeks to understand the perceptions of members of Phase I ethics 
committees about various aspects of the review process and their involvement in it. 
 
The research findings are intended to help shape the debate about member roles and may 
influence future recruitment and development strategies. 
 
4. Why have I been chosen? 
 
Committee co-ordinators have been asked to forward this information sheet to members of 
their committee.  By obtaining a variety of members’ views the researcher hopes to learn 
about member perceptions of the roles. 
 
5. Do I have to take part? 
 
No.  It is entirely up to you.  And you will be able to decline to answer any question(s) or 
withdraw at any time without having to justify yourself. 
 
6. What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
You will be invited to meet with the researcher at a time and place to suit you in order to 
engage in an informal interview about the lay and expert member role.  The interview will 
be audiotape recorded (with your permission), you will not be identified in any research 
output, you will be paid any travelling expenses, and, in recognition of your time, £100 will 
be given to a registered charity of your choice. 
 
7.  What do I have to do? 
 
Please contact the researcher by email (s.j.humphreys@herts.ac.uk) in the first instance to 
arrange an interview and/or to ask any questions you may have about the study.  You may 
care to give a telephone number and indicate when you would like to be contacted. 
 
8. What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
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By participating in this research, you will have an opportunity to reflect on your experience 
and contribute your knowledge towards a greater understanding of members’ roles.  The 
findings should help inform wider understanding of the roles and gain insight in to the views 
of current members. 
 
9.  What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
  
The researcher is not aware of any.  Your confidentiality will be fully respected and no 
interviewee will be identifiable.  If you do not wish to answer any question(s) you will not 
have to.  You may retract any statements you make and these will not be included in the 
research.  You will be able to ask questions of the interviewer. 
 
10. What if there is a problem? 
 
The researcher or his supervisors (Professors Martin r.martin@herts.ac.uk and Thomas 
h.a.thomas@herts.ac.uk ) may be contacted as appropriate. 
 
11. Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
 
Interviews will be transcribed either by the researcher or a secretary and your 
confidentiality will be maintained.  Tapes will be erased after transcription and the 
anonymised transcripts themselves will be destroyed after seven years.  Interviewees will 
not be identifiable in any resultant publication(s). 
 
12. What will happen to the results of the study? 
 
The research findings will be submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals.  A 
summary of findings will be provided to all interested participants. 
 
13. Who is organizing and funding the research? 
 
The study has been designed, and shall be conducted, by the researcher who is a doctoral 
student at the University of Hertfordshire.  It is not externally funded.  The university has 
insurance in place to cover approved student research. 
 
14.  Who has reviewed this study? 
 
The University of Hertfordshire’s Faculty of Health and Human Sciences’ ethics committee 
has reviewed and approved this study under reference NMSCC/11/09/6/A. 
 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand this information sheet, been given a 
copy of it, and have had the opportunity to consider the information.  Any 
questions I may have had about my participation have been answered 
satisfactorily.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.  I consent to taking part in 
this study. 
 
Name of Participant: ___________________________________  
 
Signature: ___________________________________ Date: _______________   
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Appendix 4 
Algorithm for membership of NRES committees 
 
Stage 
 
1. Are you a current or retired member of the medical or dental profession?     
           Yes: 
You are an Expert Member 
 
No 
 
2. Are you a current or former professional statistician?       
           Yes: 
       As a statistician did your role 
 include a period advising on 
 the statistics of clinical research? 
Yes: You are an Expert Member  
 
No 
 
3. Are you (indicate) a current or former pharmacist, nurse, midwife, optician, osteopath, chiropractor, paramedic, 
physiotherapist, arts therapist, biomedical scientist, chiropodist, clinical scientist, dietitian, hearing aid dispenser, 
occupational therapist, operating department practitioner, orthoptist, orthotist, practitioner psychologist, podiatrist, 
prosthetist, radiographer, or speech and language therapist?        
           Yes 
Are you still in practice or did you  
practise within the past 5 years?  
Yes: You are an Expert Member  
No 
 
4. Are, or have you been (indicate) either (i) a provider of medical, dental or nursing care (ii) involved in the 
conduct of clinical research (other than as a subject of such research) or (indicate) (iii) a chairman, member, 
director, officer or employee of an NHS Trust, health authority or dental board?    
            
           Yes: 
You are lay member 
No 
 
You are a lay+ member 
 
 
Having followed the above algorithm and having reached stage____ I believe myself to be: 
 
 
An EXPERT member 
 
 A LAY member 
 
 A LAY+ member 
 
 
 
 
Applicant: Name:    Signed:    Date: 
 
 
 
For NRES use:  
 
 
 
